JAPAN-VIETNAM

A Relation under Influences



Guy Faure and Laurent Schwab

Institut de recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine

Japan-Vietnam

A Relation under influences

Guy Faure and Laurent Schwab

DOI: 10.4000/12egg
Publisher: Institut de recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine, National university of Singapore press
Place of publication: Singapour
Year of publication: 2008
Publication date: 2 octobre 2024
Series: NUS Press-IRASEC Studies on Southeast Asia
Digital ISBN: 978-2-35596-067-3

OpenEdition Books
https://books.openedition.org

Print edition
ISBN (Print version): 978-9971-69-389-3
Number of pages: xv-177

DIGITAL REFERENCE

Faure, Guy, and Laurent Schwab. *Japan-Vietnam*. Institut de recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine, National university of Singapore press, 2008, https://doi.org/10.4000/12egg.

This text was automatically generated on 9 octobre 2024.

The PDF format is issued under the Licence OpenEdition Books unless otherwise stated.

The ePub format is issued under the Licence OpenEdition Books unless otherwise stated.

ABSTRACT

Japan, the reigning economic giant of East Asia, and Vietnam, an industrializing socialist country in Southeast Asia with strong links to China, occupy worlds that seem not to intersect. Yet

historical connections between the two countries date back at least to the fourteenth century, when a Japanese merchant community flourished in the city of Hoi An.
As Guy Faure and Laurent Schwab point out, relations between the two countries have been greatly influenced by outside powers. In the late nineteenth century, confronted by Western colonialism, Vietnamese nationalists took refuge in Japan and sought inspiration from Japan s economic development and resistance to the West. During the Pacific War Japan s imperial army virtually occupied Vietnam, albeit under a treaty agreement with France. And American B52 bombers flew sorties during the Vietnam War from bases in Okinawa, which made Tokyo an enemy in the eyes of Hanoi. However, the new century has brought a growing convergence of interests and the beginnings of a new relationship based on an emerging convergence of interests.

GUY FAURE

Guy FAURE has studied at the Osaka University of Foreign Studies, Nagoya University, and Chuo University. He holds a PhD in Politics from the EHESS Paris and is presently Director of the French Research Center on Contemporary Southeast Asia in Bangkok (IRASEC), and Research Fellow at French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS).

LAURENT SCHWAB

Laurent SCHWAB has a PhD in macroeconomics from the University of Paris IV (Sorbonne), and has lived for fourteen years in Southeast Asia, mainly in Thailand and Vietnam. He has worked for the United Nations (ESCAP) and as a consultant and educator.

JAPAN-VIETNAM

A Relation under Influences

The Eastern face of Asia



JAPAN-VIETNAM
A Relation under Influences

Guy Faure & Laurent Schwab

NUS PRESS
SINGAPORE

© 2008 NUS Press
National University of Singapore
AS3-01-02, 3 Arts Link
Singapore 117569

Fax: (65) 6774-0652
E-mail: nusbooks@nus.edu.sg
Website: http://www.nus.edu.sg/npu

ISBN 978-9971-69-389-3 (Paper)

All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

National Library Board Singapore Cataloguing in Publication Data

Faure, Guy.
Japan-Vietnam: a relation under influences /Guy Faure & Laurent Schwab.
– Singapore: NUS Press, ©2008.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-9971-69-389-3 (pbk.)

1. Japan – Relations – Vietnam. 2. Vietnam – Relations – Japan. I. Schwab, Laurent. II. Title.

DS849
303.482520597 — dc22 SLS2007035469

First published in French in 2004 by Institut de Recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est Contemporaine (IRASEC).

Typeset by: Scientifik Graphics
Printed by : Mainland Press Pte Ltd

Contents

List of Maps, Graphs, Tables and Boxes

Maps

Graphs

Tables

Boxes

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the many people who have helped us in our endeavour. First of all, we received learned advice from academics, especially Professor Masaya Shiraishi, Historian from Waseda University, who showed us the way through his works on the subject. We also express our thanks to Derek Massarella, Professor of History at Chuo University, for his bibliographical help in the introduction, Christopher Goscha, and Agathe Larcher for their help in the part that deals with the Indochina's colonial history and the Japanese occupation, and Gene Gregory, expert consultant on Japan, now residing in Vietnam. Besides, we owe special thanks to Ly Toan Quan, author of the thesis "Géopolitique du Vietnam", defended at the University of Paris 1 in 2000, who helped us a lot during his stay in Vietnam for the part of our work that covers the period before the Pacific War. We must also thank all the students of the Master Asian Affairs of the University of Lyon 2 who, in the framework of an internship at the University of Economics of Ho Chi Minh City, carried out documentation work for our project. We wish to acknowledge Paul Kratoska for his precious comments to improve and correct the English edition. Lastly, we would like to express our gratitude to all the Japanese and Vietnamese personalities who kindly spared time to answer our questions.

Foreword

A century ago, the Western Pacific area was divided by the colonial powers; and half a century ago, it was faced with the Cold War confrontation. If one compares the present-day situation in the region with that of the recent past, the contrast is indeed remarkable. The region is now moving toward the creation ofa cohesive mechanism. Following the expansion of ASEAN to include ten members and the establishment ofthe ASEAN+3framework, the regional members started a new effortwith the holding ofthe first East Asia Summit in late 2005, whose ultimate goal is the formation of "East Asia Community".

Japan and Vietnam are members ofthe institutionalised framework of ASEAN+3 and also the would-be-born community of East Asia. Hanoi is located about 4,000 km south ofTokyo, i.e. about a five-hour flight by airplane. Geographically the two countries are rather close, but politically they had been long separated by various factors.

By the end ofthe 19th century, Japan not only was able to maintain its independence but started expanding her sphere of influence over her neighbouring countries, while Vietnam fell into the hands of a Western colonial power. During the 1940s, Japan brutally entered the Nampo (Southern Region), the area now called Southeast Asia, a part of which was Vietnam. After the end of the Second World War, Japan became an ally of the USA, while Vietnam had to fight against the French during the 1940s and 1950s and with the Americans during the 1960s and 1970s. Right after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, positive signs for the development ofstrengthened relations emerged between the two countries. However the honey-moon period was too short, interrupted by the sudden outbreak of the Cambodia Conflict in 1978.

It was only after Vietnam's adoption of the Doi Moi policy in 1986 and especially after the conclusion ofthe 1991 peace accords on Cambodia that the two countries entered a new era. Since then, bilateral relations have developed rather smoothly and steadily. Japan is now the biggest donor of official developmental assistance, the biggest investor on the basis ofreal disbursement, and one ofthe best trade partners ofVietnam.

Streets in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are crowded with Japanese motorcycles and automobiles. Shops and markets are full of electronics and other consumer goods of Japanese brands. All of them used to be imported from Japan and other countries where the Japanese makers had established their factories, but nowadays many of them are assembled and produced in Vietnam.

Tokyo has now many Vietnamese restaurants, reflecting the increased interests in this exotic and tropical country. Handicrafts, ceramics and lacquer ware that are made in Vietnam have become fashionable objects for Japanese customers. Meanwhile, many Japanese consumers purchase Vietnamese products such as frozen shrimps, footwear and clothes, probably unaware of the country of origin.

The number ofJapanese visitors to Vietnam for sight-seeing, shopping and business has reached nearly 300,000 annually. More than 3,000 Japanese are living in major cities in Vietnam. At the same time, about 1,500 Vietnamese students are now studying in Japan.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been also very intimate. Mutual visits oftop leaders are frequent. The Japanese government has not only contributed to the upgrading and construction ofthe infrastructure in Vietnam, but has also helped the transition to a market economy and the development oflegal and other systems. Both countries have conducted various dialogues in many fields. The Tokyo government has sent two cultural missions to Vietnam in order to further develop exchange activities in this field. Japan regards Vietnam as one ofher best friends among East Asian countries. The two countries are historically located at the periphery ofthe Sinicised World and therefore share many common cultural elements. Whereas the Chinese and South Koreans have very complex feelings toward Japan, which sometimes burst into hostile demonstrations, the Vietnamese generally hold friendlier feelings and are much more sympathetic. To this day, there have been no anti-Japanese movements. Japan has positively supported Vietnam's integration into the global community as well as ASEAN and the Mekong sub-region. And she hopes now that Vietnam is a good partner in the ASEAN+3 framework and the future East Asia Community.

Vietnam, on the other hand, may have a more cautious attitude concerning her partnership with Japan. Needless to say, Vietnam appreciates greatly the contributions and support that Japan has made thus far, and further expects and welcomes Japanese collaboration in the future. However, as a "small country" (often described as such by the Vietnamese themselves), she has to survive fierce competition in the region and the

world, where "major powers" are predominant in every aspect. In order to pursue her own national interests, Vietnam sometimes needs to carefully walk on a tight rope and keep a balance among the "major powers" who are in competition with each other. According to many Vietnamese analysts, three "major powers", namely the USA, China and Japan, play power games especially in the Asia-Pacific theatre. Under these circumstances, it is necessary for Vietnam to keep a free-hand as much as possible.

At any rate, Japan and Vietnam have enjoyed a cooperative and amicable relationship for more than a decade since the early 1990s. The two countries have never enjoyed such a long period ofamity in the past (with the possible exception of the Hoi An period in the 16th and 17th centuries). I am very sure that this good relationship will continue for many years to come.

The English version of Guy Faure and Laurent Schwab's work (originally published in French in 2004) comes out, at the very moment when the East Asia region is witnessing important changes and when Japan and Vietnam are about to enter the next stage in mutual relations following a decade and a halfofa honey-moon period. At the same time, more than 15 years have passed since my own work on a similar topic was published in English (in 1990). Naturally, my book does not cover the period after Vietnam's adoption of the Doi Moi policy. Therefore, a new book which discusses more recent developments in Japan-Vietnam relations in a comprehensive manner has been eagerly awaited. In this regard, the publication ofFaure and Schwab's English book is very timely.

One thing to note is that the authors are neither Japanese nor Vietnamese. They have however good reasons to publish this book. First, they are well-trained specialists who understand deeply both Japan and Vietnam. Second, being the citizens of a third country, they can keep a fair (if not neutral) position between Japan and Vietnam.

I am convinced that the readers will learn immensely from their informative and insightful book. I congratulate them on their successful work.

Masaya Shiraishi
Professor in International Relations
Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies
Waseda University

May 2006, Tokyo

INTRODUCTION

A History of Bridges from Hoi An to Danang

Today the Japanese have become great builders of works of art, particularly tunnels and bridges. During the post-war period, infrastructure such as ports, railways and roads as well as big facilities such as dams and electricity plants, were carried out in large numbers in Asia by the Japanese. This was made possible because ofwar damages and thanks to developmental aid. To a certain extent, their big Public Works companies remodeled Asian cities. Before this recent period, the Japanese had left only very few traces of their passage or colonial occupation in Asia, whether in Korea, Manchuria or Taiwan which still retain a few administrative buildings and industrial installations, but very little compared to what had been left by the former European imperial powers in their ex-colonies.

In central Vietnam, however, we find a strange bridge believed to have been constructed by the Japanese who had lived between the 17th century in the small town of Hoi An, a historical jewel that has been miraculously saved from the past and recent wars and very recently declared a world heritage site by the UNESCO. This small bridge constitutes the most remarkable evidence of an earlier presence. It is known as Bridge Pagoda (Chua Cau) or Lai Vien Kieu (bridge of far-away visitors) and is believed to have served to connect the Japanese to the Chinese quarter.

This historical monument kindles our interest in "bridges", which are both a symbol and a characteristic feature ofJapan's presence in Asia. Some of these symbols, however, have been cast into negative light in the public consciousness, like the famous "Bridge on the River Kwai", which was popularised by a well-known film based on Pierre Boule's

novel. The new emblematic bridges are more positive like the one recently constructed at Danang. In this modern port, that has replaced Hoi An, silted for centuries now, the Japanese have recently finished constructing a superb bridge. It is a coincidence that these two works ofart just a few kilometres apart, are separated by many centuries. They could well-illustrate the relation between the two countries.

We can also cite the construction of the Hoang Long Bridge and the Ham Rong viaduct in Thanh Hóa province in North Vietnam, which were inaugurated in November2000 by Prime Minister Phan Van Khai. Part of the first phase of an ambitious project of renovating works of art on National Highway 1 with Japanese aid, the project is the outcome ofa partnership between the Thang Long Company and a Japanese firm, Sumitomo Group.

According to the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Vietnamese Institute of Transport and Communications Development Strategy, the construction of 38 bridges in 17 provinces in the Mekong delta is in the pipeline. Out of this, the Japanese government will give a non-refundable aid to construct 21 bridges and supply steel girders for 17 others, the construction of which is Vietnam's responsibility. Other big builders could, however, lay claim to this symbol, to begin with, the French whose Doumer Bridge at Hanoi is definitely a remarkable structure in the landscape and in the history oftheir presence in Vietnam. Yet, what enhances the analogy in the Japanese case is that the Japanese seem to have made it their specialty to construct bridges between the "banks"ofrival nations in Asia and particularly in Southeast Asia, a favoured area ofJapanese diplomacy. So much so that this typical Japanese approach of striving to connect, more or less successfully, nations separated by past or present conflicts, was called "bridge diplomacy" in the post-war period. Admittedly, Japanese diplomacy does not have a monopoly in this area, but the bridge image is in line with their style of diplomacy, particularly in this region.

Thus symbolism and reality coincide as in the case ofthe Friendship Bridge over the Mekong, that was financed by the Australians and connects Laos (a few kilometres from Vientiane, the capital) to the city of Nong Khai in North Thailand, its powerful and dreaded neighbour. In 1993, the Japanese built the Cambodia Japan Friendship Bridge (Chroy Changwar Bridge) in Cambodia and in December 2001, the Kizuna Bridge (meaning "the link" in Japanese), the country's biggest bridge on the Mekong. It is true that the Mekong River is the common point in

continental Southeast Asia. It should have connected the people but for a long time it separated them by serving as a border between the nations of the region. In the past, the river represented the dashed hopes of the French who saw in it as a possible access to South China, by providing a vertical axis to their regional expansion. Today, crossing the Mekong has replaced going up the Mekong and has thus substituted the vertical axis envisaged by the French by a horizontal axis leading to the increase in exchanges within the peninsula. The Japanese, along with others, were very much involved in the main development projects around the Mekong basin, as much through their institutions and also their companies and NGOs that are very active in this part of the world.

Through its contemporary history, Vietnam, in its independence struggle during the Indochina War and more so during the Vietnam War led by the Americans, occupies a special place in the memory and collective way of thinking of the Japanese. Their feelings about this country were very well-conveyed by a Japanese expression that summarised their situation in the face of this terrible conflict. This expression "fire from the other side of the river" (Taigan no Kasai), means that a major event does not really affect us as long as we are on the opposite side, safe and beyond its reach. Thomas Haven made use of this image for the title of his book on the Vietnam War from the Japanese angle: Fire Acrossthe Sea, the Vietnam War and Japan 1965–1975.

Even though Japan was away from the Vietnamese conflict, on the other side ofthe Pacific, so to speak, it had front-row seats in the military operations theatre. In fact, the archipelago was soon to be transformed into a formidable aircraft carrier for the Asia-Pacific American Forces, with bases spread over all over its territory, without which this war would not have been possible, according to American military chiefs. But in spite of themselves, the Japanese were one of the essential pillars of the air and naval "bridge" between the two enemies. It was an ambiguous situation and a source of discomfort for the Japanese to find themselves de facto accomplices of a war that they did not want and the futility of which they soon became aware. This frustration was the cause of a new Japanese approach, not only towards Vietnam but also the whole Asian region. With respect to the American experience in Asia, Japan built its own vision of the zone. This new vision corresponds of course to a complete revision of the pre-war concept known as the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" that envisaged placing the region as a whole under Tokyo's political aegis and military control. Now Japan defends

the idea of an Asian coherence in Asia-Pacific, a new spatial concept popularised by Japan in the 1970s, both within the concerned region and also outside it.

Thus for the Japanese, Vietnam occupies a special place in Asia though it cannot vie with some of its neighbours in the sphere of economic attractions for Japan. It does not have any of the strategic wealth of the Indonesian Archipelago in terms of raw materials or oil, nor is it the key component of Japan's industrial and commercial set-up. This place is occupied by Thailand, the Land of the Rising Sun's leading partner, and home to more than 30,000 Japanese expatriates. Yet Vietnam takes on great importance in the eyes of the Japanese. In fact, this country has become indispensable, not only for the stability ofSoutheast Asia, but also for North Asia because it is a hub serving as a "geographical, political and cultural bridge" between the two regional entities formed by Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. The former, however much it is influenced by ASEAN's political clout, is today a reality. The latter still exists only on paper, but most probably one day it will become a coherent geopolitical reality.

So, given their very challenging nature, Nippo-Vietnamese relations must be better analysed, and not merely by a simple monographic study of bilateral relations. Japanese diplomatic action that is easily underestimated by summarising its international situation using the well-known but reductive assertion that Japan is "an economic giant but political dwarf" must be viewed in a better perspective. We will see that Indochina and Southeast Asia have enabled Japan to return to the international scene but this important fact in itself is nowhere near the perspective of regional integration in the widest sense and the important question in the background is that of China's gaining a foothold in the peninsula, thanks to its southern province, Yunnan, which is connected to its southern neighbours by the Mekong River.

The current context, with Japan's reduction ofits public development aid in a bid to turn around its economy, and with China's predominance in all fields, including aid, throws up the question ofwhat place Vietnam, as an ASEAN member, will come to occupy in the Japanese and Chinese chessboard. In other words, is the Indo-Chinese Peninsula an important stake, or merely secondary to the rivalry being played out between the two big Asian powers?

Part One

Japan's Presence and Influences in the Past

Exodus to the East

東遊

CHAPTER 1

Japan's Modernisation as Seen from Hanoi

Peaceful Trade Expansion in the 16th and 17th Centuries

Noël Péri has a rare double qualification — he was a distinguished expert on Japan, as well as a specialist on Indochina. In the 1920s, as a member of the École Française d'Extrême-Orient (French School for Far Eastern Studies), he carried out a study on Japan's relations with the countries that constituted French Indo-China. Unfortunately, he died in 1922, without completing the thesis that he had started writing. Nonetheless, in 1924, the early chapters of his work appeared in the Bulletin de l'École Francaise d'Extrême-Orient.[1] His research pertained to both Japan's trade with the peninsula and its presence in the region. However, only the parts relating to maritime traffic and Japanese ships trading with the peninsula were published in their entirety in the bulletin. In the interest of Japanese establishments in Southeast Asia, though, there are many outstanding monographs written by Japanese researchers, revolving around nihonmachi — a term literally meaning "Japanese towns", but which refers mostly to rather more modest settlements, trading posts and colonies. Scholars like Péri have left us Shogun archives which give a detailed view on trade between Japan and Southeast Asia during the 16th and 17th centuries. Japanese authorities established

under the fiefdom ofpowerful Shogun Toyotomi Hideyoshi were known for having a system of authorisation known as shuin-jô, or "red-seal licence", which entailed the granting of a sort of license or passport for overseas navigation and trading. This control system imposed by the feudal regime gives us relatively precise information about the movements of ships authorised to navigate, their destinations, the ship-owners as well as their cargo. A first set of figures tells us that out of around ten ports that were given authorisation, seven belonged to Indo-China, four ofwhich were situated in present-day Vietnam. Two-thirds ofthe permits mention Faifo, today's Hoi An, as a destination. Trading with the kingdoms situated in modern-day Vietnam represented an essential percentage of the region's trade, in terms of volume. In the order of importance, we find trade with Annam, Cochin-China (although the distinction between the two kingdoms was quite blurred at that time), followed by Tonkin. Trade with this part of the world mainly consisted of Japanese imports of silk, textiles, ceramics and tea. On the export side, the Japanese sold a variety ofproducts, notably military equipment. The silk trade was so vital, that a "maritime silk route" was spoken of.[2] For a long time, Japan depended on Chinese supplies of these products, but these were disrupted increasingly often by the incessant activities of Chinese and Japanese pirates, known as wakos, who preyed on ships along the Chinese coasts, thereby forcing the Japanese to find sources in a less dangerous region.

This situation partially accounts for the fact that while trade was mostly with China in the 15th century, by the 16th and 17th centuries, Japan had expanded trade in Southern Asia. Consumption of tea, however, did not enjoy widespread popularity in the mid-16th century. However, Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiteru (1532–54) liked it very much and contributed to making the fortune of the Nakajimas, a Samurai family that owned a famous teahouse or chaya, as they are known in Japanese. The name chaya replaced the Nakajima patronymic and it was under this name that the family came to be known in Vietnam. In his study, Péri records that several letters to the king of Annam are "sufficient to establish that the name of Chaya was favourably known in Cochin-China and enjoyed real prestige here".[3] A letter dated 1628 mentions that a war had just been declared between Cochin-China and Tonkin.

The Lord ofHué, who was aware that Japanese ships supplying him arms also supplied his adversaries in the North, tried to make use of the Chaya family's influence with the Shogun to forbid not only arms

supplies to his enemies but also put an end to trade with Tonkin. Another letter dated 1635 reiterates this demand made by the king of Annam to Chaya Shirojiro of the Nakajima family: "Send merchant ships here every year regularly to maintain good relations (…); in future ifany ship goes to Dong-Kinh (Tonkin), which is my enemy's province, give authorisation to sell only other goods; I ask that the two officers of the ships impose a ban on carrying sulphur, copper vessels, bullets and guns…. If you sincerely follow my instructions, I shall be greatly obliged to you."

This flourishing trade with Southeast Asia soon enabled the Japanese to establish themselves in the region. At first, there were simple trading posts and in some places, more developed Japanese towns, nihonmachis, but they never became truly populated colonies. Hence, no just comparison can be made between the Japanese presence and the larger migratory movements of the Asian diaspora, predominantly consisting of the Chinese. The residents ofthese towns were sailors, merchants, ronins — samurais without a master, in other words, soldiers of fortune. Some of them served as personal bodyguards of Khmer and Siamese monarchs.[4] Nihonmachiscould be found in Dielaos and San Miguel in the Philippines, at Faifo (Hoi An), Tourane (today's Danang) in Vietnam, at Ayutthaya in Siam, as well as in Cambodia.

Ofall these Japanese settlements, Hoi An is the best known because it is the best preserved. Hoi An, a flourishing port city, reached the zenith ofits prosperity during the 17th century and in the first halfofthe 18th century. It was at this time that it became a port of registry for many foreign merchants. Right from the 16th century, Japanese merchants were active traders, as were others such as the Portuguese and Chinese. The city ofHoi An, mentioned by Father de Faria in 1576, was described in detail in Christoforo Borri's diary in 1618: "The city of Faifo is so vast that one would think it is two juxtaposed cities; a Chinese city and a Japanese city." Japanese merchants made an appearance in Hoi An towards the end ofthe 16th century; particularly after the edict promulgated by Shogun Yeyasu Tokugawa in 1592, authorising trade with South Asian countries. Following the Chinese example, the Japanese settled down, bought lands and fields and married Vietnamese women. In the course of time, they established a Japanese quarter, which they administered and where they imposed their own customs. The location of the Japanese quarter is now known: it is in the Tran Phu Street neighbourhood.[5]

With the subsequent arrival ofDutch, British and French merchants, the port continued to develop further in the 17th and 18th centuries. However, the establishment of the first Dutch trading post in 1636 marked the beginning of the decline of the Japanese presence. In fact, at this time, the Shogun forbade sea voyages and maintaining relations with foreign countries. This historic decision isolated Japan for two centuries; the sakoku (closure) period came to an end only upon the arrival of the American fleet under Commander Perry in the mid-19th century.

The Meiji era, which took its appellation from the name taken by the new Emperor Mutsu Hito when he began his reign in 1868, was a period of rapid modernisation for the Japanese Empire. The emperor soon proved to be an excellent student of the West in all fields, solving the double-quandary confronting all non-Western people who faced foreign imperialism: First, finding an appropriate response to the threat the big powers posed to their independence and territorial sovereignty. The second, of an intellectual and cultural nature: becoming 'modern' without losing one's cultural identity. In tackling these issues, Japan had undeniable success. King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) of Siam and the young Emperor ofChina, Guangxu, also tried to follow Japan's example from the late 19th century, but without much success. However, Japan's experience remains, if not a model, at least a source of inspiration even today, especially for countries undergoing economic and political upheaval, such as China and Vietnam, and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia and Laos.

Meiji Restoration

At the end ofthe 19th century, exchange ofinformation and acquisition of knowledge about Japan for the Vietnamese was essentially through China — through Chinese nationalists, reformers and revolutionaries, as well as through numerous Japanese writings translated into Chinese. Despite this, the Vietnamese as a whole showed little interest in Japanese matters, although these were ofsignificant importance to their neighbour and mentor, China.

The Vietnamese shared the Chinese opinion that there was nothing to learn outside the Sinicised world. So when a Siamese envoy to the court of Emperor Tu Duc suggested he send students to the West in quest of new knowledge, the Emperor replied: "Our culture is Chinese, so why waste our time by learning from barbarians?" However, the

Emperor's immediate entourage numbered several people who supported the Japanese approach of venturing out to the West in search of new knowledge worthy ofemulation. Nguyen Truong To (1835–71) was one ofthe first among them to urge the Nguyen court to follow the Japanese example by sending students overseas to bring back modern learning. Despite his efforts, memos and petitions, the Emperor did not heed his arguments.

However, following the newly constituted Japanese naval forces' victories against the Russian army and the Czarist fleet in the Tsushima Strait (1904–1905), the Vietnamese élite were compelled to modify their view on Japan. These masterful victories left an impression on Vietnamese intellectuals. For example, in the "letters from prison" (Nguc Tring Thu) of Phan Boi Chau (1867–1940), an eminent Vietnamese patriot who played an important intellectual role in the anti-colonial resistance:

> Japan's victory in its war with Russia is also a great advance for us. Our minds may now contemplate a new, exquisite world. Prior to its domination by France, our country knew only the existence of China in this whole wide world. When the French came we then knew nothing but France. The world has changed, with amazing new developments ofwhich our people have never dreamed…. It is impossible to deny that thanks to the Russo-Japanese war our consciousness has been raised.[6]

There are other commentaries in the same vein, such as those of Prince Cuong De, who greatly hoped Japan would liberate and modernise his country: "The news about Japan's victories, one after another, warmed many Vietnamese hearts, especially members ofour group…. We believed ifwe asked Japan for help, it would be readily given for the Japanese and Vietnamese share the same culture and are of the Asian race."[7]

The dong du[8] (Exodus to the East) or the Missed Opportunity

The interest kindled by Japan amongst the Vietnamese in the early 1900s can be gauged through a key person of the Vietnamese resistance against colonial France: Phan Boi Chau. He left his imprint in the Vietnamese national movement during the first 20 years of the 20th century. His aims and means can be summarised in one sentence: to get

rid of colonial authority through illegal actions, in other words, by insurrection, for Phan Boi Chau was right in his opinion that France would never agree to leave Indo-China of its own accord.

Such an undertaking was, however, not possible by the Vietnamese alone. External help was necessary. Much inspired by the Japanese imperial system, in 1905, Phan Boi Chau went to Tokyo in search of arms for the forthcoming insurrection, amongst other things. He never got them. But beyond the immediate practical aspect, the Vietnamese nationalist's choosing to turn to Japan arose from the vision of Asia in general, and Japan in particular, that was shared by a good number of Vietnamese intellectuals of the time, Chau most of all. Three points draw our attention here.

To begin with, Phan Boi Chau and his followers had a dichotomist vision of the Asian continent: countries belonging to the Sinicised civilisation, and the others. According to him, his country, Japan and China were countries of the "same culture, same race, same continent" (dông van, dông chung, dông châu),[9] whereas Siam and Cambodia, for example, shared neither the same language nor the same alphabet with Vietnam. Now it was clear that Japan, under the Meiji era (1868–1912), after emerging victorious over Russia in the naval battle of Tsushima, appeared to be "the new upcoming country of the yellow race" and a civilised nation par excellence.[10] By demonstrating that a "yellow" nation could win over a "white" power, Japan showed the rest of Asia the way.

Further, Phan Boi Chau, who held a Darwinian vision ofthe world, opined that an underdeveloped country should come out of its condition by its own efforts; it was only a question of will-power. However, if Vietnam failed to take up this responsibility on time, it could suffer the same destiny as the ancient kingdom ofChampa (which was absorbed by Vietnam itself) and the Ryukyu Islands (annexed by Japan at that time). Japan, by its voluntaristic policy of modernisation, was a role model. This was how progressive, educated people tried to develop activities hitherto neglected by Vietnam: companies were to multiply in the areas ofagriculture, commerce, industry, and in the field ofpolitical and scientific teaching.[11] Further, Phan Boi Chau felt that Meiji-era Japan was a perfect example of the positive outcome of a reform programme, in other words, that a reformed monarchy could very well contribute to the modernisation of a country. Lastly, the Vietnamese élite saw Japan as a highly civilised nation. Young Vietnamese selected by Phan Boi Chau and his followers were thereupon sent to Japan to

undergo general and military training; they, in turn, would have the responsibility oftraining their countrymen when Vietnam revolted against French rule. Once they arrived in Japan, the Vietnamese students were entrusted with the unofficial responsibility of the "Association of the countries of the same culture as Eastern Asia" (Tôa dôbunka).

This journey to Japan was known as the "exodus to the East", the dong du. Established as a model, the Empire of the Rising Sun thus replaced the Celestial Empire. This change from Chinese orientation to the Japanese example is a symbolic and ambiguous one. In the "geo-cultural" aspect, Vietnam, for the first time in its history admittedly followed a Confucian power as reference, though not China. Vietnamese reformers also had to improve the image ofthe military, which was until then looked down upon by the Confucian culture ofthe Mandarin type, and get used to techniques needed to modernise the Army and the Navy. Such a step clearly illustrates a significant change in the model to be followed: Vietnam, without breaking its ties with China, a mainland country, turned to Japan, which was a rising Asian maritime power in the early 20th century.

As for Japan itself, it held the ambiguous position of being, at the same time "too insular not to be "maritime" (and) too Sinicised not to be partially "mainland",[12] as François Joyaux observed. Isolationist Japan, which was then a "mainland" archipelago, progressively became a "maritime" empire, open to ideas and trade circuits of the external world towards the late 18th century; particularly from the beginning of the Meiji reform (1868). Despite that, the kaikoku policy (opening up ofthe country) thus decided upon was not without ambivalence inasmuch as it was accompanied by the concept of kokutai (national essence). In fact, the opening, which was to a great extent oriented towards the West, meant a reinforcement of nationalism in the face of foreign influence. Between 1880–1905, the term "modernisation" replaced the notion of "westernisation". Japan was able to combine tradition and modernity: the cliché is classic. It was precisely this nationalist Japan's modernisation that kindled great interest amongst the Vietnamese; but we also find amongst them a similar ambivalence in being both "mainland" and "maritime". For ifthe process ofJapan's reformation enjoyed unanimous approval, admittedly there is a difference in interpretation amongst the various components ofVietnamese nationalism, for geopolitical reasons. For the North Vietnamese nationalists, historically more influenced by China's "mainland" mentality, it was a question offollowing the Japanese

example and modernising the country in order to better resist Western influence by looking inwards and relying on its own capabilities.

South Vietnamese nationalism, which was less rigid and historically more attracted to an Indianised Southeast Asian model, preached modernisation by opening the country to external influence in order to better compete with the West, without, however, putting up a radical resistance against it. But the dong du movement was a missed opportunity for Japan and the Vietnamese. Phan Boi Chau and his friends were, in fact, "betrayed" by the Japanese powers, as was the case with the educated traditionalists before them, when the Chinese ally entered into an agreement with France (Treaty of Tien Tsin of 1885).

The Japanese empire refused military aid to the Vietnamese resistance for two main reasons. The first was that the Japanese did not wish to contest the status quo in Asia and thus risk turning against the powers of that time, including France, by supporting the Vietnamese and the Asian nationalists in general. The second rationale is also based on the same logic. After the Russian war, Japan was in great need of capital. This is how France, while making arrests and suppressing protests within its colony, came to sign a treaty on the outside with Japan in July 1907, by which Japan officially recognised all French possessions in Asia; in exchange, the Japanese government would receive a loan of 300 million francs.[13] From the following year onwards, Tokyo would send back young Vietnamese students staying in Japanese universities. Some took refuge in China, where they later joined the Kuomintang ranks, while others found refuge in Siam. For his part, Phan Boi Chau also took refuge in southern China. Under the influence of the nationalist party of Sun Yat Sen — whose revolutionary movement contributed to the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and took him to the head of the first Chinese Republican government, Chau changed his ideology and formed a new political organisation: "Vietnamese Restoration Society" (Viêt Nam quang phuc Hôi). His objective was to abandon the project of restoration of a renewed monarchy in favour of the Republican option. Tactically, he deepened his radicalism by opting for anarchic action.

The Middle Empire was an eternal "Chinese shadow" in Vietnam's history because even during the dong du period, China's influence in Vietnam cannot be considered negligible. The Chinese empire continued to play a predominant role in more ways than one, primarily as an intermediary between the Annamese dissidents and the Empire of the Rising Sun, more specifically, as a "geographic" intermediary, because

southern China was always a refuge for members of the Vietnamese Resistance, who enjoyed the support of their Chinese counterparts. Moreover, the port of Hong Kong was a compulsory stopping point en route to Japan. Phan Boi Chau, was a "political" intermediary because once he arrived on Japanese territory, he met with Chinese nationalists such as Liang Qichao, who introduced him to Japanese political circles and established contact with Chinese reformerswho were very prominent in Japan at that time.[14] At the same time, Sun Yat Sen was also in Japan, where in 1905, he became the President ofa Republican league that had considerable influence in China: the "Tongmenghui" (United League), the first step to Guomindang. The Republican Sun, however, opposed Chau, who supported monarchy at that time.

Resolving this disagreement between the two men, which was more than a divergence ofpolitical agendas, was the need ofthe hour. To begin with, the Chinese leader counted on leading his action from Tonkin with Vietnamese support, and later, once victorious, giving them all the necessary help to let them fight their own battle successfully. On the other hand, his Annamese interlocutor proposed the opposite solution: first of all, Vietnam should be freed from the French yoke so that later "the Chinese revolution (could) make use of Viêt Bac as a springboard, from where it would first save Guangxi and Guangdong".[15] Sun Yat Sen's tactics became a reality about 40 years later, when Vietnamese communists were able to combat French forces more efficiently from the huge "springboard" that was the PRC; thus liberating North Vietnam as a first step.

In the final analysis, it can be pointed out that Phan Boi Chau, the "prodigal son" who was once under Japanese influence, finally came back to China, which was then undergoing total socio-political change, and where he formed the "League for China's prosperity and Asia's recovery".This was an international organisation that aimed at reinforcing solidarity between the Chinese and the colonised people.[16] For Phan Boi Chau, former neo-monarchist now converted to Republican values, this meant recognition of the geopolitical influence of neighbouring China, which had, in the meantime, become a Republic.

From the early 20th century, Japan — anxious to regain place amidst the pantheon of great powers and striving not to provoke the ire of the "white gods"— concealed the role of Prometheus assigned to it by Asian revolutionaries in general and the Vietnamese in particular. In fact, in Japan, in 1908, Phan Boi Chau founded the Eastern Asia

League with the help of Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Indian and Philippine revolutionaries, anarchists and socialists. Its aim was to become a solid alliance bringing together all Asian countries to fight Western imperialism and create "Greater Asia"; and it had nothing to do with Japan's official pan-Asianism stand. But this was the vision that became a reality nearly forty years later.

Vietnamese Nationalism and the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere"

Between the two World Wars, the Japanese empire openly showed expansionist ambitions towards Eastern Asia. It conceived the great plan of establishing a common area under its aegis, the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" (Dai toa kyoeiken). This ambitious project aimed at establishing Japan's political, economic and cultural hegemony in this sphere, at the same time, making Japan replace Western powers. The project was outlined by the Total War Research Institute (founded in 1940). The concept of "total war" demonstrated Tokyo's intention of waging war in all fields: in the cultural field, the Japanese applied the same strategy as missionaries did in Indo-China: once its zone of influence was established, the Japanese Empire took the educational system of Asian countries in hand in order to spread a "new spirit": the Japanese spirit, thanks to new text books, new teaching methods and intensive learning of the Japanese language, which was intended to be Asia's vernacular language.

But the desire of the Empire of Rising Sun for supremacy clashed somewhat badly with the Asian nationalist movements' quest for independence. As a result, it would prove difficult to sidestep this contradiction. In Japanese official circles, the prevalent feeling was "that the independence of the various peoples of East Asia should be based on constructing East Asia as independent countries existing within the New Order of East Asia" and that this conception differs from independence based on the idea of liberalism and national self determination.[17] In 1942, Hashimoto Kingoro, President of the Japan Youth Party (Dai Nippon Seinentô), authored an article in which he explicitly said that weak nations could only exist with a strong power's protection, just "as a child grows up freely and safely under the protection of his father".[18]

For the Japanese, a great majority of "future Asian states" were in the early stages of nationalism; their social and economic bases were

still too weak to form a solid national movement. In other words, these players did not have the maturity needed to take up the sole responsibility of their political future. Such a paternalistic vision justified the Asian nations' delegating their military, economic and foreign policies to Tokyo. On the whole, as was later accepted by General Tojo before the International Military Court, the Japanese, in the long run, had to replicate the Manchukuo-type model, the puppet government that they had established in Manchuria (China), Burma, the Philippines, Siam, Java, French Indo-China and even in India and Afghanistan. The Manchukuo model was the archetypal Japanese approach, also serving as experimental ground for its economic development policies.

In early 1932, the Japanese army stationed in Manchuria, facing the resistance of Chinese forces, set off a Manchurian independence movement. Although the Chinese — who constituted a large majority of the Manchurian population — rejected this movement, an "executive committee of Northeastern provinces" published a declaration of Independence for Manchuria on 18 February. The regency of the new state, named Manchukuo, was conferred upon Prince Pou Yi, the last Chinese emperor dethroned in February 1912 by the Republican revolution. Soon after, on 24 August, the Japanese government gave official recognition to Manchukuo. Thanks to the Nippo-Manchu agreement signed the following month, Tokyo was entrusted with the task ofensuring the internal and external security of the new state. For this, Japan obtained the right to station its military there. Independent on paper, Manchukuo actually became a protectorate in the hands of Japanese "advisors".

In the first place, Japanese propaganda aimed at controlling the intellectual élite of every Asian country that would later serve as intermediary between the Japanese authorities and the Asian masses. In this perspective, the Japanese government organised something similar to dong du at the Asian level. Some Asian intellectuals were, in fact, sent to Japan to undergo "training" at the International Students Institute[19] (Kokusai Gakuyukai) that would make them efficient agents of the Japanese Empire. The aim of this institute for international students — founded in 1935 by Gaimushô, the Foreign Affairs Ministry — was to encourage foreign students to come to Japan. It received generous funds from the government and donations. In 1942, the Institute functioned directly under the Greater East Asia Ministry, which was responsible for many of the Foreign Affairs Ministry functions related to the countries ofthe Co-prosperity Sphere. Very clearly, the dongdu logic was reversed:

whereas in 1905, young Vietnamese went to the Japanese Archipelago to obtain military and intellectual resources to combat France, Japan of the 1930s intended to train Asia's future nationalist leaders to serve its own interests.

In fact, in Southeast Asia, some nationalists willingly responded to the call. Thus, following Emperor Bao Dai's abortive renovation attempt in the early thirties, a few Vietnamese Resistants — Caodaist and Hoa Hao sect members and even Catholics such as Ngo Dinh Diem — once again looked to the East for inspiration, especially to the "League for the restoration of Vietnam" of Prince Cong De, who had taken refuge in Japan. U Saw, who later became Burma's Prime Minister, went to Japan in 1935, and in the same year, founded an association to improve Nippo-Burmese relations. Benigno Ramos, a leader from the Philippine resistance, took refuge here. Malaysian Ibrahim Yacoob came into contact with the Japanese around 1938. Lastly, right from 1939, Phibun Songkhram, Prime Minister of Siam — the only member country of the League of Nations (LN) which had not condemned the Japanese "aggression" in Manchuria in 1933 — started sending hundreds of students for military instruction to Japan, just as Phan Boi Chau had done 30 years earlier.

As mentioned previously, Siam signed a pact of mutual assistance with the Japanese powers two years later. All these men were zealous sycophants of the Japanese model.[20] As for Vietnam, the local press, especially Left-wing newspapers such as the daily La Lutte, continuously denounced the rise of Japanese imperialism. In 1931, when Japanese troops penetrated Manchuria, public opinion and the Vietnamese press largely supported China, condemning Japan's aggression. So most Vietnamese viewed the encroachment of the Japanese army into their territory with great distrust.

Occupation

占領

CHAPTER 2

The Pacific War and the Imperial Army in Vietnam

Vietnam: A Bridge between China and Southeast Asia

While Japan gained a foothold in Vietnam, which was then under French control, the regional scene was rife with tension. Towards the end of the 1930s, Japanese imperialism became defined clearly and spread across Asia towards China and Southeast Asia. According to the Japanese military strategy, French Indo-China — cut off from the home country, and hence very vulnerable — had a major role to play in the Japanese troops' inexorable advance across the Asian continent. Once again, Vietnam's destiny was linked to those of the surrounding countries, especially China.

Right from the beginning of the 20th century, Meiji-era Japan was modernised on the Western model, asserting itself as a powerful regional player in Asia; its 1905 victory over Russia lending credence to this assertion. Japan proved to the world in general, and to Asia in particular, that the "yellows" were capable of defeating the "whites". Basking in the glow of this prestige, the Japanese archipelago placed itself in the forefront to become "Asia's leading spirit". More than this desire to guide and "civilise" the Asian people, an urgent reason behind its expansionism was the need to ensure the viability of a Japan cramped for space and also

poor in raw materials. To solve its internal problems, especially that of overpopulation, the Empire of the Rising Sun arrived at the conclusion that only a policy of economic development, together with territorial expansion, would afford it access to a power worthy ofits name. To begin with, Japan had to be economically independent, that is, protected from the vagaries offoreign markets. In this regard, the huge Chinese continent was a Heartland to be conquered as a first step.[1] There, within reach, was a gigantic market that could fulfil Japan's need for food and raw materials and at the same time be an outlet for Japan's industrial exports.

Japan's expansionist policy, undertaken during the First World War and brought to a close by Western powers following the Treaty of Washington on 6 February 1922, once again became very vigorous during the inter-war period. Right from 1922, Tokyo showed a very keen interest in Manchuria and North China. Neither was it indifferent to Southeast Asian countries, at least as far as the press was concerned. It was not uncommon, for example, to read that Filipinos were "brothers of the same race". As for French Indo-China, Japanese editorials had estimated back in 1918 itself that it had become a "useless burden" for France;[2] Japan should relieve her of this burden.

Such talk aroused suspicions that were confirmed by events that took place in early 1939. In fact, Tokyo made its expansionist desire manifest by occupying Hainan Island in February and in March, the Spratly Islands, that had still been an integral part of Indo-China from 1933. France's diplomatic protests were futile. Japan advanced step by step. And such signs foreshadowed Japan's final objective: clearly, a takeover of Southeast Asia's human and natural resources. This wealth, earlier coveted by the West, now stirred Japan's greed, and the Second World War provided it the opportunity to fully achieve its ambition of territorial expansion.

Japanese Occupation

The first episode started in Asia in 1937 during the Sino-Japanese conflict. Already from 1931, the Japanese had been occupying Manchuria, re-named Manchukou, and North China. After that, Southern Asia remained to be conquered by them. But Chinese nationalism — thanks to Western help, which came from the southern side, from Tonkin — continued to resist the Japanese invasion. Twice in 1939, Japanese General Tsushihashi was sent post-haste to ask the French colonial

authority to put an end to the arms transit to southern China; he was never successful.[3] In these adverse conditions, French Indo-China was once again in the eye of the Japanese cyclone. It became apparent to the Imperial Military that the occupation of the northern part of the Indo-Chinese peninsula was essential, as it would result in cutting off the Tonkin border, thus depriving Kuomintang troops ofWestern logistical support. The geo-strategic position of French Indo-China placed it in a delicate situation wherein its destiny was closely connected to the Sino-Japanese conflict. With the United States warning Japan against its advance in Indo-China, on 18 August 1941, the Japanese government showed its conciliation by expressing the intention of withdrawing troops from Indo-China after settling its dispute with China.

So all Japan had to do was wait for a good opportunity to gain a foothold in the French territory. And this opportunity did not take long to offer itself when France suffered military defeat at the hands of Germany in June 1940. Alone and abandoned by its home country in total disarray, and by the Anglo-Saxons fighting on the European front, Indo-China, under Governor General Catroux and later under Admiral Decoux, former Chief of French naval forces stationed in the Far East, found itselfto be politically weakened. On the contrary, Japan, which had just then signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on 27 September 1940, was free to carry out its great "Co-prosperity Sphere" project.

It was in the year 1940 that the Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister, Matsuoka Yosuke, had unveiled Japan's ambitions by announcing clearly and officially its project to create a sort of Asian economic and political bloc headed by Japan. This was the "new order" as conceived by the Japanese Empire for Eastern Asia. On 30 July, Matsuoka, in a first draft of the project, referred to "Japan's vital zone" which would include French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaysia, Borneo, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, India, Australia and New Zealand.[4] For the first time, on 1 August 1940, the Chief of Japanese diplomacy mentioned the concept ofa "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" (Dai toa kyoeiken). So the idea of a "new order of Greater East Asia"[5] (Dai toa shinchitsujo) — which already comprised Japan, Manchukou and North China — had to be extended by including "zones such as the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China".[6]

Konoe Fumimaro used the geopolitical expression "Greater East Asia" for the first time on 3 November 1938. However, as early as

April 1934, the idea that peace or order in East Asia should be built under the sole "responsibility" or authority of Japan, had been put forward by the "Amo declaration". Moreover, the project of a great Asia under Japanese domination had known other variants such as "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" (toa keizai-ken), a sort of "economic federation" which aimed at bringing together Indo-China, Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, the East Indies and the Philippines.[7]

In the early 1940s, Indo-China's economic situation was less than satisfactory. The French colony, whose trade depended largely on rice and rubber exports from Cochin-China, was asphyxiated by the blocks imposed by Great Britain, then fighting with Japan. As a result, the French colony thereafter became Indo-China's sole possible outlet.

It was at this time that French Indo-China was amputated from the northern provinces of Cambodia by the imposition of the Franco-Thai convention, signed in Tokyo on 9 May 1941. Thailand, Vietnam's eternal competitor, obtained this important transfer thanks to its traditional good relations with Japan, sealed by the Mutual Aid Pact of 21 December 1941.[8]

In such a vulnerable situation, which did not go unnoticed by the indigenous population, Indo-China resigned itself to satisfying Japan's demands — which were becoming more and more insistent, even threatening. From June 1940 until the famous coup of 9 March 1945, when Japan ousted France once and for all from Indo-China, a series of Franco-Japanese accords were effectuated under pressure from Japan.

The 20 June 1940 accord, concluded just as the Paris government fled before the advancing German tanks, allowed Tokyo to control the Tonkin border, thus depriving China of access to its source of food supplies from the south. On 30 August, Vichy was forced to accept the idea ofan accord, no doubt acknowledging France's sovereignty in Indo-China, in principle, but especially the Japanese Empire's interests in the Far East. Military agreements on 4 and 22 September made use ofNorth Tonkin in the Sino-Japanese conflict for Japanese troops to land; thereby paving the way for easier penetration into China through the Hai Phong port, railways, roads and aerodromes.

It should be noted that Japan obtained this accord by applying pressure. On 22 September 1940, the Japanese launched a sudden attack on the French forts ofLang Son and Dong Dang. Japanese aircraft bombarded Haiphong. In an instance of historic irony, this show of force stemmed from the same principle as the "gunboat policy" practised by France in

the 19th century, when it wanted to obtain major concessions from Vietnam to facilitate the colonisation process. In May 1941, important economic agreements were signed between the two States, such as the clause of the most-favoured-nation, facilitating rice and raw material exports to Japan. On 29 July, the Darlan-Kato agreement integrated Indo-China into Japan's military system under the hypothetical name of "common defence", whereas Japan had ensured USSR's neutrality by signing a non-aggression pact a few months earlier in April 1941. Thereafter, Japanese troops were able to make use of airfields as well as the Cam Ranh and Saigon naval bases.

In short, Japan had found a military and economic foothold in Indo-China. Cochin-China became an advanced base for access to the wealthy Southeast Asian countries, insular or peninsular, whose oil was necessary for Japanese ships, which were in turn indispensable for the operations carried out in that maritime region.[9]

Thus Japan began its "Southward march", its "Nam Tiên" ("Nanshin" in Japanese). And to advance towards the south, the Japanese military applied the Go strategy that Bui Xuan Quang summarises so well: "The principle of the game is to capture the enemy by attacking him from the periphery towards the centre, while positioning stones (territories already conquered or allies or friends) all around him to encircle him gradually and to render his situation untenable."[10] As we have said earlier, by occupying Hainan and Spratly islands in 1939, Japan had "encircled" French Indo-China so as to facilitate grabbing it later. Once under Japanese domination, it served, in its turn, as the "peripheral stone" from which Japan would reach the heart ofSoutheast Asia. In fact, Japan's presence in Indo-China, especially in Tonkin and in Cochin-China, was a real threat for the Philippines, Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies — so many strategic and food supply points for Great Britain and the United States. Further, it was from this time, the summer of 1940, that Washington finally pressurised Japan to stop its advance towards the south. Until then, American leaders had not taken Japan's encroachment into Indo-China seriously. They were ofthe opinion that Tokyo, having got stuck in the Chinese front, would not dare open a second front in Southeast Asia. Stalin committed the same error by thinking that Hitler would not risk opening a second front in the East when the German troops were already having a tough time on the Western front.

We are familiar with what followed. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese drew the United States into the war. However,

they reacted too late to prevent Japanese troops from sweeping across the whole of Southeast Asia. In the West, Japan had reached Burma. In the South, it had gained a foothold in part of New Guinea. Thus the Japanese empire found itselfin a position to threaten India and Australia respectively. To a certain extent, it can be said that the Pacific war took shape exactly at the time when Japan landed its troops in Indo-China, thus posing a double threat to the vital interests of England and the United States. It is to be noted that the operation base set up at Saigon by the Japanese facilitated the take-overs of Malaysia, Singapore, the Dutch Indies and Burma.[11] Nevertheless, according to some historians like Bernard Fall, Indo-China had played a very secondary role in the Second World War.

At that time, President Franklin D. Roosevelt held the view that Indo-China "served as the springboard for the Japanese attack on the Philippines, Malaysia and the Dutch Indies", as was revealed in 1943 by the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull.

As far as Japan was concerned, the passage provided by Eastern Indo-China — in the north towards China and then towards Southeast Asia — became all the more obvious as it was not an occupation in the real sense of the term but rather a "stationing" of Japanese troops. Their numbers never exceeded 35,000 men between 1941 and 1945, and they were stationed mostly around the communication highways. Beyond these strategic points, it was the French administration that had control over the Colony's daily life. France's order and authority continued to prevail.

In fact, this French-Japanese "co-existence"dictated by Japan's desire to handle France's Vichy government carefully, and to ensure that it was able to obtain new economic outlets peacefully, served the Japanese well; all the more because the Decoux administration fulfilled its economic needs, such as rail transport and maintenance ofJapanese troops, all the while ensuring that there were no internal problems. Thus Japan was present in Indo-China without having to bother about management problems. So, freed from the restrictions normally caused by any political occupation, the Japanese troops had time to concentrate on the conquest of other Southeast Asian regions whose wealth in raw materials they considered indispensable for the ensuing military operations.

In the strategy ofImperial military conquest, Indo-China had become a strategic passage through which supply convoys for the troops of Chinese resistance made their way. Later, it was this very passage that

the Japanese army invaded to reach Southeast Asian countries. It was from the regional perspective that Indo-China's, that is to say Vietnam's, role of transit passage and crossroads acquired meaning. By being at once continental and maritime, Indo-China enabled Japan, a maritime power, to penetrate into the continental space of China and the maritime space of Southeast Asian peninsular and insular countries.

Japanese Presence and Indo-China's Emancipation

Japan's policy regarding French Indo-China may be differentiated as "before" and "after" the Japanese coup of 9 March 1945.[12] At first, Indo-China's independence, just as the Dutch East Indies', was envisaged as a possible objective. But in the early 1940s, it was necessary to ensure Japan's political and economic supremacy in these two Western possessions, considered major strategic and economic points in its expansionist plans for the Southern seas. In these circumstances, Japan faced the option of invading Indo-China and overthrowing French control. The Japanese military preferred to spare its forces, continuing with the colonial administrative structure that happened to depend on the Vichy government established in June 1940. Except for the Japanese officers posted in Indo-China and the Vietnamese nationalists, the Franco-Japanese pact signed in 1940 and 1941 that allowed France to maintain nominal control over its empire was a serious "anomaly" in view of the slogan introduced by Japanese propaganda: "Asia for Asians". Aware of this contradiction, the authorities in Tokyo pointed out that the situation was of a temporary nature. In their mind, there was no doubt that in the end, the entities constituting French Indo-China should become independent, even though that independence would be singularly limited by Japan's "protective" attitude. Japan had, in fact, decided that it was necessary to "train" the Vietnamese on a long-term basis because their political capabilities and their aptitude to manage a fully autonomous state were still very limited.[13] This paternalistic approach of Nippo-Vietnamese cooperation could only lead to the frustration of the local nationalist movements that distrusted Japan, which was, after all, an imperialist power.

During the early 1940s, Japan's presence on colonial soil spelled constant pressure for the French authority that applied, not without success, a screening policy between the Japanese and the pro-Japanese Vietnamese. Faced with Japanese propaganda — led by Kempeitai, the military police,

amongst others — Admiral Decoux, then Governor General, took a series of measures that were likely to win over the indigenous people of Indo-China.[14] In this way, the Japanese forces, by their presence and the destabilising nature of their activities, indirectly contributed to the emancipation of the people of Indo-China.

The French and the Japanese fought on ideological and cultural grounds; the former to ensure the loyalty of the Vietnamese, the latter to increase their influence over them. According to David Marr "Although Tokyo did not wish to undermine French capacities to maintain internal order, it remained committed to 'Asia for the Asiatics' and allowed civilian and military personnel to organize projects designed to convince Indochinese of Japanese superiority and the longer-term merits of participation in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."[15]

A comprehensive cultural policy was developed, with Japanese language courses being held in big cities, Vietnamese films being projected, and magazines like DongA (East Asia) published. Many Japanese works on culture, sports, martial arts in particular, were translated into Vietnamese and made available to the public. Radio programmes were also broadcast in Vietnamese. Intellectuals, artists and Japanese Buddhist monks were invited as public speakers. Some Japanese civilians took active part in this conquest of the mind, including Matsushita Mitsuhiro, a businessman who had lived in Indo-China for a long time and who endeavoured to build a network among pro-Japanese Vietnamese allies of Prince Cuong De. The writer Komatsu Kiyoshi influenced Vietnamese intellectuals with his anti-colonial and anti-fascist opinions. Komaki Oomi, another indefatigable proselyte of the Japanese cause, also played an important role as the Director of the Japanese Cultural Institute at Hanoi (Nihon Bunka Kaikan). He is also credited with setting up an association of Vietnamese writers called "Today Society"[16] (Konnichi-sha).

Before the Japanese coup against the French administration, the prevalent feeling amongst the Vietnamese was that though upheavals were to be anticipated, there was no actual support for the Japanese against the French. Early contact between the native population and the Japanese showed signs of a certain fascination for the Japanese martial style, the irreproachable order ofthe troops and the bearing ofits sword-bearing officers. The Japanese troops, in addition, were encouraged to fraternise with the people, and it was rumoured that Japanese soldiers had gone to the defence of the Vietnamese against French settlers in

the streets. The French noted that the Vietnamese were gratified by the announcement ofevery new Japanese victory over the Europeans. However, the Vietnamese had increasing difficulty in understanding why the invincible Japanese were not using their might to oust the French colonialists just as they had ousted the English, Dutch and Americans.[17] With the spread of the Japanese presence, there were rumours in circulation regarding Japanese brutality, particularly that of the Kempeitai, a combined armed and political police force. People began to realise that the Japanese could turn out to be more cruel oppressorsthan the French.

Finally, the sole concrete Japanese action in Indo-China was the coup of 9 March 1945, which was a crucial turning point in Vietnam's history, proving to a decisive factor shaping the country's future. In a few months, a sequence of events plunged the Indo-Chinese peninsula into the decolonisation era, and later, into the Cold War era.

On the night of 9 March 1945, the Japanese troops put an end to the French presence in Indo-China. Internal and external pressures caused this sudden change of attitude. On the one hand, Tokyo came to know about the existence of French Indo-Chinese networks that informed and assisted the Allies.[18] On the other hand, the external scenario was no longer favourable to Japan, for, since 1943, Anglo-Saxon forces had regained ground in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific. Besides, in another theatre of the World War, France's liberation in 1944 ended the Vichy regime in favour of General De Gaulle's government. Lastly, the loss of the Philippines in December 1944 had swept away residual Japanese reluctance to oust France from Indo-China. Thus, after the events in the Philippines, Indo-China, "the springboard" to Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia, had every chance of becoming, in its turn, the theatre for future confrontation. From rear base, the Indo-Chinese peninsula became the war front.

The consequences of the Japanese putsch were immediate and considerable: from March, Japan freed thousands of Indo-Chinese political prisoners who had been rotting in French jails; some of them were immediately given important administrative posts, contributing to the prevailing anarchy by suppressing those who had cooperated with France. With the looming threat of defeat, the Japanese chose to support the Vietnamese resistance, notably by placing arms at their disposal.

Moreover, Tokyo granted symbolic independence to the entities constituting French Indo-China. In March 1945, Japan asked Emperor Bao Daï to repeal the Protectionist Treaty of 1884, in favour of a

reunified Vietnam; thus he put an end to the existence of three "Kys"; Bac Ky, Trung Ky, Nam Ky, otherwise known as Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin-China, symbols of more than 80 years of French domination.[19] Cochin-China's fate, fought over by the Vietnamese and Cambodians, nevertheless remained in suspense. This French colony, placed under Japanese control immediately after the coup, was given back to the Vietnamese only on 14 August 1945, that is, one day before the capitulation of the Japanese empire.

Above all, the ousting of colonial rule gave rise to a political void, further intensified by the Japanese capitulation on 15 August. This was a void into which Vietnamese nationalist movements, the most vigorous in Indo-China, plunged unhesitatingly.

One of the major consequences of the Japanese coup was to cause the OSS (Office of Strategic Services, American Secret Service), that no longer had French networks, to turn to Vietminh, the best organised Vietnamese resistance group, with which it would be closely linked. The fact is to be emphasised because President Franklin D. Roosevelt's America, known for its anti-colonial sentiments, had followed the Japanese policy ofpreventing France from returning to its colonies. Washington, through the OSS, saw to it that the power vacuum (political, administrative and legal) was prolonged, because of which its ally Vietminh asserted itself in the Vietnamese political scenario. Some historians consider that the United States' support played a decisive role in the success of what the Vietnamese later called the "August revolution".

In fact, in this anarchic interregnum, the Communist Party ofIndo-China (CPI) came through very well. In a circular dated 6 August 1944, the CPI had already prophesied clearly that the next upheaval would take place "in very favourable and unique conditions in the history of the country's struggle. The opportunity being favourable and factors conducive, it would be unpardonable not to take advantage. It would be a crime against the history (of the) country."[20] The Japanese coup of 9 March provided the "favourable opportunity" (thoi co) which the Vietnamese communists awaited.

The CPI movement, with limited participants, was the only political organisation with well-defined strategy and tactics. In September 1941, the CPI had set up the Vietminh under its command; a united front bringing together all the rebel forces, the armed wing of which was to be the National Salvation Army. In the same year, its chief, Nguyen Ai Quoc, adopted the symbolic name of Ho Chi Minh.

Apart from their organisation, the communists had two other major strong points compared to the other nationalist movements. Firstly, as opposed to the Dai Viêt party and certain other groups, including the Caodaist and Hoa Hao sects that claimed to have nearly a million followers each, the Vietminh did not play the Japanese card. From 1943, Japan had encouraged various supposedly pro-Japanese nationalist factions to unite. In September, the different groups in the South, notably the religious Caodaist and Hoa Hao sects, had also come together to form an alliance.

In the North, the different nationalist movements united between late 1943 and early 1944 to form the National League ofGreat Viet (Dai Viêt quôc gia liên minh Hôi), known by the contraction "Dai Viêt", (a reference to the Viet country, which, after ten centuries of Chinese domination, had acquired independence in 968 and took the name of Dai Co Viêt, the "Great Viêt", as opposed to "Great China"). To do this, they profited from the goodwill of the new occupation authorities, whose interests the CPI did not compromise. Secondly, the communists had a safe zone that the French attempted to "pacify" without success in 1943–44: the Viêt Bac, a base situated in the high Tonkin region on the Chinese border that connected them, ipso facto, to their Chinese comrades, and even to the Communist International.

Well-organised, recognised for its actions against the French and Japanese, and strongly established in the Vietnamese territory, especially in the countryside, the Vietminh enjoyed strong external support from groups such as the Chinese Communist Party and the American OSS, as well as a solid and homogeneous but limited internal sociological base.

Also, from the time the Japanese capitulation was made known, the CPI was able to form a temporary National salvation government and continue its "August revolution" by dispatching troops to Hanoi. On 9 August 1945, the Supreme War Council met at Tokyo and, under pressure from Emperor Hirohito, accepted the "unacceptable": Japan's capitulation. The surrender was officially signed on 2 September on board the American ship Missouri, the very day on which Ho Chi Minh announced the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Emperor Bao Dai, made head of the government immediately after the Japanese coup, was forced to abdicate on 25 August. On 2 September, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence ofVietnam, which was named the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

The coup of 9 March 1945 was thus indirectly the factor that set off a series of events, which, before concluding six months afterward, would give birth to the DRV. Japan's presence in Indo-China for scarcely five years was thus a major "episode" in the history of the Indo-Chinese peninsula in general and Vietnam in particular. But while the Vietminh was trying to take Japan's place at the helm, elsewhere, Vietnam's destiny was being decided. For the third time since the colonisation of their country, the Vietnamese, in this case, the Communist resistance movement, were in fact "ditched" by their ally of the moment, the United States.[21] When Harry Truman replaced Franklin Roosevelt (who died on 12 April 1945) as President of the United States, Washington changed its Indo-China policy significantly. There was no longer question of placing the peninsula under international tutelage, as the preceding president had wished. Circumstances had changed in the world because the "Soviet danger" loomed large on the horizon.

This was how the Potsdam Conference (July–August 1945) created the worst of scenarios for the Vietminh. It was decided that the disarmament of the Japanese troops should be supervised by nationalist China, the traditional enemy, and by Great Britain, a colonial and maritime power, on either side of the 16th parallel. The Chinese brought along Vietnamese nationalists, survivors of the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD), "decapitated" by France immediately after Yen Bay in 1930, who had not collaborated with the Japanese and therefore enjoyed some legitimacy even though they were under Kuomintang's influence. As for the British, in all probability, they were going to help the French restore their sovereignty in Indo-China. In fact, just a month after the birth of DRV, the American Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained in a telegram America's new policy concerning the return of France to the Indo-China peninsula:

> The United States has no intention of opposing France in restoring its control over Indo-China and no official stand taken by the American government, even indirectly, challenged France's sovereignty in Indo-China. However, it is not the government's policy to help the French in re-establishing their control over Indo-China by force and America's desire to see the French control restored assumes that the French claim of having the support of the people of Indo-China will be confirmed by the events that follow.[22]

On 12 April 1946, the new Secretary of State, James Burnes, officially made known Washington's consent to reinstating French authority

in Indo-China, thus tacitly recognising that the maintenance ofEuropean colonial empires had become necessary to confront the possible rise of Communism in the region.[23]

At first, colonial France's geopolitical venture considered Vietnamese territory an initial transit passage to reach the Chinese market, later becoming the platform for Japan's continental and maritime expansionism into southern China and Southeast Asian countries. Thus Vietnam, which had barely come out of the world conflict, found itself "placed" geo-politically by external powers at the intersection of two new eras, between that of colonisation and the Cold War. Besides, the Franco-Chinese Treaty of1885, the Franco-Japanese Treaty of1907 and finally the Potsdam conference in 1945 taught the Vietnamese resistance a double lesson. Firstly, following the process ofcolonisation, their country's fate was totally beyond their control. Secondly, Vietnamese nationalism could depend only on its own resources, and not on those ofexternal allies, whose palinodes had showed the limits oftheir support.

Responsibility for an Apocalypse or the Origins of the 1945 Famine

One of the most tragic consequences of the double occupation of Vietnam was the terrible famine of 1945 that caused veritable carnage in the country. More than 10 per cent of the population died of hunger or the consequences of famine. This disaster was the result of a combination of factors, namely natural (floods, severe winter), industrial and military, which entailed the bombing of roads, bridges and ports, and the added torpedoing of boats by Allied submarines. However, the Japanese occupation was one of the most decisive factors in this human catastrophe. The country's economy had in fact undergone total restructuring in favour ofthe Empire and its army. All the indicators, especially those ofIndo-China's Statistical Directory, confirmed a very rapid increase in exports to Japan, particularly rice and maize. At the same time, the peasants were forced to grow cash crops such as cotton, jute, sesame, castor and other oil seeds, to the detriment of traditional food crops.

Within three years, from 1942 to 1944, the area used for cultivation of industrial products had doubled in Indo-China, but, as Nguyen Thê Anh pointed out, the transformation in Tonkin was even more considerable than was suggested by the change in production, because the area for cash crops had tripled.[24] These conditions lead to an acute

shortage in essentials, making the people's daily life increasingly difficult; "the spectre of famine thus loomed ominously over the North".[25] It is said that sorrow never comes alone, for, from 1936 to 1939, Vietnam and particularly Tonkin suffered from major floods caused by the breaching of dikes, which lead to considerable losses in rice harvests. Around 150,000 farmers were reduced to begging. Rampant speculation led to an increase in all domestic prices, which, for some people, reached prohibitive levels. The cost of a quintal of rice, which was 30 piastres in 1940, went up to 600 piastres in early 1945. The intensifying problem of war, coupled with a very severe winter in the region, led to tragedy.

According to Nguyen Thê Anh, "The great famine of the year At-dâu was an atrocious calamity that left, an indelible mark on the people's memory."[26] This gave rise to two questions; the first, concerning the magnitude of the disaster. Depending on the source, the figures vary from 700,000 victims according to the French authorities of that time, to two million as per official estimates of the post-war Vietnamese authorities.[27] The second question was regarding to whom responsibility for the catastrophe could be imputed, setting aside the aggravating factors of inclement weather and the Pacific war.

The French and the Japanese, naturally, blamed one another. In a telegram in September 1945, General Leclerc, Commander of French troops in the Far East, presented an account of the catastrophe by citing natural causes, disruption of supplies and insecurity as the prime causes. He mentioned that a rumour was being spread that the French were responsible. He replied to this attack with the "French defence", based on four major points:

1. The Japanese, large consumers of rice, had confiscated a sizeable portion of the available stock, thereby causing speculation.
2. The Japanese had brought down the area of food crop cultivation to serve their needs.
3. Harvests towards the end of 1944 had been bad.
4. As the French had been chased away and replaced by incompetent Japanese or Annamites, the relief programmes could not be organised.

American historian David Marr passed a harsh judgment on the actions of each of the two protagonists, considering that, at that time, both the French and Japanese authorities were entirely aware of the food situation and had the means to reverse the trend, had they so desired.

Despite this, neither the French nor the Japanese sent rice on a priority basis to feed the starving Vietnamese civilians. He added that, above all, the two powers were only preoccupied with their own military logistics.[28]

The historian thus corroborates the judgment passed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The responsibility becomes incumbent on the "French colonialists and Japanese Fascists". However, the blame is not so equitably shared amongst the Vietnamese themselves, at least in retrospective view of this episode in their history. In their opinion, the colonial administration was the main culprit. According to them, it would have deliberately created the famine situation to weaken the opposition and to ensure the continued French presence in Indo-China.

In the final analysis, the Vietnamese thus let off the Japanese more lightly. The people had not forgotten that the French administration remained in place until March 1945 and Japanese officials had given much publicity to the food grain they donated to help the famine victims. In any case, few Japanese felt the least guilt for the Imperial Army's actions in Indo-China. Unfortunately, this attitude is a reflection of post-war Japanese ignorance about the most tragic episodes that had marked the Pacific war. The same goes for the great Vietnamese famine that is considered in Japan to be simply an unfortunate calamity in that war-torn period.

Japanese Renegades in the Vietminh

If Westerners as well as the Japanese remain largely ignorant of the great Vietnamese famine of 1944–45, the presence of Japanese at the side of the Vietminh in the first Indo-China war "could seem somewhat strange to those who are traditionally accustomed to seeing only two main players in a conflict, that is France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam".[29] In fact, as the Historian Christopher Goscha points out, the end of hostilities did not mean the total disappearance of Japanese forces from Indo-China. It was estimated that out of 97,000 Japanese military and civilians stationed or residing in Indo-China, several thousand soldiers of the Imperial Army had refused to be repatriated or to surrender to the Allies. Also, many soldiers lost in the Guam jungles have been found, until as late as the 1970s. The number of Japanese deserters in Vietnam in 1945 is often put at 5,000; their role was minimised by Vietnamese propaganda because "the subject is still explosive if not taboo".[30]

The French did not hesitate to denounce the presence of Japanese deserters amidst the Vietminh ranks to discredit the Vietnamese resistance. They were present in officers' schools, in elite units, etc. Some high-ranking generals like Giap and Nguyen Binh recruited their "instructors from amongst Japanese officers who had remained in Indo-China to serve Indo-China in the capacity ofmilitary advisors and even as bodyguards".[31] But military cooperation was not the only available field of activity for "these belated Allies".

The Finance Ministry relied on the advice of about ten Japanese financial experts and economists. In his "Journal ofa Minister",[32] Le Van Hien, Finance Minister from 1947 to 1954, confirmed that a good ten Japanese were working under him and had played a fairly important role in the working of the Ministry. Also, in the area of health, there were Japanese doctors, pharmacists, nurses and even veterinary surgeons. Oka Masamichi, journalist and writer, narrates the journey of one of these deserters in "Love in the Annam jungle".[33] While in Oka's narration, the "hero" is forced to cooperate with the Vietminh and ends up marrying a Vietnamese girl, some ofhis fellow-countrymen were driven by other economic, ideological and even legal motivations, for some war criminals; not forgetting the die-hards who fought against the West to the bitter end.

With Vietnam aligning itselfwith the Communist camp, the increase in China's aid rapidly replaced other sources of aid and isolated these Japanese "renegades"in the early 1950s. In fact, Goscha explains that "according to a recent military study published in Hanoi, in 1951, the Vietnam military itself decided to dismiss officially Japanese (and European) advisors working in its offices. It sent them back via international channels of Communist China."[34] For their part, the Japanese authorities, with the consent ofthe Allies and the French, had organised several missions to find and repatriate their countrymen. The fate of these Japanese — missing soldiers or idealists — is both symbolic of irony in history, and also of the constant ambiguity in the relations between the two peoples.

Part Two

Vietnam's Perceptions from War to doi moi

Independence

独立

CHAPTER 3

The Vietnam War as Seen from Tokyo

Okinawa's Role

For Japan, the Vietnam War was a decisive time for regaining political autonomy vis-à-vis its American mentor. Though the Japanese and the Americans had consensus on almost all issues after the Second World War, the Cold War in Asia gave rise to major differences of opinion. Technically, the Japanese were supposed to have been "neutralised" by a Constitution barring them from sending troops overseas and disallowing the armed forces any means of settling international disputes. This is to have been the effect of the famous Article 9 of the post-war Japanese Constitution, inspired by America. Few Japanese expressed sympathy for Communism. Neither were they convinced partisans of America's military interventions in Indo-China, regardless of whether they were conservative or progressive. In fact, conservatives were highly sceptical about the likelihood ofcertain victory on a battleground that recalled to them the Imperial Army's military campaigns in China.

Most of the Japanese people were, then, in favour of a peaceful solution to the conflict that flared up in Vietnam. However, they could not remain neutral, as Shiina Etsusaburo, the Foreign Affairs Minister

reminded them in May 1966. Their situation was further complicated by the United States' use of Okinawa, part of their territory, to send troops to the battlefields. In the early stages of America's military action in Vietnam, Okinawa was still occupied by North American troops. The island was returned to Japan only in 1973 and even then, the bases used by the American forces would continue to remain under their control.

What made Japan's situation ambiguous was that despite the strong opposition of the Japanese public opinion, increasingly frequent demonstrations to denounce the conflict, and the United States' role in it, these movements never led to deep-rooted anti-Americanism, as was the case in other parts of the world. Moreover, despite profound disagreement with their trans-Pacific partner on the Vietnam issue, the Japanese remained its ally without ever questioning this alliance.

In 1952, Article 6 of the San Francisco Mutual Security Treaty was the subject of lively debate. This Article defined the scope of the Treaty and its intention to "contribute to Japan's security and to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far-East".

In the early 1960s, when American troops started getting involved in Indo-China, the Left opposition contested the use of American bases in Japan because the Japanese had earlier marked off those zones by military actions from the Archipelago's bases in the north ofPhilippines. Nevertheless, other objections from opposition parties revealed that the Japanese political leaders, in their interpretation of the Treaty, had allowed Americans the liberty of using their bases freely for the Indo-China conflict.

The Treaty of San Francisco was also an opportunity to decide the principle of payments for war damage reparations. Japan opted for settlement in kind, in the form of government and private loans to Asian countries that were victims of the conflict. This proved to be very favourable to Japan's interests, due to its need to open to new markets, given that the American market of that time could not absorb Japanese products that were not adapted to America's domestic demand. Thus, the decisions taken in 1952 gave Japan the Asian markets, and extensive infrastructure to be reconstructed.

As for Vietnam, France had insisted that reparation be paid to it, though its infrastructure was, relatively speaking, spared by the Pacific war. Initially, the demand was $2 billion. In point of fact, about $55 million was paid to South Vietnam until 1965. Ofthis sum, $39 million

was for repairing the Da Nhim dam's hydro-electric power station, and the rest was in the form ofgovernment and private loans. Both the Right and the Left in Japan strongly opposed giving recompense to a country which had suffered very little damage on account of Japanese troops during the war, compared to massive destruction caused by Imperial troops in China and other Asian countries. Consensus was, however, reached on this issue, taking into account the amount of sympathy for this choice and the political stakes involved for Okinawa's return at the end.

For their part, the Vietnamese held the opinion that these payments were Japanese investments enabling their return to the Indo-Chinese market. In fact, exceptional financial means in the form ofAmerican and Japanese aid pouring into Saigon made it possible for the Vietnamese to source from Japan equipment that they needed most.

Nevertheless, the terms of exchange were inequitable. Thus, in 1961, the year in which Japanese exchanges with South Vietnam reached their peak, its exports amounted to more than $65 million, against less than $3 million worth of imports from Japan.

Though official exchanges took place easily with South Vietnam, which had been recognised by Tokyo since 1955, there were also private exchanges between Japan and North Vietnam through the Japan-Vietnam Trade Association (Nichietsu Boekikai). The Japanese were successful in working through what appeared to be a new contradiction between their political and economic interests. In fact, in the 1950s, despite an anti-Communist policy and a military alliance with the United States, the Japanese restored unofficial exchanges with Communist countries — some very actively — as with China in 1952, and USSR in 1956. For North Vietnam, Japan was a fairly important outlet for a part of its coal production at Hongay, but in fact all Japan did was merely resume the purchase of supplies that were started by the French during the colonial period. The volume of exchanges with North Vietnam was, however, hardly one-fourth of Japan's trade flow with the Republic of South Vietnam in both directions. After 1965, Americans exerted pressure on their Japanese allies to put an end to exports of all products that could contribute to the Vietnam War effort, such as the copper and electric cables that Japanese companies were selling in North Vietnam. Nevertheless, business links were maintained at a low level and never came to a halt during the entire conflict.

The "Separation of Politics and Economics"

In the early 1960s, under the Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda's government, the "separation of politics and economics" ("seikei bunri" in Japanese) became a veritable principle ofaction. This can be interpreted in several ways, and the first one is cynical: that foreign policy action should not hamper the good functioning of business. The second implies a more realistic and pragmatic vision, wherein the pursuit ofeconomic relations culminates in and finally contributes to an improvement in political relations. Truth to tell, Japan's position regarding these two options was never clearly established. The Japanese themselves gave an explanation justifying this ambivalent attitude. Thus, Shibusawa Masahide expressed the opinion that "the concept ofseikei bunri" represented the scepticism that was largely prevalent in Japan about the relevance ofgetting involved in the Cold War.[1]

The Japanese were very comfortable with the principle of separation ofpolitics and economics, given that it contributed to the prosperity of their country. Though this stand was quite unpopular amongst the people, the Japanese government continued to defend the Vietnam War overtly, for two important reasons. The first was that it had to be alert to solve unavoidable trade problems with the United States that would only worsen with time. The second was that the Japanese authorities were waiting impatiently for Okinawa to be returned to their hands. Although we cannot say that the Americans were blackmailing their Japanese allies, the stakes involved in the Vietnam War were very apparent to all the protagonists. Oda Makoto, a Japanese intellectual, who was one of the leaders of a movement against the Vietnam War, summarises Japan's situation in this conflict as follows: "Our country was a kind of 'forced aggressor' in the war. Because of the security treaty, Japan had to cooperate with the American policy of aggression. In this sense Japan was a victim of its alliance with that policy, but it was also an aggressor toward the small countries in Indochina."[2]

The polemics on the Vietnam War were all the more heated as a very large section of the Japanese press took up Vietnam's defence, with not a single major daily supporting the bombing strategy. The involvement of the Japanese press in the war debate enabled it to regain an élan that it had more or less lost after the Nippo-American Security Treaty. The first anti-war demonstrations, organised by trade unions, started from February 1965. Thus, the big Sôhyô Trade Union and Churistsu Rôren

demanded the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. In April, that very year, Japanese intellectuals, academics, writers and artists joined forces and sent the Prime Minister an appeal focussing on three main points:

1. Refusal of military operations undertaken from Japanese bases.
2. A demand to the American government to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam.
3. A demand to the Japanese government to talk to the warring parties so that they stop hostilities and open negotiations that would include the South Vietnam Liberation Front.

Japan's Opposition to the Vietnam War

Though the intellectuals' movement did not shake the government's stand, it instead gave rise to a large informal and unorganised gathering ofpeople called the "League for Peace in Vietnam" (Betonamu ni Heiwa o! Shimin Rengo). Better known by its abbreviation, Beiheiren, it was an organisation inspired by its American twin and was open to all those opposing the war. Nevertheless, these movements against the Vietnam War did not give rise to an anti-American sentiment amongst the Japanese people. The Vietnamese, however, benefited from a wave of unconditional sympathy, without any criticism of the North. Many older Japanese who had experienced the Pacific War were ofthe opinion that the Americans would find themselves embroiled in a conflict which brought to mind their unhappy experiences fighting a nationalist guerrilla on its home terrain in China. Others felt that the Americans were supporting an already lost cause, considering the unpopularity of the pro-South regime. For them, the very convenient seikeibunri principle was akin to an "ostrich policy", because by aligning themselves with the Americans, the Japanese gave them complete freedom to define the parameters of Japan's international policy. The media, in this situation, effectively played its role of third power as well as the political leaders' conscience. To quote Thomas Havens: "The Vietnam war was a big story in Japan from start to finish."[3] The Japanese Press is one of the most powerful in the world, and most widely read, with its record circulation. Already in the 1960s, the three big national dailies were printing more than 24 million copies, plus the additional 25 million copies of 168 other regional and local dailies. Although TV and radio also feature big

press groups, the audiovisual sector participates much less in political debates, being, unlike the print media, highly dependent on advertisements. For the journalists of that time, the Vietnamese conflict was a veritable national cause, and not just the big post-war Japanese Press dossier. Consequently, the Press rightly considered itself to be more representative of public opinion than the Diet, which remained quite silent on the issue.

The press enjoyed total freedom of expression that it put into practice for the first time on the occasion ofthe Vietnam War. According to rumours started by the Americans, and subsequently in circulation, the media's editorial rooms had been infiltrated by Communists. Some of them would go to the extent of calling the venerable daily Asahi Shimbun "Red"! All opinion polls, whether conducted by the government or the Press, corroborated the fact that Vietnam occupied the first place among the international topics that interested the Japanese. According to Asahi Shimbun's survey in August 1965, 94 per cent of 3,000 adults interviewed were familiar with the conflict. Seventy-five per cent ofthem disapproved of the bombings in the North whereas only 4 per cent approved of them. The same survey showed that a majority of the Japanese feared that an escalation in the conflict would draw Japan into the war.[4] But did Japanese public opinion of that period carry enough weight to change the government's position?

The Americans thought that opinion polls did not have any real influence on the archipelago's government's stance. Douglas MacArthur II, Ambassador to Japan, declared in December 1957, "forget about what the mass public tells in your opinion pools, because the men in Japan who really count are all on our side".[5] This cynical comment on Japan's democracy is not invalidated by the fact that, without upsetting the strategic Nippo-American alliance, the media, supported by the majority of public opinion as well as all the movements opposing the conflict, posed an obvious limitation on the government's assistance to its American ally in continuing the war. Thus, public opinion made it totally impossible to send non-combating troops to Vietnam, as once envisaged by the Kaya-Kishi faction of the Liberal Democratic Party. Rather than giving real military assistance, the Japanese government was maintained de facto in what the philosopher Kato Shuichi once described as "passive complicity" in the American War. The Japanese public was kept aware of the conflict, not only by the media, but also by many intellectuals who opposed the war. Apart from the Japanese Communist Party, the

traditional Left, the ardent pacifists, including independent intellectuals such as the writer Oda Makoto, who later headed the Beiheiren, had a deciding influence on public opinion. Oda was one of the most controversial Japanese men of his time, along with, perhaps, Mishima Yukio and the Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. He was criticised by the Japanese Communists, who considered him too soft vis-à-vis the Americans, by the Socialists, who found him "petit bourgeois" and also by the Liberal Democratic Party, the conservative party in power that denounced his sympathy for a Communist Vietnam. Moreover, some intellectuals considered him élitist because the movement that he represented was strongly established and supported by students or graduates from Todai, the prestigious National University in Tokyo.

It is true that the movement, though popular, scarcely reached the agricultural and working class sectors, bringing together mostly students, intellectuals and essentially urban salaried classes. Paradoxically, Oda and the Beiheiren, considered respectively Trotskyist organisation and anarchist by the CPJ, were attacked more, not by the conservatives, but by the Left, that considered them competition. Though repeatedly accused of being anti-American, the Beiheiren movement was not very different from active anti-war movements in the United States, when it did not openly imitate their methods of action and organisation. Also absent from the Beiheiren discourse was anti-Imperialist rhetoric, because the Japanese intellectuals, including Oda, had not forgotten the situation in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, and had no sympathy for Mao or the Chinese cultural revolution. When the Americans got involved in the Vietnamese conflict, the Japanese public and most Beiheiren supporters knew nothing about Vietnam, whereas many of them knew and appreciated the United States, which post-war intellectuals saw as their liberators from militarism and the pre-1945 authoritarian regime.

In this context, Kato Shuichi remarked that for educated Japanese who were politically knowledgeable about the situation, "the Vietnam war was the first blow to American prestige in this country. By 1975 many of them were disillusioned with the United States."[6] As early as 1965, the Japanese government had lost some of the illusions it held about its American ally. In July, when the American bombings began, the American authorities informed the Sato government that due to a typhoon, the B52s based at Guam would be temporarily sheltered in Kyushu's Itazuke airport. The planes were, in fact, flown to Okinawa and two days later, the American military authorities in Saigon announced

an attack by about thirty B52s coming from Okinawa on Viet Cong positions situated about sixty kilometres south-east of the city.

Once this news was made aware in Tokyo, it caused considerable turmoil amongst the leaders who had insisted that the Okinawa bases should not be used for raids on Vietnam. Caught between the conflicting pressures of public opinion and a security system that was totally under American protection, the government merely made an announcement of regret that the bombers had made use of Okinawa as base, through its spokesman Shiina Etsusaburo, then Foreign Minister. The Americans, already vexed by Japan's trade agreement with China, became anxious about this attitude, one they thought comparable to that of Charles de Gaulle's France's spirit of independence regarding the Vietnam issue. After this bombing episode, which also had a negative impact on relations between the allies, the American ambassador in Tokyo, Edwin Reischauer, an eminent historian and specialist on Japan at Harvard, expressed his fears on the issue to his fellow-countrymen in Boston. In August 1965, he stated: "The loss of our close relationship with Japan because of Vietnam would be much more disastrous than anything that might happen in Vietnam itself except a world war."[7]

Beginning with a despatch of 3,500 Marines in March 1965, American involvement deepened in July ofthe same year, with the additional despatch of a new contingent of 50,000 soldiers; up to a total of more than 180,000 men in a year, accompanied by incessant bombings. Under pressure from the American President Lyndon Johnson, Prime Minister Sato was constrained to giving moral support to America in this war. In 1967, Miki Takeo, the Foreign Affairs Minister, who later rose to Head of Government, declared to the Diet: "Japan has neither the capacity nor the intention of undertaking a military intervention." Yet Japan's contribution to America's war effort was not inconsiderable: American bases in Japan, playing an inestimable role, as the Americans acknowledged. Thus, Admiral Grant Sharp, Commander of the Pacific forces, admitted in 1965 that "without Okinawa, we could not have continued the combat in Vietnam". A report to the American Senate in 1966 stated that the installations of the American forces in Japan were vital.[8] Besides, the Okinawa jungles served as training camp for thousands of Marines and the GreenBerets, the special forces, between 1965 and 1973.

Ifthe Japanese refrained from any direct involvement in the conflict, the government, through the Transport Ministry, recruited civilian personnel for the Navy. Once embedded, they were posted to ships

transporting troops or cargo. According to Honda Katsuichi, a journalist with Asahi Shimbun, some crews consisted of entirely Japanese sailors; others Korean sailors, wearing American uniform. In 1967, around 1,400 Japanese were employed by the American Navy. Besides, if no military person belonging to the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) was observed on the scene ofoperations, it was clear that the SDFs served as protection forces for American bases in Japan and in its territorial waters. Further, more Japanese soldiers (15,280) received training in the United States than South-Vietnamese soldiers (13,900) during the conflict. In addition, 70 per cent ofthe SDF officers went to North America to undergo training. This time marked the commencement of the early joint exercises that firmed up cooperation between the two armies. Right from 1969, the Maritime Self Defense Forces thus participated in the naval exercisesin the Malacca Strait, along with Australian and Malaysian fleets. This led to an increase in Japan's military expenses, especially when in 1970, Nakasone Yasuhiro, future Prime Minister, became the Secretary of State at the Defence agency. Japan undertook an ambitious development programme of its military forces. Lastly, at certain times during the war, SDF personnel could be seen in Vietnam as observers of the latest combat techniques and the use of new military equipment. In 1966, the presence ofthree Japanese Generals was also the target ofsharp criticism in North Vietnam, which accused Japan of complicity in this imperialist war of aggression. Naturally, to many Americans, Japan's participation appeared to be still very inadequate. Thus, in 1972, George Wallace, Alabama Governor and future candidate for the Presidential Elections, made no bones about his opinion on the issue: "the war in Vietnam would have been over a long time ago if the Japanese troops had joined us".[9]

Economic Impact of the Vietnam War

On the economic front, the Vietnam War proved to be a bonanza for the Japanese. Today, the cost of this war to America is estimated to be around $150 billion. And out of this amount, several billions were paid as remuneration to Japanese companies, suppliers of goods and services to American forces. Ofcourse, the Vietnam War would not be as important as the Korean War for the Japanese economy, because the GNP was six times less in the early 1950s when the war broke out in the Korean peninsula, compared to in 1965 when the Americans entered into war

with Vietnam. While Japan's economic gains were estimated following the end of the Korean War, no precise figures are available on its returns from the Vietnam War. However, what was noted was a great increase in the American forces' orders and tenders, when compared to their orders in peace time for the maintenance of their bases. In 1967, for example, out ofa total of$516 million, $202 million could be imputed to war expenses.

Other sources estimate the profits of the Japanese enterprises connected with the Indo-China war to be, on an average, one billion dollars per annum between 1966 and 1971.[10] The figures are not satisfactory because the proportion that can be directly imputed to war expenses can pass from single to double digits, depending on estimates. However, the sources from the Bank of Japan are more specific, with respect to public contracts for Vietnam (Betonamu Tokuju), or the sales of goods and services to the United States or South Vietnam, for use in the combat zone. These orders amounted to $292 million in 1967 and went up to $467 million three years later. But all this was only the tip ofthe iceberg. A not inconsiderable part ofthe Japanese exports, especially components for the arms industry, passed via Korea, Taiwan or some other Southeast Asian country, to be re-exported later to Vietnam. The most profitable economic development for the Japanese civil industries came, in fact, from the opening ofthe American market to the archipelago's consumer products. And contrary to what was generally believed overseas, Japanese leaders, whether they were industrialists, bankers or sôgôshôshadirectors, were all in favour of the Vietnam war being brought to an expeditious end, as they were more interested in the revival ofAmerican consumerism and the expansion of their trade in Southeast Asia than the windfall of possible American Army orders. Lastly, studies evaluating the financial importance of this war to Japan, those undertaken by the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry, those of the Miti, the Nihon Sangyô or Sanwa Banks, and also the reports submitted by think-tanks such as the Nomura Research Institute, showed that exports to the USA and Southeast Asia were of greater value in terms of profitability for the national economy than the direct impact of the war.

War orders, therefore, did not exceed 7 to 8 per cent of total Japanese exports, against 63 per cent at the time ofthe Korean War. This modest figure, however, was a stimulant at a time when the Japanese economy was undergoing a slight depression. The injection of fresh money helped considerably in the revival of the Japanese economy.

Paradoxically, the most significant long-term consequence was Japan's replacement of the United States, as the main economic partner of the Southeast Asian countries. It is especially in this regard that Japan can be considered the big winner in the Indo-Chinese conflict. A journalist with Asahi Shimbun, summarised the situation with this remark: "the Vietnam war to Japanese conservatives was an opportunity, not a problem".[11] In fact, the American Army orders served to strengthen existing relations between the United States and Japan and contributed to a substantial improvement in the profits of Japanese companies, traditional supporters of conservative Japanese, as well as agriculturists.

In the beginning, mostly Japanese small-medium enterprises (SMEs) catered to orders covering all types of goods necessary for the war, such as uniforms, rangers and barbed wire. Later, with the escalation of the war, big industrial groups and major trading companies such as Mitsui Bussan and Sumitomo Shoji took over the orders. The list of Japanese products for the US Army was very diverse, ranging from construction materials like cement to jeeps as well as toilet paper and electric generators. It was said that the American soldier drank Kirin beer, chewed Lotte chewing-gum and ate Chiba lettuce.

More controversial were the accusations made against Japanese industries that supplied napalm to the US Air Force. In April 1966, the China News Agency announced that 92 per cent of napalm used by the Americans in Vietnam was of Japanese origin. Some Japanese companies were singled out. However, nothing was proved conclusively, because a lot of ammunition passed between the American ammunition depots of the United States and Korea, via Japan. According to the daily Mainichi, nothing proved that napalm was manufactured in Japan at that time.

Nevertheless, the peaceful Japan would develop an armament industry in spite of a very strict regulation in this field, which formally barred overseas sales of military material. The Japanese argued that it was difficult to draw a clear line distinguishing between civil and military material, because it was the usage that determined the purpose. Thus, for example, in the 1970s, American missiles or smart bombs were guided by systems using components manufactured by Sony. In practice, Miti, that held the controlling authority over international trade and technological exchanges, strictly enforced the regulation with communist countries and countries at war, or those barred by the UN. Companies were, however, called into question by those who opposed war. Protestors marched several times in front of the Head Office of Mitsubishi Heavy

Industry, the biggest supplier to the American Army. Other sectors benefited from the windfall from the American forces, particularly companies engaged in repair and maintenance ofequipments ofall kinds. Thus, the biggest workshop for the repair of American Army tanks in the Pacific was in the Kanagawa administrative area. The Japanese University circles were the subject ofviolent controversy in 1969 when a Japanese government enquiry revealed that a dozen universities operated, with the aid of American funds, 279 non-declared research projects, some of which had military applications.

From Peaceful Movement to Anti-war Struggle

The beginning of the Paris peace negotiations in 1968 coincided with a change in the ideology of the anti-war movements in Japan. Their opposition became more radical, and the peaceful movements, particularly, were submerged by a more violent wave of opposition. The situation in Japan worsened. Pitched battles against the police multiplied with the arrival ofviolent student movements such as Anti-war youth committees (Hansen Seinen Iinkai) on the public scene. The committees set up on the initiative ofthe Socialist party and the Sohyô central Union in 1965 (Hansen) became rapidly aware ofthe involvement ofJapanese companies in the war. "For (the Hansen), the fight against the Vietnam War was no longer a meaningless political slogan; it had to be an everyday reality, a fight that had to be carried on in the very midst of the capitalist and imperialist system."[12]

Two series of official trips by Prime Minister Sato to Southeast Asia were the cause for an upsurge in violent demonstrations. These government-planned trips were with regard to Japan's new economic presence in this region and its increasing role in the field of development aid via the Asian Development Bank, initiated by Japan. On the political front, the Japanese government aligned itselfmore and more on America's side, because it considered the bombings unavoidable to force North Vietnam to stop fighting and start negotiating.

However, the Japanese government's submissive attitude concealed a double preoccupation. One was commercial, with mounting tensions owing to the increase in America's trade deficit with Japan, which was the site of the Trade War that poisoned relations between the two nations in the following decades. The other, more diplomatic, was the return of Okinawa's control. This open support to American policy led to increasingly violent opposition. The student organisation, Zengakuren,

turned out to be one of the world's most resolute student movements. Other Japanese organisations were more discreet in their actions against the war, such as Jatec (Japan Technical Committee for Assistance to Anti-war U.S. Deserters), a Japanese aid association, established in seven countries, that was considered one of the most efficient of its kind amongst the 33 organisations providing aid to deserters. In 1969, it organised the flight of 51 American soldiers. Yet, images of spectacular confrontations between the police and student demonstrators were regularly in the news. One such incident on 21 October 1968 marked the peak of the violence. In fact, there were unprecedented confrontations in several central quarters of Tokyo, including Roppongi and the Shinjuku railway station, where thousands of students revolted against 25,000 policemen and Kidotai, the Japanese Security police, amidst tens of thousands of passengers. The Shinjuku episode resulted in the cancellation of more than 700 trains transporting 340,000 passengers, 200 arrests at Roppongi and 500 at Shinjuku and damages worth over $18 million. However, the anti-war movement would gradually be in competition with other protests, particularly the anti-nuclear protest arising from the presence of American ships equipped with nuclear arms. The Japanese student movement aimed at a general involvement of the society, on the lines of the student movements in the United States or France. Among the more radical movements, the one initiated by the United Red Army (Rengo Sekigunha) in 1971 even resorted to terrorist actions. But their actions never had any connection with the movement against the Vietnam War.

For the Sato government, the return of more than one-third of military installations to their hands at the end ofDecember 1968 helped ease the tension to a certain extent. Richard Nixon's becoming the President changed the situation, at first, by the changes he made to America's strategy in the conflict, and also through the role that the American authorities wanted Japan to play at the end of the conflict. Despairing at not being able to involve their Japanese allies any more, they wanted them to contribute to Indo-China's economic revival so as to share some of their responsibilities in Asia. The extension of the Mutual Security Treaty thus aimed at forcing Japan to get involved in regional security through economic aid.

One of the Beiheiren leaders, Tsurumi Yoshiyuki, summarised the position of the Japanese in this conflict quite effectively: "The Vietnam War was not a fire on a far-away bank; it was a war that necessarily affected all the Japanese in one way or the other."[13]

Renewal

変新

CHAPTER 4

From Reunification to doi moi

Reunification and the Fukuda Doctrine

According to Masaya Shiraishi,[1] a specialist on Vietnam and Professor at Waseda, the Paris Accord of January 1973 ushered in a new era in Japan's Indo-China policy. This was engendered by the casual attitude of the Americans, who surprised their allies by announcing President Richard Nixon's trip to China in early 1971. This sudden change in America's strategy described as the first Nixon "shock"[2] caught the Japanese government unawares, as it had always lent support to Washington in its Taiwan policy, with respect to Beijing. Hanoi and Tokyo were likewise, surprised. This Sino-American rapprochement gave rise to a deep distrust amongst North Vietnamese. The Sato government did not endure these setbacks for long and was followed by the Tanaka Kakuei government that was much more determined to maintain a distance from its American ally. Tanaka's first diplomatic visit was to Beijing in September 1972, with a view to resuming diplomatic relations. But before Sato's leaving the government, a first unofficial contact had been arranged between Japan and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Tsuboi Yoshiharu, Vietnamese specialist and Professor at Waseda, described the episode in these terms:

> On the evening of 8 February 1972, an aircraft of the UNO's surveillance commission leaving from Vientiane in Laos landed in Hanoi. Miyake Wasuke, Director ofthe first Southeast Asia department in the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry (Foreign Affairs Minister's son-in-law) and his deputy, Inoue Kichinosuke were on board. At that time, Tokyo recognised the South-Vietnamese government (Republic of Vietnam) and did not have any diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic (North Vietnam). So Miyake and Inoue who were in charge of Vietnam at the Ministry made a secret visit to the enemy capital. Their mission was not official but they were acting under the instructions ofhigher authorities: Prime Minister Satô Eisaku, Foreign AffairesMinister Fukuda Takeo and his administrative deputy minister Hogan Shinsaku. The Japanese government saw the Vietnam conflict coming to an end and a political decision had been taken on the necessity of rapidly establishing friendly relations with Hanoi. This was the mission of the Miyake-Inoue duo.[3]

The Japanese emissaries received a very warm welcome at Hanoi. Their mission, accompanied by another in April 1973, and the negotiations between the two governments — respectively represented by Nakayama Yoshihiro, Ambassador of Japan in France and Vo Van Sung, the temporary Vietnamese Chargé d'affaires — would take offin a more official manner in Paris that July, to culminate in diplomatic recognition in September.

In the new context that emerged with the war coming to an end, the Japanese authorities recognised the urgent need to establish good relations with North Vietnam, the obvious "leader of the three Indo-Chinese countries (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), region indispensable for the prosperity and stability of East and Southeast Asia".[4] Immediately after the Paris accord was made known, a huge banner was displayed in front ofthe Democratic Liberal Party headquarters at Tokyo: "Congratulations on the ceasefire in Vietnam — In future, let us work together for reconstruction and development."

But behind the laudable Japanese declarations, the Tanaka and Miki governments continued to support South Vietnam by way of economic aid (around $61 million from 1971 to 1975), while the Archipelago's companies continued with their investments in South Vietnam. Thus, Japanese investments went up by $2.5 million in 1972 and, increased by an additional $2 million from 1973 to 1975, due to liberalisation. A Japanese economic report in 1973 spoke highly of the advantages of

the South Vietnamese market for the investors of the Land of Rising Sun: "The Vietnamese are remarkable people. They are intelligent, industrious and quick because they remember things well. Perhaps, in this matter, they come just after the Chinese as a superior nation."[5]

We can therefore understand why the North Vietnamese refused any exchange of diplomats and openings of embassies. In Japan, from 1973, the fervour of anti-Vietnam war movements subsided. Hanoi treaded cautiously with the Japanese, especially preoccupied with their economic offensive in Southeast Asia, where Japan already occupied a predominant place.

Though their economic successes were incontestable, the Japanese suffered bitter setbacks in diplomatic matters. Consequently, Tanaka Kakuei's visits to Thailand and Indonesia in January 1974 were received with violent anti-Japanese demonstrations.

With Vietnam's reunification in 1975, the objective of Japanese policy was to establish harmonious relations with both the ASEAN countries and the communist countries of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, in order to promote regional stability and to maximise their economic interests. The Japanese approach became more discreet and cautious so as to gild Japan's tarnished image in this part of the world.

To set itself apart from its American ally during this embarrassing period, Tokyo took an independent line. According to Tsuboi: "Tokyo clearly showed that it had its own vision of post-war Vietnam."[6] Japan's recognition of Hanoi was hastened by its internal situation, such as the presence of a permanent delegation of Kyôsantô, the Japanese communist party that enjoyed quasi-diplomatic status in the Vietnamese capital; something causing great displeasure to the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Meanwhile, the Japanese diplomats tried their best to regain the monopoly of their country's representation in Vietnam as quickly as possible.

With the reunification of Vietnam, the quantum of trade with the Archipelago rapidly increased. From $123 million in 1975, it went up to more than $216 million the following year, thanks to a leap in Japan's exports. The Japanese were the first to sign a non-governmental commercial pact with Vietnam, followed by a $16.6 million loan for reconstruction in 1976. After their trade offensive in the early 1970s, the Japanese began one of charm towards the end of the decade. In 1977, Fukuda's[7] official visit to Burma and five ASEAN countries provided him the opportunity to clearly state Japan's stand in a famous speech on 18th August at Manila on Southeast Asia's Age, when he announced the three fundamental

points of Japan's relations with the countries of the region. Later, this declaration would be known as the Fukuda doctrine. Firstly, Japan reaffirmed that it would not be a superpower and would not possess nuclear weapons. Secondly, it would encourage heart-to-heart association with Southeast Asian countries. Thirdly, it would strive to improve its relations with these countries, thereby contributing to regional peace. This speech was also accompanied by a generous cheque of $1.55 billion for all the countries of the region.

After the Fukuda doctrine came the Takeshita doctrine in 1989, on Cambodia and the strategy of development aid in Asia. In 1997, this, in turn, was replaced by the Hashimoto doctrine, which laid the guidelines for future relations between Japan and the ASEAN countries. More recently, in January 2002, during his visit to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Prime Minister Koizumi announced Japan's new doctrine, on the lines of that of Fukuda, his political mentor.

Several months after Fukuda's announcement, Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Van Dong expressed the hope that his country and Japan could, on an equal footing, develop economic, scientific and technical cooperation on the basis of mutual respect, for mutual gain. He added that he gave lot of "importance to relations with Japan, at the State as well as the people's level", given that "there are many similarities between the Vietnamese and Japanese people".[8] Relations between the countries promise to be lastingly fair; however they are only the prelude to an aid programme that is still very modest, which, though ostensibly generous, constitutes hardly 2 per cent of the volume of global Japanese aid.

Vietnamese Intervention in Cambodia and Japan's Deception

In 1978, Vietnam's relations with Cambodia and China became strained. The United States and Japan adopted a more hostile attitude towards Vietnam, which was sidling up closer to Moscow with the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty signed in November. China, for its part, was successful in improving relations with both Washington and Tokyo. So, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty signed in August that year, had a special significance in Asia, as it was quite different from what had been envisaged by the Japanese as a simple diplomatic normalisation of relations. From then, Japan was to become one of the pillars of what Hanoi called the "Beijing-Washington-Tokyo axis".

Unfortunately, the improvement in the situation did not last long. In December 1978, when Hanoi decided to intervene in Cambodia by sending in troops to put an end to the Khmer Rouge regime and replace Pol Pot and his administration with a government led by Heng Samrin and Hun Sen — favourable to Vietnam's interests — the break with Tokyo was complete.

In fact, Japan's reaction was not tardy in coming: In early 1979, the Japanese suspended all economic aid to Vietnam. They firmly placed themselves on the side of China, ASEAN and the United States and demanded the withdrawal ofVietnamese troops from Cambodia. Their stand remained firm until October 1984 when Tokyo resumed negotiations with Hanoi to pressurise it to leave Cambodia in exchange for aid revival. Despite the impressive amount proposed by the Japanese — around $200 million per annum for the Indo-Chinese countries once the Vietnamese troops were withdrawn — their generous offer was not sufficient to sway the Vietnamese authorities, who even announced their intention of remaining in their neighbouring country for a five to ten year period. This obdurate attitude reinforced the idea ofthe Americans, along with their Japanese allies, to concentrate their aid on "weak" countries so as to fight Communism.

With a Chinese "punitive invasion" following the Khmer-Vietnamese conflict between 17 February and 16 March, the Japanese were left aghast by the serious incidents in Indo-China. Thereupon, the Japanese government followed the policy proposed by the ASEAN, favouring the withdrawal of all troops occupying the region, placing, in a way, the Chinese and the Vietnamese on the same footing. While this decision suited the Chinese, it was not satisfactory to the Vietnamese, in whose opinion their presence in Cambodia was justified and not comparable to an aggression. On numerous occasions, in various diplomatic arenas, the Japanese had the opportunity to reaffirm their support to ASEAN's policy on the situation in Indo-China by issuing sanctions against Vietnam. Nevertheless, Japan strove to maintain a neutral position with regard to the Sino-Vietnamese disagreement. Encouraged by the Ambassador of China to support Kampuchea's independence struggle, the Foreign Affairs Minister Sonoda declared that though Japan was forced to suspend its economic aid to Vietnam for some time, it continued to be one of the few countries that could still communicate with Hanoi, and continued to give "wise" advice to the Vietnamese.[9] Tokyo did not hesitate to caution Beijing to act with prudence vis-à-vis Vietnam.

In Japan, public opinion regarding Vietnam also changed. Great confusion reigned amongst the Vietnamese sympathisers opposing the American war. Many no longer understood anything about these conflicts between socialist nations. Some still supported Vietnam and the Heng Samrin government, others China and the Khmer Rouges, but on the whole, Vietnam was disgraced. The Japanese public trained its eyes on China, whereas the Soviet Union, Vietnam's ally, was still very unpopular. The conflict that had flared up in Afghanistan in Central Asia had shown the Soviet-Vietnamese bloc to be particularly aggressive in the eyes of all the Japanese.

On the economic front, the Japanese emerged as great winners. During the Indo-Chinese conflict, their trade with Southeast Asia had skyrocketed, going up to more than 700 per cent from the early 1960s to 1975. During the rest ofthe 1970s, this trend continued, and Japan's trade with this zone was twice that ofthe United States in 1979. During this decade, Japan established itselfas the regional leader ofcommercial, industrial and technological development, ahead ofits American competitors — who, in turn, had replaced the Europeans as the key player in development and the main partner after the Second World War. The Vietnamese, on account of their expansionist military policy and an internal policy made manifest by waves of refugees, the "boat people", were excluded from this dynamism that swept across all the countries in this part of the world.

Arrival of the "boat people" in Japan

According to Masaya Shiraishi, Professor at the Waseda University in Tokyo and a discerning scholar on Vietnam, one of the main reasons for the ASEAN countries' criticism directed at Vietnam was the rapid increase in the number ofIndo-Chinese refugees arriving in ever-increasing numbers, particularly by sea, which explained the name given to them: the "boat people". For the ASEAN members, these displaced people posed security problems and were an unbearable financial burden on their economies.

The refugee issue became the matter ofanimated internal debate in Japan, between its humanitarian duty to give asylum, supported by a section of opinion, and the wish of a majority of political leaders to maintain the homogeneity ofthe population, and to fortify itselfagainst future intra-Asian exoduses. However, when compared to other Southeast

Asian countries that were in the forefront and forced to accommodate several hundreds ofthousands ofIndo-Chinese refugees in camps, Japan only had to contend with a tiny number of people fleeing the region. From 1975 to 1981, the number of refugees forced to flee Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam was estimated at more than 2 million. The big waves of refugees left in 1978 and 1979, particularly the exodus of the Hoas (Vietnamese ofChinese origin) in 1979, ofwhom 250,000 chose to flee by the South China Sea at their own risk. Only 8,000 — a very small fraction of these (1 out of 250) reached Japan from 1975 to 1985!

From the time of the first wave of refugees, Japan's attitude was considered deplorable; the target of international criticism blaming the world's second most powerful economy for its lack of open-handedness and compassion. According to Thomas Havens, the way in which the Japanese managed the Indo-Chinese refugees issue in their country was undoubtedly a very small episode in Japan's dramatic 20th-century history. Nevertheless, it showed the international community that the sentiment ofracial and cultural exclusion was fairly widespread amongst the Japanese during the 1970s.[10]

This lack of compassion for the exiles aroused criticism even in Japan: the Japanese journalist Makoto Maekawa denounced the coldness of his fellow countrymen by calling them tsumetai nihonjin (literally meaning "cold" or "glacial", "heartless"). For the authorities, the refugee question centred around the type ofstatus that should be given to them, and the maximum number of refugees allowed to reside in the country. Generally, the exiles in Japan were dissuaded by the attitude of the Japanese administration that was only willing to give them a temporary stay, in transit to another destination; North America, as it happened. Moreover, very few (4 per cent) of those who came disembarked at the Archipelago's ports, braving the obstacles and distance, managed to arrive on Japanese boats. The government had to ask the Japanese merchant navy not to further tarnish the country's image and to stop if their boats came across smaller craft carrying boat people in distress. Private organisations such as the Japanese Red Cross, the Salvation Army, Buddhist monasteries such as Risshô Kôseikai, Tenrikyô, and especially, the Catholic organisation, Caritas Japan, were the first to help the refugees in distress landing in Japan.

Later, many private associations were also involved in helping the refugees. In 1980, a committee for assistance to Indo-Chinese refugees (Indoshina Nammin Kyûen Renrakukai) was established. At the same

time, the Japan Volunteer Centre was initiated to coordinate collection of funds and material, and to send health workers and other specialists to the camps in Southeast Asia. Several thousands ofJapanese volunteers participated in these operations.

On the other hand, the government took time to get involved and coordinate the work of different administrations, NGOs, religious organisations and the Office of the High Commission for Refugees to manage the influx of Indo-Chinese refugees. The Japanese government did not want to set a precedent by granting asylum and resident status to the Indo-Chinese too generously, for there was no dearth ofcandidates for immigration at that time in the region, starting with Filipinos, Taiwanese and Koreans.

In 1978, President Carter had to take up the issue with Fukuda for his country to give humanitarian aid to these refugees and accept a certain number of them as long-term or even permanent immigrants. Following American pressure, the government relaxed its stand and agreed in principle to allow a certain number ofrefugees to settle down. A study conducted by the daily Asahi Shimbun in June 1979, showed that a majority of the Japanese (50 per cent) was in favour of the Indo-Chinese refugees' settling down in Japan. But almost all those who were interviewed felt that most ofthe refugees would not want to live in Japan because of the inhospitable nature of the Japanese.

For the government, the way out of this situation was through generous financial contributions to refugee aid. It was accused ofbuying public favour. So, when the exodus reached a peak in 1978, the Foreign Affairs Minister Sonoda Suneo surprised his ASEAN colleagues by announcing that Japan would bear half of HCR's expenses for the resettlement ofthe Indo-Chinese refugees, amounting to $30 million in 1979, and twice that sum the following year. Japan also financed other international organisations such as the UNICEF and the World Poverty Program, as well as the International Red Cross and refugee camps in Thailand, for a total of $92 million in 1979.

No opposition party objected to the government's restrictive immigration policy. The principal idea was that the Japanese were one single race and that it was important to maintain this for the harmony of society. Other popularly-held ideas, such as "Japanese is a difficult language for foreigners" were often put forth. The Japanese were also inclined to treat any one leaving his native country as suspect. So the widely shared opinion was to let the doors ofthe country remain closed.

This selfish attitude irritated the ASEAN countries that were of the opinion that Japan, being an Asian country, should give more importance to Asia. Lastly, many in Asia thought that since Japan had reaped extensive benefits from the Indo-Chinese conflict, it had the moral obligation to take in its share of refugees.

Doi moi and the Withdrawal from Cambodia

To what extent did the freezing of Japanese aid make the Vietnamese more amenable to arguments for withdrawing their troops from Cambodia? This is difficult to ascertain, just as it is difficult to evaluate all the consequences this had on Vietnam's economy. At least three factors can be considered to have been responsible for the unanimously approved Vietnamese change-of-heart.

First of all, the strategic priority changed from territorial expansion to economic reconstruction. From the early 1980s, much thought was given to failure, following reunification and the establishment of a radical socialist system throughout the country. This reflection gave rise to a programme of economic reforms based on a "new economic policy". From 1986 on, economic reform policy or doi moi (literally "change to do new things", renewal or renovation) introduced a market economy and participation in the international market as priorities.

Subsequently, the freezing of aid from developed western countries and Japan, the cessation offoreign investment and all flow oftechnological exchange had a strong impact on the economy, due to the resulting crippling shortage of capital.

Lastly, the Comecom countries' announcement in 1986, ofa gradual reduction in their assistance to Vietnam, forced its authorities to end its international seclusion. The USSR, Vietnam's main supplier of aid, was then planning to reduce 20 per cent of its aid and one-third of its military aid by the end of 1995 in order to better support its own economic reform. In these conditions, the lowering of aid would be more drastic; amounting to 65 per cent in 1990.

With the end of the Cambodian deadlock in 1990, Japan did not tarry in proceeding with a re-examination of its Vietnam aid policy. Japanese decision-makers were faced with the questions ofwhen, and for what reason Japan ought to resume its Official Development Aid (ODA) in Vietnam.

In a meeting with the ASEAN on 27 July 1990, Nakayama Taro, Japan's Foreign Affairs Minister, reaffirmed the objectives of Japan's diplomacy in Asia; the first of which was the desire to work for peace and stability in the entire region. Regarding Vietnam, he said Japan had a lot of hope in economic reforms that, in his opinion, should be accompanied by the democratisation of the political sphere. Thus, Japan's approach to aid policy was seen to be in the process of changing from one aimed at exerting pressure on Vietnam to force it to modify its attitude to the outside world, to an indirect control of regional conditions to encourage economic development. So the Japanese relied on Vietnam's development to encourage peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia. To achieve this, the aid that they proposed to give Vietnam should enable its opening to the world. From an economic point of view, Vietnam's integration into the world market benefited not only Vietnam but also the region as a whole, given that its internal demand would transform it into a new frontier for its neighbours' trade expansion. From a political point of view, on account of this integration into East Asia as an active member of regional development and in fact intensifying its interdependence in the multiple regional networks, Vietnam had to reduce its belief in the power of arms, conceived as the only means for defending its national interests. From then on, the Japanese thought their aid should primarily support the country's economic development. In keeping with progress, they changed the scale and scope of their ODA, introducing market economy and opening up the country. A policy of sanction, objectively, gave in to a policy of incentives.

While Vietnam took great efforts to promote the country's economic liberalisation, it vigorously rejected any thoughts of political pluralism and maintained the principle of the Communist party's leading role. Whether democratisation should be made a condition for reviving aid to Vietnam was a question debated by the Americans and the Japanese. The Gaimushô in its 1990 White Paper conjectured that Japan, as a nation supporting freedom and the democracy like its fundamental values, was to choose a dialogue within an international framework to help to promote the democracy and to assist by the means of the assistance the countries which make efforts to be democratised.[11]

This declaration was clearly an official recognition of the relation between the ODA and Japan's foreign policy. Yet this stand did not imply that the Japanese position held the same perspective as the Americans'. In practice, the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry declared that Japan

would not impose any kind of system or political values in countries receiving its aid. At that time (because things started to change from then), Japan's stand was therefore not to link revival of aid to political or humanitarian conditions. Japan's belief in this field was that development and economic growth would inevitably lead to democracy; a widely held opinion that could, today, appear less obvious because the passage to democracy seems to be less automatic, as could be observed in the case of China. The Japanese were very pragmatic in this respect: they thought that if economic development did not necessarily lead to democracy, stimulating economic development through market mechanisms was a more realistic approach than slowing down a country's economic development by refusing it aid.

The Return of the Japanese

In the field ofsocio-economic changes, Vietnam at first showed few signs of promise. It remained highly critical of the East European countries that had given up socialism. During the 7th Plenary session of the Central Committee in 1989, the Secretary-General of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Nguyen Van Linh, denounced the East Europeans' attitude and reaffirmed that democracy in Vietnam should be "guided" by the Party. Shortly afterwards, however, President Vo Chi Cong accepted that the death of Communism in East Europe was the inevitable result of the Party's errors. In the following Plenary session in 1990, the principle of reform led by Party leaders was again reasserted, and any contestation of the Party's leading role in the country's politics was rejected. Many people in Japan then shared the conviction that in the near future, Vietnam would be facing a head-on collision resulting from tension between political dictatorship and economic liberalisation. This collision did not take place.

During the 1990s, Japan had to face two obstacles in its project of reviving aid to Vietnam. The first one was external and resulted from the United States' and the ASEAN's opposition to aid revival. The second stemmed from the inability of the Vietnamese economy to absorb a massive foreign economic aid. The United States exerted strong pressure to dissuade the Japanese government and companies from providing any financial aid to this country. The Americans particularly feared that the effectiveness oftheir policy of"isolating and pressurising" for the MIAs (soldiers Missing In Action) would be altered. Though the

Bush (Senior) administration had initiated negotiations in 1990, all trade remained prohibited according to the Trading with Enemies Act. In 1991, Washington issued a declaration in which the State Department indicated the four-step process for withdrawing sanctions against Vietnam (including the trade embargo).

First of all, it called for a cease-fire in Cambodia and the setting up of a United Nations temporary administration at Phnom Penh. Following this, the schedule for lifting the trade embargo would depend upon the progress made in the MIA issue.

As long as the United States continued the embargo, the Japanese were supposed to act only on a humanitarian level, or at the most, on the level of human resources and social infrastructure development.

For their part, the ASEAN countries toned down their opposition to the revival of Japanese aid because they had seen the evident potential of the Indo-Chinese markets. In the early 1990s, public capital and private investors began to flood this new promising market, despite a certain preliminary inertia on the part of the bureaucracy and the military, which had tried, without much success, to slow down initial efforts.

The Vietnamese in Japan (1999)

Resident Status	Number
Authorised professional activities	2,170
Interns	1,619
Students	599
Pupils	92
Vietnamese staying in Japan	4,480
Long-term residents	5,401
Permanent residents	3,903
Others	1,114
Vietnamese living in Japan	10,418
Total	14,898

Sources: Nyûkan Kyôkai (Japan Immigration Association), Heisai 12 nenppan zairyûgaikokujin Tôkei (Statistics on foreigners in 2000), Nyûkan Kyôkai (Tokyo, July 2000): 155.

Vietnam's Official Development Aid (1976–85) (in millions of dollars)

	Japan	OECD and multilateral aid*	USSR
1976–80	111.8	1,354.9	1,400
1981–85	8.3	680.6	6,200

Note: *Countries of the Development Assistance Committee of OECD and Organisations of multilateral aid.

Sources: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Development Countries, Paris, years referred to: 1980, 1984, 1987 and 1990.

Part Three

A Time for Exchanges and Rediscovery

Business Opportunity

商機

CHAPTER 5

Development of Business Relations

Economicrelations between Japan and Vietnam cannot be analysed without taking into consideration the yawning gap that separates the two countries: Vietnam's GDP of $33 billion in 2001 was only 0.8 per cent of Japan's. In 2001, Japan's exports to Vietnam were not even two days' worth of its exports to all countries. Yet the Japanese authorities, as well as companies took the 1987 opening up of the Vietnamese economy very seriously. Right from the early nineties, the Japanese government showed its willingness to support the economic transition process. In 1992, Japan became the first country to give development aid to the tune of $282 million; in the following years, this quantum only continued to grow and in 1999, Vietnam was the fourth largest recipient of Japanese aid. For their part, companies developed a very systematic approach to the Vietnamese market.

Considering that Japanese companies are powerful and have close relations with the State, many observers anticipated a Japanese tidal wave, which would lead to an absolute domination of the Vietnamese economy. As in Indonesia, and to some extent, in Thailand, the prevalent opinion was that after the influx of donations and public loans, the markets would succumb to the domination of Japanese firms. In Indonesia, Japanese companies controlled 70 per cent ofthe colour television,

80 per cent of the motorcycle and 90 per cent of the automobile markets.[1] But as for trade in Vietnam, as seen today, it is considerably more diversified: Japan has indeed become Vietnam's leading trade partner, but it is only the third biggest direct investor. While it occupies a dominating position in certain sectors, such as infrastructure and energy production, it has serious competition in others.

1991: The Starting Point

As mentioned before, in the second halfofthe 1980s, exchanges between Japan and Vietnam were quite negligible since most of Vietnam's trade was with the USSR and the socialist bloc countries. However, it was at this time that the Japanese sôgôshôshacame back to Vietnam, with the Nissho Iwai establishing a representative office there in 1986. Their first objective was to import Vietnamese oil, as production had just begun in the Bach Ho wells, in collaboration with the USSR. These trading companies also undertook detailed studies of Vietnam's developmental needs and multiplied business delegations to this destination. From 1991 onwards, economic exchange was intensified for several reasons. First ofall, Japan launched a series ofdiplomatic initiatives in the region. The Japanese Prime Minister Taro Nakayama went to Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia. This was the first visit ofa Japanese leader since diplomatic relations were established between the countries in 1973.

At the same time, Japan participated in the negotiation of the Paris Accord, according to which Vietnamese troops were to withdraw from Cambodia, and a major United Nations peacekeeping mission was to be sent to this country. The resumption of trade relations thus took place in a specific political framework that encompassed not just Vietnam but the entire Indo-Chinese peninsula.

The quantum of trade, however, remained moderate: Vietnam's exports to Japan were worth $340 million in 1990, and comprised mainly oil, whereas imports from Japan were only to the tune of $169 million.

Trade accelerated when the American embargo on Vietnam was lifted in 1994. In August that year, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama visited Hanoi to announce the launching of a 600 million dollar aid programme. Japanese companies that had earlier operated through front companies based in Hong Kong or Singapore could now work directly from Vietnam. The sôgôshôsha continued to establish themselves and by the late 1990s, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Tomen and Kanematsu were all

Trade between Vietnam and Japan, 1986–2000
(in millions of current dollars)



Source: ADB, Economics and Development Resources Center, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Country, 28 (Oxford University Press, 1999). <www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/1999/default.asp>

present in Vietnam. Exports from Vietnam to Japan would quadruple in four years, to settle at $1.2 billion in 1994.

It should be noted that in sectors considered strategic by Japan, companies combined a strategy of commercial penetration and establishment with an "upstream" approach that, closely linked to Japanese public development aid, offered Vietnamese authorities strategic advice and analyses. The example of Mitsubishi in the automobile sector is an interesting case in point.

In late 1992, Mitsubishi Corp. handed over to the Vietnamese authorities a report entitled "Development Plan for the Automobile Industry", containing detailed suggestions for the sector. Among these were the means of transport to be given priority, as well as detailed

demand projections targeting the year 2005, according to the type of vehicle, price levels and the evolution of customer preferences. It also contained extremely precise recommendations for the production of vehicles and spare parts. According to experts, the scope of the report was to simultaneously lay the ground for the development of a sound automobile industry in Vietnam, and to ensure this became the stronghold of Japanese firms. The Japanese would adopt similar measures in other sectors, particularly that ofinfrastructure, by financing studies and master plans through public development aid credit (see infra).

Trade

Japan and Vietnam followed a trade model common between countries with very different models of economic development. Thus, in 1999, textiles accounted for 27 per cent of Vietnamese exports to Japan, marine products 21 per cent and crude oil, 17 per cent. For its part, Japan exported capital goods and manufactured goods. A part of Japanese exports to Vietnam was induced by aid flows: thus Japan exported construction equipment, bulldozers and excavators used by Hanoi to carry out major infrastructure work.

During the course of the decade, a more or less parallel trade progression was observed between the two countries. Japanese exports increased, and Vietnam, in turn, increased its exports to Japan. It is interesting to note that this resulted more from the motivations of the Japanese authorities and sôgôshôshathan from the Vietnamese themselves. Vietnamese companies were not in a position to effectuate a real prospecting of the Japanese market, which was reputed to be a particularly difficult one. They had few or no representative offices in Japan. Therefore Japan was the one to play an active role in stimulating Vietnamese exports, by providing support mechanisms. JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) organised several trade fairs in Vietnam, during which Vietnamese companies met potential Japanese importers, and managers and executives from Vietnamese companies were invited to Japan. In a rare and remarkable occurrence, until 1999, Vietnam had a trade surplus. It was almost as if Japan "accepted" a deficit just to promote the development of the Vietnamese economy. However, the figure was negligible in relation to total Japanese exports.

As we said earlier, the lifting of the American embargo gave an impetus to trade, and exports from Vietnam to Japan doubled from

Japan's and China's share of Vietnam's total import (%)

Source: ADB, Economics and Development Resources Center, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Country, 28 (Oxford University Press, 1999). <www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/1999/default.asp.>

1994 to 2000, from $1.2 billion to $2.4 billion, and Japan became Vietnam's leading trade partner. However significant this progression might have been, considering Vietnam's overall trade evolution during the decade, it was truly a boom. From $2.4 billion in 1990, Vietnamese exports grew 5.5 times to reach the figure of $13.9 billion in 2001. Vietnamese trade grew concurrently with a large number of countries and zones. For an idea of these figures, exports to Korea went up 13 times and to China 138 times.

Simultaneously, Japan's share of Vietnamese imports grew in relative value and settled at 13.9 per cent in 2001, but Japan was in significant competition with its Asian neighbours: imports from Korea touched

Main products traded between Vietnam and Japan

Vietnamese Products Exported to Japan	Products Imported from Japan
1. Fish and sea-food	1. Electrical equipment
2. Deep-frozen shrimps	2. Industrial products
3. Cuttlefish	– chemicals
4. Metal goods	– machinery, accessories and building machinery
5. Wood and coke	– industrial machinery
6. Pharmaceutical products	– equipment
7. Fuels (coal, petroleum)	3. Transport vehicles
8. Silk	– lorries and buses
9. Garments	– motor coaches
10. Luggage	– motorcycles
11. Household accessories and furniture	4. Electrical goods
	– electrical appliances
	– motors
	– audio-visual equipment
	5. Metal products
	– alloys and steel

Source: Ha Huy Thanh, External EconomicPolicies of Vietnam and Japan-Vietnam EconomicRelations, no. 322 (Tokyo: IDE, VRF series, 1999), p. 27.

11.4 per cent of the total, and from China, 12.2 per cent. Particularly in the FMCG (fast moving consumer goods) markets, Chinese imports were in direct competition with Japanese products. In terms of trade, Japan was thus able to establish an important position, though not a predominant one, in Vietnam's trade. An examination of the strategic choices made by the Vietnamese authorities pertaining to key sectors of the economy explains these figures. We shall return to this later.

Direct Investments: An Evolution Over Four Periods

During the first half of the 1990s, the quantum of Japanese direct investment remained very low: between $168 and $250 million per year. Admittedly, this was due to constraints arising from the American embargo, but it also reflected the stumbling blocks Japanese companies encountered in the Vietnamese context: the bureaucracy, complex decision making, absence of reliable information. In this regard, the Japanese approach was hardly different from that of western nations,

and was quite in contrast to the "coups" that Singaporean and especially Taiwanese companies were wont to attempt, without hesitation. During this period, except for financing oil exploration (see infra), Japanese investments remained very modest.

Despite that, companies were not passive. During the first half of the decade, there were tens of thousands of visits by Japanese companies that were gathering detailed information through numerous study missions, in careful preparation of their projects. The Japanese sought to win the confidence of their Vietnamese partners; most often public enterprises, and of the authorities.

As soon as the embargo was lifted, trade saw a marked acceleration and in 1995, the annual investment flow rose to $1.2 billion. Many projects, drawn up in the preceding years, were implemented.

The Japanese were interested in heavy and light industries, construction, real estate, and also constructed industrial zones: Nomura Industrial Park in Hai Phong (investment of $163 million), Thang Long Industrial Park in Hanoi ($53 million) and Long Binh Industrial Park in the Dong Nai province ($41 million). One of the aims of these industrial zones was to encourage Japanese firms to establish themselves. However, in 1996, Japanese investment flow dropped abruptly to $591 million; a fall that preceded the Asian financial crisis. This showed that Japanese companies were changing the way they saw the Vietnamese market, for, during the same year, Japan's direct investments increased in other Asian countries.[2]

Locally, Japanese investors complained of the difficulties they encountered when they operated their businesses, such as the state of Vietnamese infrastructure, the lack of information about projects, the complex decision-making process in Vietnam and corruption. These criticisms were not very different from those expressed by other investing countries of the time. The response of the Vietnamese authorities was to show their willingness to have talks and arrange various co-ordination structures with foreign investors, such as the Private Sector Forum, organised by the World Bank. In addition, a working group consisting of government directors and company heads of Japan and Vietnam was formed. Concomitantly, Japan put in place an arrangement to insure investments, to give them greater protection.

However, this dialogue initiative and the mechanisms actually put in place were not sufficient: during 1998 and 1999, Japanese direct investment flows dropped to an average of $85 million. And despite the

Japanese Direct Investments and Public Development Aid to Vietnam (1988–2000) (in millions ofdollars)



Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment, Vietnam InvestmentReview; Embassy of Japan in Vietnam for ODA. <www.vir.com.vn>

acceleration in investments in the year 2000, with them crossing the highest level recorded in the decade with an amount ofalmost $2 billion, the leap was due only to oil exploration contracts and the construction of a gas pipeline.

In December 2000, 290 Japanese investors were established in Vietnam, with a registered capital of $4 billion. This placed Japan in third place amongst foreign investors in Vietnam, after Singapore and Taiwan. In terms of realisation, that is to say, actual disbursement of funds, Japan was the leading investing country (see table on p. 75).

The Logic and the Modes of Establishment

Japanese companies are found in many sectors ofactivity. This is because the groups are conglomerates, which permits them to position themselves simultaneously in different sectors, while getting the support of banks affiliated to each group. Four major lines ofreasoning determine investment decisions:

1. The logic of security of supplies. This can be seen in oil, gas and coal. In the case of oil, the requisite high figure of investments considerably affects the total figure of Japanese direct investments in Vietnam.

2. The logic of out-sourcing. This means using Vietnam as production base, with a view to re-exporting products. From this perspective, Vietnam is included in the general strategy of Japanese companies that first made them choose Southeast Asia and China to set up activities that were not likely to attain a profitable level in Japan. According to a study conducted by JETRO in 2001, 36 per cent of the Japanese companies in Vietnam exported their entire production. Clearly, low salary structures were attractive, and not just for Japanese investors. Thus Nike, a company which recently faced disputes related to working conditions in Vietnam, carried out 90 per cent of its production in Taiwan and Korea in the nineties. Nike gave up on these countries, mainly because of the increase in minimum wage, and shifted operations to countries like Vietnam, China, Indonesia, and Pakistan (see figure on p. 74). However, cost was not the only consideration.

3. The logic of market penetration. Many investors sought a presence in the Vietnamese market as soon as it opened up. Although they were aware that it was a small market, they thought it necessary to grab a significant market share by swiftly taking positions in the country. Further, being present in the market gave these companies the advantage of blocking the entry of competitors who came in late. This logic worked in the sector of products for mass consumption, such as electronic goods, motorcycles and cosmetics.

4. Falling in line with priorities of Japanese public development aid. As we shall see again in Chapter 7, power generation, infrastructure and transport are the sectors most closely allied to the interests of development aid and the support of Japanese companies. The latter make an entry into the country by production units established on the spot through joint ventures or direct investment, or by importing equipment and machines to carry out projects.

Generally, the establishment of Japanese companies happens through close connections with the Vietnamese authorities. Thus in 2001, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Mitsubishi signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Vietnamese Ministry of Planning

Sector-wise Japanese investments in Vietnam
(millions ofcurrent dollars from January 1988 to November2000)



Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment, Vietnam InvestmentReview.

and Investment and the Industry Ministry. Their aim was to gather detailed lists of projects arising from Vietnamese public enterprises, so as to give them to Japanese companies.

Management and Performances of Companies

It is not easy, by and large, to explain the management system set up by Japanese companies in Vietnam and the results it achieved. One criterion can however be considered first: an effective project set-up. In the first years of the opening of the Vietnamese economy, few were the foreign projects involving colossal investment figures that saw the light of day. In the case of Japanese companies, the rate of disbursement of investment projects was high: in 2001, a study by JETRO showed that

The 23 leading Japanese subsidiaries in Vietnam*
(Investments larger than 10 million dollars)

Name	Year of Creation	Activity (activities)	Province	Capital (millions of dollars)	Japanese and Local Partners (share of total capital)
Nghi Son Cement Corp.	1995	Cement	Thanh Huoa	104	NM Cement, Vietnam Cement (35%)
Ajinomoto Vietnam Company	1993	Food products	Dong Nai	53.5	Vietnam Food Industries (30%)
Toyota Motor Vietnam**	1996	Automobiles and auto parts	Vin Phuc	49.14	N.a (30%)
Vietnam Float Glass	1999	Glass	Bac Ninh	45	Nihon Itagarasu, Viglacera (30%)
Honda Vietnam	1996	Two-wheelers	Vin Phuc	31.2	VEAM (28%)
Nidec Tosok Co.	1998	Auto ancillaries	Ho Chi-Minh City	29.38	Nihon Densan (100%)
Mabuchi Motor Vietnam	1997	Small motors	Dong Nai	28.14	Mabuchi Motor Vietnam (100%)
Mitsui Vina Plastic & Chemical	1996	Plastic products	Ho Chi-Minh City	27	Mitsui Corp, local (66%)
Yamaha Motor Vietnam Co	1998	Two-wheelers	Hanoi	20.53	VINAFOR (35.5%), Hong Leong Industries
Vina Kyoei	1996	Metal products	Vung Tau	20	Vietnam Steel Corp (40%)
Sakura Hanoi Plaza Joint Venture Co.	1993	Hotels	Hanoi	20	Hanoi Bus Station (40%)
San Miguel Yamamura Haiphong Glass	1996	Glass	Haiphong	17.45	Haiphong Glass (27.2%)
Than Long Industrial Park Corp.	1997	Industrial zone	Hanoi	18.86	Sumitomo Corp., Dong Anh Mechanical (48%)
Isuzu Vietnam	1997	Lorries	Ho Chi-Minh City	14.7	Isiuzu Motors (35%), Itochu Corp. (35%), Samco (20%), Govimex (10%)
Japan Vietnam Fertilizers Co.	1998	Fertilisers	Ho Chi-Minh City	14	Nissho Iwai (*60.4%), Central Glass (9.6%), Southern Fertilizer (30%)
YKK Vietnam	1998	Zip fasteners	Ho Chi-Minh City	13	YKK Vietnam (100%)
Vietindo Daihatsu Automotive Corp.	1996	Mini lorries	Hanoi	12.32	Daihatsu (26%), Kanematsu (2%), local (72%)
Yazaki EDS Viet-nam	1996	cables	Bing Duong	12.16	Yazaki EDS Viet-nam (100%)
Thi Vai International Port Co.	1997	Port management	Baria-Vung Tau	12	Kyoei (52%), Vung Tau Shipping and Service (38.4%), Vietnam Steel (9.6%)
Vietnam Suzuki Corp.	1996	Two and four wheelers	Dong Nai	11.7	Suzuki (35%), Nishi Iwai (35%), Veam Vikyno Factory (30%)
Muto Vietnam Corp.	1996	Plastics	Dong Nai	11	Muto (97.5%), Tomen (2.5%)
Lotte Vietnam Co.	1996	Food products	Song Be	10	Lotte (60%), Marubeni (5%), Lotte Korea(10%), local (25%)
Inoue Rubber Vietnam Co.	1998	Tyres	Vinh Phuc	10	Sao Van Rubber (30%)

Notes: * The Toyo Keizai has counted 172 subsidiaries of Japanese companies in 2000.
** Toyota has two other commercial subsidiaries, Toyota TC Hanoi Service Corp. (1996), and Toyota Tsusho Saigon Motor (1995).
Sources: Toyo Keizai, Rinji Zokan Data Bank, Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo SoKan, Koku Betsuan, 2001, pp. 519–29.

only 9.8 per cent of the projects undertaken, representing 5.8 per cent of the capital had been cancelled, as against an average of 15 per cent for all foreign investment projects taken together[3] (see box below).

Secondly, the profitability of Japanese companies in Vietnam is obviously an essential criterion for the quality oftheir management. This question seems to have provoked many debates in Japan. In an article published in 2001, in the magazine Diamond, Gene Gregory, a consultant who had lived for a long time in Japan, and then in Vietnam, wrote that the Japanese investment boom in Vietnam was over.[4] He felt that the situation was the outcome of several factors, in particular, due to Japanese firms that were established in the course of the 1990s, such as Fujitsu, Mabuchi Motor, Ajinomoto or Sony, acquiring dominating positions in their respective sectors, which could discourage any possible new entrants. However, the companies that were already present were satisfactory performers: According to a study conducted by JETRO in 2001, 62 per cent ofthe 129 companies posted profits, a figure that was 4 per cent higher than the previous year. If the profitability of Japanese companies in Vietnam seemed perfectly tenable, it is nevertheless goes without saying that Japanese company heads kept a close watch on the respective performances of different Asian countries. Thus, in a certain number of sectors, Japanese companies showed growing interest in China (see table on p. 78).

Mitsui in Vietnam

Founded in 1876, Mitsui is ranked amongst the leading Japanese groups in the field of international trade. Its presence in Vietnam goes back to a long time. In 1897, the company was buying rice and rubber from Vietnam. In 1997, the volume of transactions between Japan and Vietnam controlled by this company was 600 million dollars. Its Vietnamese customers were big companies such as the Vietnamese Electricity Board, Post and Telecommunications, VN Steel Corporation or PetroVietnam. Mitsui created 16 companies, as joint-ventures or with 100 per cent investment in Vietnam. Total investments were more than $300 million and allowed the creation of 16,000 jobs. The fields of activity ranged from chemicals to spare parts for the automobile industry, including textiles, steel or food products.

Source: Vietnam Scoop, no. 21, 1 November 1998.

Sectorial Elucidation

We have singled out four important sectors in particular, not only from the angle of Vietnamese economy, but also considering its relations with Japan. The first one is oil, in which the Japanese interest can be traced back to the late 1970s. Secondly, the telecommunications sector is an important "test" sector to appraise the effectiveness ofthe enterprise strategies of foreign, and hence Japanese, companies. Next, infrastructure and power production deserve particular attention for these are, without a doubt, the sectors in which Japanese outlay (ODA and investment) is the heaviest. And finally, to complete our observations, the consumer goods sector; greatly favoured by the Japanese in other developing countries of the region.

The Importance of Oil

The oil sector constitutes a major factor both for Vietnam and the relations between the two countries. The American company Mobil discovered oil during the Vietnam War, yet it was only in 1981 that drilling operations could begin, within the framework of a partnership with a Russian company Zarubezhneft, and a Vietnamese state enterprise Petro-Vietnam. The Vietsovpetro joint venture alone currently produces more

Membership figures for Japanese Chambers of Commerce and Industry in some ASEAN countries
(number of member companies, March 2001)

Country	Name	Number of members
Indonesia	Jakarta Japan Club	363
Malaysia	The Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Malaysia	519
Philippines	Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Philippines	446
Singapore	Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Singapore	838
Thailand	Japan Chamber of commerce and Industry in Bangkok	1,159
Vietnam	Japan Chamber of commerce and Industry in Hanoi	111
	Japan Chamber of commerce and Industry in Ho Chi Minh City	211
TOTAL		3,647

Source: Nihon Shôkô Kagisho, Tokyo, 2002.

Japanese companies' intentions regarding foreign investments

Which are the promising countries for your medium term overseas operations?
(for the 3 coming years; multiple replies)

		Rank in 2001
China	82%	1
USA	32%	2
Thailand	25%	3
Indonesia	14%	4
India	13%	5
Vietnam	13%	6*
Taiwan	11%	7
South Korea	8%	8
Malaysia	8%	9
Singapore	6%	10
France	4%	15

As far as Vietnam is concerned, the companies cite the following factors:
- Cheap labour: 78.7%
- Market with strong potential growth: 44.7%
- Excellent human resources: 27.7%
- Export base for trade with third parties: 25.5%
- Export base for Japan: 23.4%

Note: *Rank in 2000.
Sources: Results ofa survey conducted in a sample ofcompanies having activities and installations in foreign countries (in 2001, 792 companies, of which 63% replied); Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) 2001 Survey, The Outlook for Japanese Foreign Direct Investment(Tokyo: JBIC, 2002), pp. 39–40 and 43.

than 80 per cent of Vietnamese oil. The country's actual reserves stand at around 600 million barrels and it is expected that new wells will be discovered.

Japan's interest in Vietnamese oil began as early as 1976, as it wanted to diversify its supply sources. All through the previous decade, Japanese trading companies bought around 80 per cent of the oil produced by Vietnam, on the basis of quotas negotiated with the Vietnamese state enterprise, Petrolimex. Though Mitsubishi-Meiwa, Sumitomo, Nissho Iwai and Marubeni are prominent amongst the buyers, the Japanese have only a minor role in oil exploration and production.

As far as exploration is concerned, investments take place in the form of contracts for production sharing, in which the investment is

Oil production and exports

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Production millions of metric tons	10.1	12.5	15.2	16.3	16.7
Exports millions of dollars	1350	1400	1500	3570	3500

Source: The General Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook(Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2002), p. 213 (for production), Ministry of Commerce and World Bank, Vietnam EconomicMonitor (Hanoi: The World Bank in Vietnam, Spring 2002), p. 36 (for exports).

made by the foreign partner. The exploration sector is controlled by the state enterprise PetroVietnam that is the obligatory partner of foreign companies. In 1990, Vietnam had granted nine exploration licenses to oil companies and in 2000, this number rose to 33, with around ten already having commenced operations. In order to reduce prospecting costs, the oil companies worked through joint ventures. MJC combines American and Japanese interests, Idemitsu and Zarubezhneft bring together Japan and Russia, and AEDC and JVPC are solely Japanese concerns.

For want of refining industries, almost all the crude oil is exported to other countries in the zone: Japan, China, Australia, and Singapore. Ten years ago, the Vietnamese authorities announced their intention to build a refinery; at first, slated for the south ofthe country. Many foreign companies, including Japanese ones, expressed an interest. Feasibility studies were conferred on Total, but these did not lead to an agreement, as the Vietnamese authorities decided to change the proposed site. They chose instead, Dung Quat, to the south of Danang, and, as a result, the projected profitability of the project was considerably reduced. Finally a decision was made to grant a license to a joint venture composed 50/50 of Zarubezhneft and PetroVietnam.

In this sector, the situation of Japanese companies was restricted by two main factors. The first was an outcome of the hazards inherent in oil research: the large majority of oil produced now is done through the joint-venture Vietsovpetro. The second results from the desire ofthe Vietnamese authorities to strongly diversify partnerships with foreign countries.

Telecommunications

Telecommunications is a strategic sector in many respects, as it serves to shape Vietnam's future development opportunities; whether for exchanges with foreign countries or in relation to the internal development ofthe economy. Thus the Vietnamese have clearly understood that the standard of education and its development in the country were dependent on access to knowledge resources, especially the Internet.

The field of telecommunications has witnessed nearly 20 per cent annual growth since the 1990s. In 1991, Vietnam had only 127,000 telephone connections, that is, 0.2 per cent for 100 habitants. By 1998, the number ofconnections went up to 2 million, and the percentage was 2.58. However, this was still far from Thailand's 6 per cent, Malaysia's 15 per cent and Singapore's 40 per cent.

Until 1996, Vietnam Post and Telecommunications (VNPT) had a monopoly, and regulations disallowed direct investments in the sector. So Vietnamese authorities set up an arrangement by which they authorised business cooperation agreements. Foreign investors installed telephone lines and the resulting communications provided remuneration. Between 1995 and 1997, VNPT signed three cooperation agreements, based on a common model, with foreign partners. In the case ofJapan, collaboration was brought about through a consortium comprising NTT, Nissho Iwai and Sumitomo (see table).

Cooperation agreements for the construction and commissioning of telecommunications infrastructure

Foreign partner	Date	Number of lines	Contract Value (millions of USD)
NTT, Nissho Iwai and Sumitomo	November 1997	240 000	222
France Telecom	November 1997	540 000	493
Cable &Wireless	November 1997	250 000	207
Telstra	Several contracts in succession 1998	n.a	237
Comvik	1993	n.a	n.a

Sources: Vietnamese Press, Company sites, and DGPT, Vietnam. Figures reconstituted by the authors from information that appeared in the Vietnamese Press and in the site <www.vnpt.com.vn.>.

At the same time, the Vietnamese government induced partial competition in the sector by authorising the promotion of a new company, Saigon Postel Corporation. Apart from land lines, this company was authorised to provide mobile telephone and Internet services.

In 1998, the army floated another company, Vietel. In 1999, the Japanese authorities handed over a master plan for the period 2000–2010 to the Vietnamese government. This plan showed an investment programme evaluated at $5.7 billion for the whole period; that is, no less than 17.3 per cent of Vietnam's current GDP. The objective was mainly to increase the production of equipment so as to provide 15 to 20 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants by 2010.

Of course, it was necessary to use the equipment; the market for which developed rapidly, going from $710 million in 1997 to $1,200 million in 1999.[5] In this field, as in others, Vietnam followed a policy of systematic diversification of supplies, a part of which was manufactured on the spot through joint ventures. Goldstar produced optic fibre cables and digital switches, Daesung (Korea) took charge of cable production, Alcatel, the assembly of digital switches and Newtel (a group supported by Goldman Sachs and Nikko Securities) manufactured telephone equipment. For its part, Siemens produced optic fibre cables and digital switches.

Though we are not able to provide the exact statistics about import of telecommunication equipment, most of the information gathered shows that in this respect too, diversification is the rule. The professionals of the sector estimate that there are currently not less than twelve different kinds of digital switches!

It is interesting to note that the Japanese sôgô shôshas, especially Sumitomo, Nichimen and Kanematsu, intervene in the financing of equipment purchase, without, however confining themselves to products of Japanese origin. Eventually, the signing of the bilateral trade agreement in 2001, between Vietnam and the United States, would also have a profound impact on the sector. American companies suffered because of the American embargo. Until recently, they were not very active and they wish to make up for the delay. In early 2002, the Vietnamese government announced the intention of opening its market to American companies and asked the United States to participate in the Vinasat Communication satellite project, costing an estimated $197 million. Lastly, as this is a strategic, growing sector, Japanese companies face strong competition and cannot be regarded to be in a predominant position.

The Infrastructure Sector

Infrastructure was a major bottleneck for the Vietnamese economy in the beginning of the 1990s. Since then, this sector has experienced a highly consistent growth. A good indication of this progress was the growth ofconstruction equipment imports; the value ofwhich rose from $106 million in 1995 to $377 million in 1998. This increasewas chiefly based on public orders and development aid. Between 1996 and 2000, the proportion of infrastructure in the budget outlay for Vietnam was to the tune of 34 per cent, i.e. almost 3 per cent of the GDP.

In this field, the Japanese took the pole position; here, the features of their development aid policy obviously worked in companies' favour. According to the Japanese doctrine in this matter, the projects have to be generated by the beneficiary country. In a context where it is still difficult for Vietnamese ministries and agencies to create projects conforming to international standards, Japanese companies had all the time to take the initiative by "advising" their local partners.

Preliminary studies were undertaken with the help offunding from Japanese public powers, which helped them establish themselves in the initial phase of the project. Thus, between February 1999 and June 2000, the Transport Ministry carried out a study financed by JICA, which resulted in the publication of a "master plan", a strategic study of Vietnamese transports; a document that became the reference point for almost all the players involved in the sector. Most notably, it suggested the priority development goals to be targeted over the medium term (drawing up of a 5-year plan) and long term (10-year master plan and 20-year perspectives) for a number ofmajor projects. Very recently, JICA declared its intention to finance the carrying out of the master plan for transports in Hô Chi Minh City and the Red river transport plan.

At the same time, the Japanese ensured a more significant part of the finances, both in the form of donations (through JICA) or loans. Thus, from 1992 to 1999, the Japan Bank for International Co-operation (ex-OECF) committed to providing loans to the tune of $5.3 billion dollars, at concessionary interest rates. Projects financed by the Japanese are considerable in number and importance: renovation ofthe Da Nang port, in the centre of Vietnam and the Hai Phong port in the north; renewal of the main highways and construction of bridges, both on the country's major communication routes and in rural areas. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that Japan occupies an important place as far as construction material supply to Vietnam is concerned. In 1997,

its market share of these imports was 26 per cent, but it is interesting to note that the overall share of European suppliers was more, at 37 per cent. Asian competition was also in the running, with a market share of 16.6 per cent for Korea, 6.3 per cent for Taiwan and 5.4 per cent for China.

Consumer Goods

The consumer goods market, which is growing steadily, shows two distinct characteristics: in urban areas, it is close to the models that can be observed in other, more developed Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand or the Philippines; on the other hand, the weak purchasing power in rural areas considerably affects overall sales. The best selling products are often those manufactured by Vietnamese companies, and the market share of imported goods is extremely low.

In cities, the market is very competitive since all available products are made by purely Vietnamese companies or joint venture companies, or are imported. Japanese products penetrated the market in the early eighties, often smuggled in from Thailand. Subsequently, the Vietnamese government adopted an import substitution policy that in principle, restricted consumer goods imports and favoured those that were locally produced. Japanese companies preferred a cautious approach and were content to export their products for several years. The company Honda, for example, was established only in 1996, as a joint-venture, and began production only in 1997.

Japanese companies are mainly active in areas in which they are traditionally strong competitors, such as motorcycles and popular electronic products. In the as yet tiny automobile market, in 2001, Toyota was responsible for around 29 per cent of the sales. In recent times, Japanese companies have expressed concern about the steady influx of Chinese products, especially motorcycles, which tend to impinge on the Japanese market share, as they are sold at much lower prices than Japanese products. Companies are also increasingly worried by the rise of the fake goods market: very recently, Matsushita Electric bought advertisement space in the Vietnamese Press to warn consumers about the imitations ofone ofits brands and threatened to sue the counterfeiters.

Vietnamese Interests versus Japanese Interests

In the introduction, we spoke of the yawning gap between the Vietnamese and Japanese economies. Seen from the Vietnamese angle, the

development of relations with Japan could only be profitable; whether in terms of development, trade or investment aid. Let us not forget that in the early nineties, Vietnam faced the collapse ofits external trade with the USSR and People's democracies, and so the diversification of its markets and supplies was of vital importance. Seen from the Japanese angle, however, the benefits are less apparent. Admittedly, that the Japanese wished to diversify their oil supply sources should be duly noted. But even Vietnam's enormous hydrocarbon reserves would not be enough to meet Japan's requirements. Besides, even after a decade of increasingly intense economic trade, the Japanese did not manage to establish a dominating position in the oil sector. The major part of the production still arises from collaboration between Vietnam and Russia, and the Vietnamese tend to multiply their international collaborations for prospecting new wells. So we cannot be satisfied with an analysis that reduces the economic relations between the two countries to an aid for oil "accord", as seen in other countries supported by Japan.

In fact, Japan's interest in Vietnam rather reflects the desire of Japanese companies to acquire a market share with the taking off of the economy, orchestrated by the great strategic choices of the Vietnamese government (see Chapter 7). However, these dynamics must be broken down into two sub-groups, the characteristics of which are quite heterogeneous.

In the first sub-group, infrastructure construction and energy production, especially electricity, should be included. In this regard, development aid would be a way of ensuring Vietnamese demand and also, since it concerns infrastructure, a way of creating a good circle of development. The rapid development ofinfrastructure, in particular, ofports, simultaneously enables Japanese companies to find new markets and Vietnamese external trade to develop. Further, it results in increasing the overall efficiency ofthe Vietnamese economy by reducing transport costs, which indirectly benefits Japanese companies established in Vietnam.

The second sub-group includes the sector of mass consumption goods, motorcycles and cars. Here, aid "mechanics" work very slightly, ifat all. Japanese companies deal with the Vietnamese market within the framework of their general approach to Asian markets; which is a long-term one, as they rely on the gradual increase of demand.

At this point, we must bring into question the economic viability of the Japanese approach, in terms of the ratio of the costs/advantage of development aid funds to the purely economic investment (direct

investment and the setting up oftrade networks). The economic hazards of the Vietnamese market, even seen in a medium term perspective, are quite low as compared to other Southeast Asian countries, not to mention China. According to a purely economic logic, this investment has some meaning only if it allows Japan to achieve a sustained and significant market share in Vietnam. Now, if we examine the structure of Vietnamese imports, we see that ifJapan has actually increased its market share in ten years, from 7 per cent in 1987 to almost 15 per cent in 1999, the figure is still considerably lower than those it has achieved in other countries of the region (24 per cent in 1999 in the case of Indonesia, for example). Moreover, in the coming years, Japan's position in Vietnam is set to be strongly challenged by China, on the one hand (and Korea, to a lesser extent) and on the other by the United States, that stands to benefit from the opening of Vietnamese markets, at least in certain sectors, such as telecommunications.

We are therefore inclined to think that as far as Japan is concerned, notwithstanding its economic objectives, its orientation is predominantly political in nature. In other words, as we have already seen, the initiatives come more from the Japanese State, and the companies more or less "follow them up". For their part, the Vietnamese authorities, even though they obviously want to benefit from Japanese funding, have adopted a deliberate strategy of proliferating political and commercial alliances in order to avoid a situation of over-dependence on Japan.

Culture

文化

CHAPTER 6

Mutual Rediscovery

Ideology and the Market

Doi moi was a turning point in the Vietnamese perception of Japan. Before 1985, Japan's representation was first and foremost an ideological one, as it was considered the United States' "junior partner" in the context of the Cold War, in which the Japanese belonged to the enemy camp. Moreover, Japan was seen as one of the three world Capitalist centres, which was quite enough!

Upon realising the failure ofthe radical socialist way to development that they had adopted after the country's reunification, the Vietnamese seemed to turn their backs on the ideology; choosing instead the path of pragmatism, at least as far as the economy was concerned. The end of the Cold War tore down the ideological curtain that concealed all other possible analyses. Hence the Vietnamese would henceforth see Japan differently, as the Asia-Pacific giant. From an imperialist power associated with the American enemy, Japan was transformed into an economic power whose success was judged exemplary by the authorities. Japan's fundamental role in East Asia was acknowledged, especially in the success of the NICs and the rest of the ASEAN, owing to the industrial investments and technology transfers that went with them. Further, the Japanese market became the preferred target for the Vietnamese since the embargo imposed on their country denied their companies access

to the American market. Moreover, Japan became an essential partner for Vietnam in its strategy of opening up internationally, as the United States still refused to normalise its relations with Vietnam, and Europe remained cautious in its approach to the Vietnamese market. Japan also had an edge over Russia since it was on par with the United States in the fields ofscience and technology. Besides, Japan's experience in development and industrial policy was endlessly rich in lessons for Vietnamese leaders. The strategies deployed by Japanese leaders in the field ofenergy or defence (defensive strategy under the American nuclear umbrella) served as inspiration to Vietnamese leaders, who were very partial to the models and policy guidelines they could borrow and adapt to their country's context.

Thus doi moi and the end ofthe Cold War coincided with a distinct warming up to Japan on the parts ofVietnamese leaders. As we will see, the same was true ofVietnamese public opinion and a general tendency in the whole of East Asia.

Images and Perceptions

After the Second World War, and for several decades, the Vietnamese held a negative view of Japan, partially because of the painful memories of the past, but also as a result of the rapid growth in the 1960s. To the image of the cruel invader was added a caricatured, derogatory image of the "economic animal" living only for and through its work; an economic miracle incarnate. This vision would prevail in Asia and in the West for a long time. Violent anti-Japanese demonstrations during the official visits of Japanese Prime Ministers to Southeast Asia in the early 1970s testified to the people's defiant attitude towards the Japanese, whom they once again regarded as intruders. But the Japanese, who were conscious of their image, patiently reconstructed it in Asia through generous public aid programmes and the large investments made by their companies. This approach, which was not unlike France's policy of extending its cultural influence, or "Francophonie" (French-speaking world), can be called "Nippophonie" (Japanese-speaking world), but to a lesser extent, and would turn out to be completely effective in the medium term.

Although Asian countries could not forget the Japanese military adventures and the tragedies of the Pacific War, in their public opinion, it can be seen that Japan's image underwent "pacification". As far as

Vietnam is concerned, a large majority (69 per cent) of the people interviewed in opinion polls conducted by the Japanese press confirm that the past is no longer part of the continual discord between the two countries. Only a small percentage (16.3 per cent) thinks the past is to blame. In this regard, we must note the effect of the population's demographic structure, since the majority consists ofyoung people who had not personally known the World War. We must also note the quite understandable fact that the collective memory of the Indochina and Vietnam Wars left deeper scars on the Vietnamese people than the World War. According to Motoo Furuta, who teaches at the University of Tokyo and is one of the best experts on Vietnam, in primary and secondary school textbooks, depending on whether they were written before or after doi moi, we can see the same distinctions involving approbation for Japan.[1] In recent textbooks, Japan is given far more importance. If critical appraisals of the Second World War period still exist, they are better placed in the international context ofthat time, and in particular, clearly show that the economic success after the War is no longer treated with contempt.

Are the Imperial Army's deeds during the Second World War an obstacle to the development of the relations between your country and Japan?

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Cannot say (%)
China	48.6	34.6	16.8
South Korea	71.3	19.3	9.4
Indonesia	11.8	74.1	14.1
Malaysia	25.2	66.7	8.1
Thailand	35.5	60.1	4.4
Vietnam	16.3	69.0	14.7

Sources: France-JaponEco,no. 65 (Winter 1995): 23, according to a survey conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun in May 1995.

In the course of time, it would be seen that the way its Asian neighbours perceived Japan clearly changed for the better. With the notable exception of South Korea, which could not easily shake off the effects of half a century of colonisation, Japan's image improved. A number of opinion polls conducted over the whole of Asia by major Japanese media, such as the daily Yomiuri Shimbun in May 1995, show that Japan garnered a high percentage of favourable opinions.

What is your impression of Japan?

	Good(%)	Bad (%)	Cannot say (%)
China	52.5	37.8	9.7
South Korea	29.8	67.6	2.6
Indonesia	71.5	13.9	14.6
Malaysia	93.2	2.9	2.8
Thailand	79.6	19.5	0.9
Vietnam	95.3	1.1	3.6

Sources: France-JaponEco,no. 65 (Winter 1995): 23, according to a survey conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun in May 1995.

Seen as a whole, these opinion polls bring out a marked difference between the judgements of Northeast Asian countries, whose approval is qualified, even hostile, and those of the Southeast, clearly in favour of Japan. In the Northeast, the United States is considered the biggest economic partner, whereas in the Southeast, Japan leads the pack. Not only is Japan's economic presence no longer considered dangerous, it is on the contrary desired, encouraged, and in fact judged necessary.[2]

What does the word "Japanese" mean to you?

	Reply 1	Reply 2	Reply 3
China	Polite	Hard-working	Scientifically up-to-date
South Korea	War	Colonial domination	Frightening
Indonesia	Intelligent	Scientifically up to date	Hard-working
Malaysia	Hard-working	Intelligent	Polite
Thailand	Hard-working	Safe economic environment	Patriotic
Vietnam	Hard-working	Scientifically up to date	Intelligent

Sources: France-JaponEco,no. 65 (Winter, 1995): 22, according to a survey conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun in May 1995.

The Japanese national also appears as the role model for all the countries of the region, with once again, the exception of Korea, where he is still synonymous with the soldier of the Imperial army. In an emerging and industrious Asia, the terms "hard-working", "intelligent", and "scientifically up-to-date" express a positive evaluation as well as a fascination, quite different from the envy aroused by the western high standard of living.

The whole of the Asian region experienced a marked amelioration of opinion when questioned on what they felt about Japan. It is also in Southeast Asia that this progression is the most significant. In this region, Japan moved from being repulsive to the best guarantor of development and security. And it is in Vietnam that Japan seems to have the best support. Almost 80 per cent ofthe people who were interviewed felt that their opinion of Japan had improved from 1985 to 1995. This period corresponds to the ten years that had passed from the beginning ofdoi moi, when the country opened up to the world, to the mid-1990s that saw a rapid growth of Japanese investment in the country.

How have your feelings about Japan changed over the last ten years?

	Improved (%)	Worsened (%)	Unchanged (%)	Cannot say (%)
China	25.8	12.0	52.0	10.2
South Korea	42.5	13.4	41.4	2.7
Indonesia	66.5	7.2	15.7	10.6
Malaysia	67.4	14.2	12.3	6.2
Thailand	53.0	22.0	23.2	1.8
Vietnam	79.9	5.0	9.0	6.1

Sources: France-JaponEco,no. 65 (Winter 1995): 22, according to a survey conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun in May 1995.

Besides, the responses ofthe Vietnamese to the question: "ifyou had the opportunity to do so, would you like to work in a Japanese company?", as they appear in the results of the opinion poll conducted by Yomiuri, show that the Vietnamese are the most attracted by this prospect. Once again, these replies show that the Japanese companies established in Southeast Asia enjoy an excellent reputation as employers: they are seen as providing good working conditions, as well as offering promotion and training opportunities.

In 2001, we conducted an opinion poll in Vietnam, retaining the structure ofthe questionnaire adopted in 1995 by the Yomiuri Shimbun. This poll was conducted amongst Vietnamese students of the MBA course at the Franco-Vietnamese Management training Centre housed in Ho Chi Minh City by the University of Economics and in Hanoi by the National Economics University. Our sample comprised 282 students mostly belonging to these two establishments, with an equal number of

If you had the opportunity to do so, would you like to work in a Japanese company?

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Cannot say (%)
China	47.7	39.3	13.0
South Korea	35.4	56.6	8.0
Indonesia	65.3	23.6	11.1
Malaysia	65.6	23.0	11.3
Thailand	69.2	28.7	2.1
Vietnam	75.9	16.2	7.9

Sources: France-JaponEco,no. 65 (Winter 1995): 24, according to a survey conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun in May 1995.

young men and women aged 20 to 35 years. The opinions were more varied as compared to the 1995 survey, probably due to the fact that the sample represents a student population that is still a minority in this country, which is far more aware ofinternational realities than the whole of the Vietnamese population. This is, further, owing to significant changes in recent years, particularly the Asian crisis and the obvious lack of leadership in Japan, which is itself plunged in crisis, and therefore a great disappointment to many of its most fervent supporters in the region. This can be seen, especially in the responses to question 6: "Do you consider Japan the best guarantor of development and security in Southeast Asia?". Lastly, Vietnam's joining ASEAN changed the situation as far as the economic partnership is concerned (question 8). However, it appears that on the whole the 2001 responses do not contradict the earlier Japanese surveys. Thus we find the identical liking for the Japanese model (questions 10 and 11). Finally, the lure ofJapanese firms for future Vietnamese graduates still remains very strong (see table on pp. 92 to 94).

Vietnam and the Ethnic Boom in Japan

For their part, the Japanese are increasingly more attracted to Vietnam; its people, its landscapes, its handicrafts and its food. Change in this regard was radical. From a very small number in the 1970s, followed by a very modest number in the following decade, the flow oftourists would then increase rapidly from the beginning of the 1990s. In one decade, the number ofvisitors to Vietnam grew20-fold, from 10,000 to 200,000,

Opinion poll of Vietnamese regarding Japan

1. What does the word "Japanese" mean to you?

	Reply 1	Reply 2	Reply 3
Men & women	Hard-working (57%)	Scientifically up-to-date (28%)	Intelligent (35%)
Men	Hard-working (52%)	Intelligent (35%)	Scientifically up-to-date (28%)
Women	Hard-working (61%)	Scientifically up-to-date (34%)	Intelligent (35%)

2. What is your impression of Japan?

	Good (%)	Average (%)	Bad (%)
Men & women	58	40	2
Men	59	38	2
Women	56	42	2

3. Are the Imperial Army's deeds during the Second World War an obstacle to the development of the relations between your country and Japan?

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Cannot say (%)
Men & women	23	67	10
Men	23	70	7
Women	23	63	12

4. How have your feelings about Japan changed over the last ten years?

	Improved (%)	Worsened (%)	Unchanged (%)	Cannot say (%)
Men & women	55	16	26	3
Men	55	16	26	3
Women	54	16	25	3

5. Do you consider Japan a peaceful country?

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Cannot say (%)
Men & women	58	21	20
Men	55	24	21
Women	61	19	20

6. Do you consider Japan the best guarantor of development and security in Southeast Asia?

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Cannot say (%)
Men & women	27	49	24
Men	31	50	19
Women	24	47	28

7. Do you think Japan can have a leadership role in Southeast Asia?

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Cannot say (%)
Men & women	46	40	14
Men	44	46	10
Women	47	35	17

8. According to you, which are Vietnam's most important economic partners?

	Reply 1	Reply 2	Reply 3
Men & women	ASEAN (49%)	Japan (22%)	People's Republic of China (21%)
Men	ASEAN (44%)	People's Republic of China (21%)	Japan (17%)
Women	ASEAN (54%)	Japan (25%)	People's Republic of China (21%)

9. Would you say that Japan-Vietnam relations in the last ten years have been essentially economic relations?

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Cannot say (%)
Men & women	73	18	8
Men	77	15	8
Women	68	20	8

10. Do you think Japan can serve as a model for Vietnam?

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Cannot say (%)
Men & women	60	32	8
Men	55	40	5
Women	63	25	12

11. If yes, in which area(s) can it be a model for Vietnam?

	Reply 1	Reply 2
Men & women	Economic (70%)	Economic and cultural (30%)
Men	Economic (79%)	Economic and cultural (21%)
Women	Economic (64%)	Economic and cultural (36%)

12. Regarding Japanese serials and commercials for Japanese products, does Vietnam television broadcast…

	Too many (%)	Enough (%)	Not enough (%)	Cannot say (%)
Men & women	6	65	23	6
Men	8	64	20	8
Women	4	65	25	4

13. If you had the opportunity to do so, would you like to work in a Japanese company?

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Cannot say (%)
Men & women	69	21	10
Men	63	27	10
Women	73	17	10

Note: Hong Kong is included in PRC.
Sources: France-Japon Eco, no. 65 (Winter 1995), according to a survey conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun in May 1995.

that is, more than 60 per cent in certain years. In 2001, Japanese tourists comprised around 9 per cent of the total number, of which the strongest battalions were made up of continental Chinese (around 30 per cent) and Taiwanese (10 per cent), even though the vast majority were seen to be tourists only by their visas, since the main aim of their trip was trade and business.

Equally important are the flows of the viet kieu, the Vietnamese of the diaspora, visiting their families that stayed back in the country. So in 2001, Japanese tourists exceeded the number of American and French tourists.

To meet this rapid increase in the number of Japanese visitors to Vietnam, Japan Airlines, ANA and Vietnam Airlines strengthened their connections with daily flights between Tokyo, Osaka and Ho Chi Minh

Number of Japanese tourists visiting Vietnam
(1993–2000)



Source: Niën Giam Thông Ké (Statistical Directory), General Statistics Office (Hanoi, 2001): 209.

City. A Hanoi-Tokyo connection is also on the cards. The absence of a direct flight between the two capitals during the last decade has resulted in the Japanese mostly visiting the south and the centre of the country. Moreover, the large majority ofthese visitors are less than forty years old and have two distinct characteristics: they mainly comprise young women (Office Ladies) and students.

The direct consequence of this recent predilection for Vietnam is that the Japanese have become increasingly interested in "ethnic" products. From 1999, Japan has been the leading importer of handicrafts and art objects. Products made of wood and bamboo for furniture and interior decoration are particularly appreciated in Japan. In 2000, the country bought more than $60 million worth of these products. Bamboo, a traditional material in Japan, is also much sought after in the modern urban milieu. It is always in vogue. And in a chic boutique in Aoyama, which specialises in bamboo articles, a number of Vietnamese products can be found. This is followed by silk, ceramics and other porcelain items that are much in demand in Japan, whose orders are worth nearly $5 million. Besides, this proclivity is nothing new: Vietnamese ceramics were being exported to Japan since the 16th century. Excavations have uncovered them in a large number of sites in Okinawa, Sakai (near

Osaka), Hakata and Edo (present-day Tokyo). In Japan, in private collections or in museums, lovely pieces of Vietnamese origin can be seen. They are particularly appreciated for their use in the tea ceremony.

A major cultural power in Asia, Japan's influence on Vietnam is also seen to a large extent in its multimedia products, such as disks, video games, cartoons and, of course, manga. A Japanese comic series has become a bestseller in Vietnam: Conan, the great detective, the hero born of the imagination of Gosho Aoyama. The Conan phenomenon deserves special mention as he is a real cult hero amongst young readers; more popular than other well-known comics such as Doraemon or Dragon Ball, which have also stolen the hearts of millions of Vietnamese children. This series sells at the rate of almost 25,000 copies per week, as against an average of 500 for other Vietnamese comics. But curiously, Japan is missing on Vietnamese television. Other Asian countries supply the bulk of the television programmes that are most popular with local viewers: Korea comes first, followed by Hong Kong and Taiwan, and these countries are formidable competitors to the Japanese in this sector. Korean programmes that flood the television channels have a very successful run and are regularly ranked first in the local TV ratings.

If the modern, urban Korean lifestyle is very close to the Japanese lifestyle, Korea has the advantage of offering more affordable dreams to the Vietnamese. Korean ladies' fashion successfully counters Japanese creations, which are too expensive for the average consumer. So a handful of Korean manufacturers dominate 60 per cent of the cosmetics sold legally in Vietnam, as against the 30 per cent claimed by Shiseido, that has a dozen boutiques in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Genuine Shiseido products are priced at 200,000 dong, whereas imitations from China, Taiwan or the Cholon market are available in supermarkets, small shops and even in some bookshops for 10,000 dong. Although the young people of the region see Tokyo as the uncontested fashion and pop culture capital, the Vietnamese turn to Seoul to acquire inexpensive, fashionable clothes, cosmetics and various accessories, apart from handicrafts. The Japanese, or rather, Japanese women have a great liking for products of Vietnamese origin, particularly household goods, tableware and clothing. So, according to the economic daily Nikkei, the ao dai, traditional Vietnamese dresses sell like hotcakes in some chic boutiques in the Daikan-Yama neighbourhood. In the Tobu department store, in another Tokyo neighbourhood, Ikebukuro, Vietnamese products such as ao dai sell very well during the Asian weeks that they organise regularly.

Further, Vietnamese fashion shows held in Tokyo generally are a huge success (see box on p. 98).

For several decades, Tokyoites had considered that fashion, the art of living and gastronomy from Europe and the United States were the only legitimate ones, but now they show a growing interest in all that comes from other Asian countries. Ethnic fashion is in, and restaurants that offer ethnic food grasp this all too well! Vietnam is now cashing in on this tendency, whereas in the past, the Japanese as a whole gave scant consideration to these traditional products, whether they were simple articles of daily use, handicrafts, or works of art. They now seem to be less obsessed by luxury brands and more interested in authentic items. Further, they are more price-conscious than before. In terms of purchasing power, Vietnam is a real Land ofPlenty for Japanese visitors, and Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi have become latter-day El Dorados for Japanese with shopping on their minds. This inclination has compelled the Vietnamese to make a marked progress to improve the quality of their products, knowing that their prices would be competitive anyway.

Japanese Vietnamology and Vietnamese Japanology

In the academic world, Japan has risen to the highest ranks in the field of Vietnamology.[3] The Japanese Association for Vietnamese Studies (Nihon Betonamu kenkyusha kaigi), established in 1987, is today one ofthe biggest in the world. It has more than hundred members. Japanese expert knowledge about Vietnam is of a high order. The specialists on this country are based almost everywhere in University establishments, research centres and private think-tanks.

This Japanese school owes a lot to its past collaborations with French researchers, whether the EFEO (French School of the Far East), the Écolepratique des Hautes Études (School for Higher Studies) or the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (School for Higher Studies in Social Sciences), to mention only the main institutions. Paradoxically, Japan has a larger number of inheritors of the great tradition of French Vietnamese studies than France, which, after a period of decline, now sometimes has the benefit of collaborating with Japanese Academics. If Japanese Vietnamology grew significantly from 1975, it is far from new. Long before the First World War, the Japanese admittedly focussed on the East to derive the knowledge they needed for their modernisation, yet did not neglect Asia so as to not lose their cultural heritage. They

Does Nippo-Vietnamese cross-culture have a future?

Saigon's SAITO restaurant

Arnold Dang Trung Hiêu is a designer. A Vietnamese national, he was born in Saigon and is fluent in French and English. He designed and opened a restaurant, the SAITO, a contraction of Saigon and Tokyo that, housed in a villa going back to the French period, aims at a fusion of traditional materials of Vietnam — lacquer, celadon, silk — and an interior decoration in the "Japanese spirit".

Q: Why Saito? What did you have in mind when you first created this place?

Creation comes from the heart. As for me, it was by hearing Japanese songs such as those sung by Ms. Yoko Kishi that I thought of setting up this place. I targeted especially, but not exclusively, the Japanese, more and more of whom are coming to visit Vietnam.

Q: How did you get interested in the Japanese aesthetics of interior decoration?

I noticed that Vietnamese fashion was very popular in Japan. Japanese people seemed to like Vietnamese models and clothes such as the ao dai. I figured that what went for clothes could also go for the home. I also know that Japanese-style decoration is very popular in Europe.

Q: What does the Nippo-Vietnamese cross-culture in your restaurant signify?

SAITO is an experience, a challenge. I wanted to show that it was possible to create beautiful things by combining elements belonging to the two cultures. In fact, I could have also called it "Asian Restaurant", for it represents my vision of present day Asia.

Q: Do you think such experiments will be developed in other fields of art or design in Vietnam in the coming years?

It is already happening in the fashion sphere. Vietnamese designers often integrate Japanese-style graphic elements into the design of their models. I also know that the Japanese like Vietnamese paintings. And I am interested to note the appearance of "Buddha music". With the development of exchanges between our two countries, I think the trend will continue.

Q. Have you ever been to Japan?

No.

Source: Interview by Laurent Schwab, in January 2003.

plunged into the study of China and Sinisised countries, including Vietnam. For they thought knowledge should find a balance between western science and technology on the one hand, and the Japanese and Asian spirit and culture on the other. It was the magic formula summarised by the slogan "Wakon Yôsai", literally "Japanese spirit and western science". In the period between the two World Wars, and more precisely in the 1930s and 1940s, Japan felt the urgent need to update its knowledge of Southeast Asian countries. Japanese specialists on Europe were therefore mobilised as they had easier access to works published in English and especially in French. A new specialisation appeared, "French Indo-Chinese studies" (Futsuin Kenkyû). For, during the Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere propaganda in the forties, many publications speculated on the similarities between the two peoples.

After the Second World War, one had to wait for the early 1960s for Vietnamese classes to be opened in several universities, arising due to sympathy for independence struggle movements and those against the Vietnam War. But it was actually after the hostilities had ended in the mid-1970s, that Vietnamese studies flourished. The rising power of Japanese research on Vietnam fully contributed to Japan's diplomatic objective of getting closer to this country, as Motoo Furuta points out: "Perhaps, the best symbol of this era of intellectual exchange between the two countries was the Hoi An International Symposium, held in March 1990, in Da Nang, in the central region of Vietnam.... The Hoi An International Symposium was successful not only for the rich insights contained in the papers, but also because it symbolised the dawn of a new era of international exchange between Vietnam and Japan."[4]

In Vietnam, Japanese studies is relatively new field. A report drawn up by the Japan Foundation in 1999, based on surveys conducted by the Japanese Embassy in Hanoi, shows that there were around hundred specialists (95 in 1996), of whom 41 per cent had doctorates, spread over various disciplines, including History (29), Economics (25), International Relations (7) and Linguistics (6). The majority (60 per cent) were interested in the Meiji modernisation period and in the Post-War economic development. The dynamism of Japanese studies in Vietnam owes a lot to official development aid as well as to foundations such as the Japan Foundation, the Sumitomo Foundation and the Toyota Foundation, that have been offering around hundred scholarships in technology every year since 1997. The Japan-ASEAN programme launched in 1995 by the Government enables some hundred young Vietnamese

to be invited for study each year. Lastly, the number of Vietnamese students staying in Japan is consistently increasing despite the prohibitive cost of studies in that country. In fact, a large majority benefits from scholarships.

At the institutional level, Vietnam has around 15 establishments that concentrate on Japan. The biggestis the Vietnam Centre for Japanese Studies, founded in 1993 by a Government order, within the framework of the National Centre for Human and Social Sciences. With around 30 researchers, the Centre comprises five Research Departments for Economics, Politics, History, Culture and Language, and Nippo-Vietnamese relations. It is interesting to note that a country like France has no such centre on Japan.

In addition to this facility, the Japanese Government's initiatives saw the recent establishment of several Colleges, the construction of which began in 2001, notably two establishments for teaching International Trade, one in Hanoi, the Ecolesupérieure de commerceextérieur (Institute ofForeign Trade), a joint venture; the other, the Vietnam-Japan Human Resources Cooperation Centre, at a cost of $3 million at Ho Chi Minh City, also offers courses in Japanese management, language and culture. Lastly, we must mention the opening of the Vietnam ELearning Centre in 2001, inaugurated in Hanoi by Hiranuma Takeo, the Minister for the Economy and International Trade (METI). In these centres, Japan's objective is training future executives and public and private company directors in Japanese managerial practice and initiating future engineers and technicians to Japanese technology. In certain spheres, we find very focussed programmes such as those offered by Nedo, a Japanese body responsible for the development of the coal industry, that trains yearly around 60 engineers and technicians ofVietnamese mines belonging to Vinacoal, a company that exports 3 million metric tons of anthracite every year, a third of which goes to Japan.

Influences, Cross-culture and Cultural Traditions

It is probable that the rapprochement and the various exchanges between the two countries represent an enduring trend in their relations. Many convergent indices speak for their mutual rediscovery. Yet the general impression is that we are still in an observatory phase. In Vietnam, as in other Asian countries, relations can be assessed over a long term, and when all is said and done, ten years is not such a long time.

An archaeologist with a passion for Tuân Long and Trong Chinh

Every ancient object has its own origin. It bequeaths historical and cultural knowledge to posterity. These objects found during excavations constitute invaluable documents that take us right back to the origins.

The Linh Nam pier is a-bustle with life. Amongst the passengers who disembark, a young foreigner stands out. He is the Japanese Nishimura Masanari, a friend of the inhabitants of the Kim Lan village, a man whose passion is archaeology. His desire to study Vietnamese archaeology led him to Nguyên Viêt Hông, Head of the village's "Return to origins" group, and a qualified ceramist. The collaboration between these two men, one from cherry-blossom country and the other from North Vietnam, turned out to be fruitful. "In 2000," says Mr. Hông, "having learnt that ceramic pieces had been found in our village, Nishimura Masanari came to work with our group. He even requested the Southeast Asian Fund for the protection of underground vestiges to finance our work. This is how we discovered many ceramic objects – glazed pottery, porcelain – going back to the prehistoric era and the 9th and 10th centuries." Adds Nguyên Van Nhung, a member of "Return to origins", "Our Japanese friend participated in the excavations and determined the exact date of the unearthed objects."

Nishimura was studying archaeology at the University of Tokyo. In 1990, a year after leaving the university, at the age of 25, he went to Vietnam. In 1991, along with Vietnamese archaeologists, he carried out excavations in the vestiges sector of the Vac village in the Nghê An province. Thanks to his numerous on-site studies, in 1992, he successfully defended his thesis "The carved stone culture and the Hoa Binh culture in Vietnam" that was appreciated by the Scientific Council and archaeology professors in Japan. In 1994, the Japanese Education Ministry decided to send him to study at the Centre of Vietnam studies, attached to the Hanoi University for cultural exchanges.

In ten years, Nishimura Masanari made a huge contribution to archaeological works in Vietnam. In conjunction with Vietnamese scientists, he carried out scores of excavations from plains to mountains. He contributed to the unique discovery of Dông Son bronze drum moulds, in the Luy Lâu fort sector of the Bac Ninh province, unearthed six still-intact ceramic kilns dating from the 9th and 10th centuries and belonging to the Van An village in the Yên Phong district of the Bac Ninh province. This was a rare archaeological site, where the ancient Viêts produced ceramic objects. Explains Nishimura Masanari: "There are still a large number of valuable archaeological vestiges in Vietnam. They are an invaluable source of documents that help us know the past and the history of a nation". He confides: "I love Vietnam because Vietnam and Japan have historical and cultural resemblances based on the civilisation of irrigated rice cultivation. I hope the results of my works will contribute their mite to strengthening Vietnam-Japan friendship."

Source: Vietnam Review, December 2002.

So we feel it is much too early to talk of "cross-culture". Seen from this angle, the initiative taken by Arnold, the Saigon hotelier, however interesting it may be, still largely comes within "fundamental research". It also arises from typically Japanese cultural characteristics that are strongly marked by insularity and a feeling of "irreducibility", whereas Vietnamese culture is still under construction, after a decade resolutely in favour of economic take-off and quite naturally, material prosperity. It is also no doubt too early to predict that Japan will be the one to derive more benefit from the current opening process in Vietnamese culture, be it in advertising, fashion or popular culture. The Vietnamese may also turn to the United States that is still a reference point and a source of fascination. Moreover, there is a large viet kieu community in the United States, which represents a powerful vector for the propagation of ideas and trends. Many films produced in the United States are immediately recorded, sometimes in the cinema hall itself, and displayed for sale in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City shops.

In fact, soon we will be seeing a mixture of American, Chinese, Japanese and Korean cultural influences here, as in other places in the Asia-Pacific region. This does not mean that Vietnamese culture will disappear. Just like Japanese culture, it seems strong enough to adapt to these influences without in any way losing its originality. In this respect, it is possible to draw a parallel between the situations in Japan and Vietnam, for both countries have developed, throughout their histories, a capacity to absorb foreign influences whilst preserving their own traditions.

Assistance

援助

CHAPTER 7

Strategy, Diplomacy and Official Development Aid

Development aid plays a very important role in Japan-Vietnam relations, and, as we have mentioned earlier, cannot be solely allied to Japanese companies' desire to promote their interests in Vietnam. Other issues come into play. First of all, the currently implemented development aid is based on major strategic choices made by the Japanese government more than 30 years ago, and foremost amongst them was the intention to organise Southeast Asian countries within the ASEAN. Aid, therefore, constituted a measure contributing to Vietnam's economic development in order to ensure political stability. In the case of Vietnam, as far as development aid is concerned, we find the same thematic and sectorial priorities that Japan had with respect to other Southeast Asian countries. Two major objectives can be clearly perceived: firstly, favouring Vietnam's integration into the ASEAN and secondly, giving an impetus to active cooperation among countries along the Mekong river, including the Chinese Yunnan province. Lastly, while Japanese aid policy aims at contributing to the reconstruction of Vietnam's economy, it also favours Vietnam's integration "over land" with neighbouring countries, and "over the sea" with other ASEAN countries.

Assistance as an Extension of the Fukuda Doctrine

A development aid policy always has multiple objectives: to enhance the donor country's influence, strengthen economic, trade and cultural ties, as well as to deal with geopolitical and strategic issues. In Japan's case, aid to Vietnam must be viewed with respect to a historical and geographical context. The aid policy implemented in the early 1990s is clearly an extension of the Fukuda doctrine (see Chapter 4). The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 had forced the Japanese leaders to set aside this doctrine, but its main principles would be reemployed, and served more or less as the template for Japanese aid to Vietnam, and more generally, to the Indo-China peninsula.

In the early 1990s, Japan had already given significant aid to the ASEAN countries: the amounts exceeded 3.5 times what China had received, Indonesia being the primary beneficiary. Former Indo-China countries, with the exception of Laos, were not included (see table on facing page).

Since it had to deal with Vietnam, Japan had to take into account a complex local and regional reality. Vietnam still maintained very close ties with the USSR, from which it received considerable aid. It also had a military presence in Cambodia, very limited relations with Western nations, and practically ignored its ASEAN neighbours, that it regarded as its longstanding enemies. Further, the American embargo on Vietnam considerably restricted the Japanese leaders' scope for manoeuvring. In a book published in 1989, a Japanese specialist on Southeast Asia, Juichi Inada, discussed, at length, the chances of resumption of Japanese aid to Vietnam.[1] He particularly felt that this implied both the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, and a sort of nihil obstat on the part of the ASEAN. So the Japanese leaders would undertake a "nemawashi", which literally translates to "preparing the soil before planting a tree". In other words, they would engineer all the informal meetings that would prepare the ground for taking decisions at the regional and international level, in order to steer their aid policy towards Vietnam. As we have shown earlier, Japanese leaders had taken measures to simultaneously encourage stability in Cambodia and the resumption of political contact with Vietnam. In many ways, what is particularly striking about the Japanese approach in this matter is that it strove to take into account both the typical characteristics of the Vietnamese economy and the regional environment.

Japanese aid to ASEANcountries and to China in 1991 and 1999
(in millions of dollars)

	1991		1999	
	Value	% of ASE	Value	% of ASE
Burma	84.52	4.1	18	0.5
Brunei	2.96	0.1	0	0
Cambodia	n.a	n.a	87	2.3
Indonesia	1065.70	51.9	1604	42.0
Laos	20.56	1.0	133	3.5
Malaysia	n.a	n.a	0	0
Philippines	458.92	22.3	413	10.8
Singapore	15.98	0.8	0	0
Thailand	406.17	19.8	880	23.1
Vietnam	n.a	n.a	680	17.8
Total ASEAN	2054.8	100	3815	100
China	585.29		1225	

Sources: Japan Foreign Affairs Ministry, <www.mofa.go.jp>;GMS (Greater Mekong Subregion) portal of the Asian Development Bank website.

Aid to Vietnam

While they prepared to implement their aid policy, the Japanese leaders identified three major challenges before Vietnam:[2] targeting general long-term development, a systemic transition to market economy, and lastly, integration within the regional economic environment, particularly the ASEAN. Japan reckoned that if the other donors concerned themselves with the objective ofsystemic transition (installing market economy mechanisms, and framing corresponding laws and regulations), for its part, it wanted to further privilege the objective ofeconomic development. In this context, support to infrastructure and the power sector were essential priorities for the Japanese. Japan's stand was therefore clearly in line with Keynesian principles, by which the ODA funds helped satisfy the total Vietnamese demand on the one hand, and, on the other, contributed to increasing the economy's productivity.

At first, Japan supported Vietnam's return to the international financial community. Japan and France together drew up a financial plan that would allow Vietnam to repay its debts to the IMF, thereby facilitating

borrowing from the organisation in the future. At that very time, Japan was to participate in an important European Union programme for the repatriation and reintegration ofthe Vietnamese boat people. It officially resumed its aid policy in November 1992, with a loan of 45.5 billion yen (around $380 million), at an annual interest rate of1 per cent. More than half this amount was used to repay Vietnam's debt to the OECF, while the rest was earmarked for the purchase ofgoods. In January 1994, Japan signed an agreement with Vietnam for the construction of two thermal plants, a hydro-electric project, renovating the Hai Phong port and National Highways No. 1 and No. 5 (see infra). So, clearly, from the very outset, the emphasis was on rebuilding infrastructure.

Although at the start Japan granted financial commitments to the tune of$536 million, the actual amounts disbursed were much less; not only from Japan, but also from the other donors. As a result, Vietnamese authorities found it very difficult to define their priorities and coordinate their projects. This discrepancy between commitments and disbursements arose in the first place because certain projects were spread over several years, and also because there was often a time lag between the commitment date and the project implementation date. It can be noted, however, that this gap between commitments and disbursements has

Development Aid received by Vietnam (1993–2000) (millions of dollars)

Year	Total Commitments	Total Disbursements**	Aid from Japan (commitments)	Aid from Japan (disbursements)	% of Commitments
1993	1,810	274	536		29.6
1994	1,910	625	662	79	34.7
1995	2,260	612	810.7	170	35.9
1996	2,430	985	818.7	121	33.7
1997	2,400	1,100	745	232.5	31
1998	2,700	1,430	872.3	388.6	32.3
1999	2,800	1,400	1049	531	37.5
2000	2,400*	1,690		870	

Notes: * provisional.

** the difference between the commitments and the disbursements arise because certain projects are spread over several years, and also because there can be a time gap between the commitment date and the project implementation date. We note, however, that the difference between the commitments and the disbursements has narrowed in recent years.

Sources: The "Vietnam Economy" site, <www.vneconomy.com.vn> (for total aid) and the Japanese Embassy in Vietnam, Japan-Vietnam Fact sheet,<www.vn.emb.japan.go.jp>(for Japanese aid).

narrowed in recent years. The lifting of the American embargo in 1994 would enable the World Bank and the IMF to resume disbursing funds to Vietnam. The aid flow would therefore increase to account for 3 per cent of Vietnam's GDP in 2000.

Within a few years, Japan became Vietnam's main bilateral sponsor, far ahead ofFrance, that came second with 63.78 million euros in 2000. In 1999, Vietnam became the 4th largest beneficiary of Japanese aid after Indonesia, China and Thailand. Japan provided aid through two institutions, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, which primarily gave technical assistance in the form of donations, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, which granted long-term loans at concessionary interest rates.[3] It will be noted that the bulk of Japanese aid took the form of long-term loans, accounting for 96 per cent of total aid in 1993, and again, nearly 91 per cent in 1999. Japan also provided multilateral financing through its contribution to the Asian Development Bank and also through contributions to the multilateral agencies, the World Bank and the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme).

To be very fair, we must also include JETRO in the operators of Japanese aid, since this body contributes by promoting bilateral trade, but the amounts involved are much lower than those provided by JBIC and JICA. Japan participates in the various coordination structures for aid received by Vietnam and especially in the Consultant Groups organised every year under the aegis ofthe World Bank. It has, however, privileged relations with the Vietnamese authorities, particularly the Planning and Investment Ministry, and has set up various co-operative structures, in the political domain and in specific fields. We have earlier shown how Japan has positioned itselfin the Vietnam Government's decision-making process, especially in the transport infrastructure sector, where it co-chairs the Sponsors' group. This helps Japan play an instrumental role in the formulation ofdevelopment strategy by the Vietnamese authorities, and in directing development aid.

Financial Aid and "Conceptual" Aid

Japan financed a series of big projects, an approximate outline of which is shown below. One part was financed within the framework ofbilateral aid, while the other was earmarked for projects of the Greater Mekong Sub-Region programme (see infra).

Some large projects financed by Japan (November 2002)

	Project	Amount of loan (billions of yen)
Power	Phu My Electric Power Station	61.9
	Pha Lai Electric Power Station	72.8
	Ham Thuan Hydro-electric Power Station	53
	Rehabilitation of the Da Nhim Electric station	7
Transport	Rehabilitation of Highway No. 5	20.9
	Rehabilitation of bridges on Highway No. 1	35.8
Urban Development	Hanoi Urban Infrastructure-Phase I	11.4
	East-West Expressway at HCM City, construction of a tunnel	4.2

Sources: Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), JBIC ODA Loan Assistance to Vietnam, JBIC (Hanoi, 2000): 4–10.

In addition, the Japanese wanted to give the Vietnamese "conceptual aid" to facilitate the formulation of macroeconomic and sectorial strategies. In 1995, Do Muoi, the General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party visited Japan and signed an agreement on a Nippo-Vietnamese research project, headed by Shigeru Ishikawa, a Japanese Academic from Hitotsubashi University. The project, spread over six years, was to comprise various sections, all of them related to aid for the formulation of Vietnamese development strategies.

Japan would thus participate in the preparation of Vietnam's sixth 5-year plan covering the period 1996–2000. It would also offer its advice in the key areas of Vietnam's economic development, such as making the preliminary arrangements for the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), or negotiations to access the WTO. After the 1997 Asian crisis blew up, Japan would also advise Vietnam on the question of financial liberalisation. Lastly, the Japanese would participate in the preparatory work for the seventh plan, covering the years 2002–2005, and for the ten-year strategy, covering the period 2001–2010.

To understand the importance of this cooperation, it must be noted that key documents such as plans or strategic documents are instrumental in a country like Vietnam, because of the State's role and also the importance of international aid, as mentioned earlier. Quite significantly, these documents serve as the basis for negotiations with donors,

Major sector-wise Japanese aid to Vietnam



Source: Japanese Embassy in Japan <www.vn.emb-japan.go.jp>.

so when decisions are to be taken, influence enables or facilitates the awarding of certain projects to a country or its corporate sector.

In early 1999, the Miyazawa initiative was launched. Named after the Japanese Finance Minister, it was an appeal for the creation of a Japanese aid fund to support, amongst others, ASEAN countries facing the financial crisis. This was how Vietnam, although less affected, benefited from an extension of aid originally intended for Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Thus, in September 1999, Vietnam and Japan signed an agreement according to which a loan of 20 billion yen (around $190 million) would be given to help the Vietnamese Government pay for imports, and for sustaining ongoing economic reforms. Apart from financing Vietnam's balance of payments, this credit also went toward technical assistance in areas such as formulating a support programme for the private sector, financial diagnosis for a number of public enterprises, and the conversion of certain non-tariff barriers into customs tariffs.

Japan also organised interfaces for cooperation and exchange with Vietnam, for both academic and strategic considerations. Regarding economic strategy, it initiated an exchange programme with the National Economics University of Hanoi, which allowed Japanese and Vietnamese experts to carry out basic work on sectors such as steel, textiles, and the software industry.[4]

In addition to the fields mentioned above, Japan also initiated a major cooperation programme for Vietnam's Human Resource Development. It also helped in the field of Health (rehabilitation of the Bach Mai Hospital in Hanoi, and the Cho Ray Hospital in Ho Chi Minh City, anti-AIDS programme). It participated in the reconstruction or rehabilitation of schools and universities (University of Can Tho in the Mekong Delta, for example). Lastly, it financed various programmes to assist the populace residing in underprivileged zones.

Scientific and cultural exchange was also facilitated when Japanese experts were sent to Vietnam and Vietnamese trainees were received in Japan: in 1999, 300 Vietnamese were studying in Japan, 2,500 were in France in 2001 and about 500 are now in Russia.

Integrating Vietnam into its Regional Environment: The "Greater Mekong Sub-Region" Programme

A major feature of Japanese aid to Vietnam is that from the very beginning, it was conceived with the regional context in mind. In the early 1990s, Japanese aid to Thailand was noteworthy. Programmes were undertaken in Laos, and Japan intended to launch an assistance programme in Cambodia as an extension of the Paris Accords. It was in this context that Japan launched the GMS (Greater Mekong Sub-region) programme. The main elements of the programme had been drawn up during the Vietnam War itself, and more or less finalised by the Asian Development Bank in 1992. The key concept of the programme was to give equal importance to all countries sharing the Mekong river — Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the Chinese Yunnan province. Its aim was to plan and implement the development of the sub-region in a concerted manner. The project's promoters laid emphasis on the fact that many natural obstacles (mountains, rivers) were a major constraint for development. They also considered that various natural resources, such as hydraulically generated electricity in the case of Laos, were not given enough importance owing to lack of investments and also the lack of outlets.[5]

In fact, trade exchanges were much reduced in the early 1990s. As for the three "Indo-Chinese countries",[6] Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, they were caught up in a process of transition to market economy.

By the inclusion of Thailand, Japan clearly showed its intention of establishing a link between Vietnam and the ASEAN.[7] The presence of Yunnan province, apart from its geographical situation, probably arises from the desire of the Japanese leaders not to induce the Chinese leaders to view the GMS programme as a diplomatic structure potentially against China's interests.

Laos' electricity production largely exceeds its consumption and the surplus is exported mainly to Thailand. The use of the term "Indo-Chinese" in the economic literature on the region deserves a separate study. The Japanese seem to have not had any difficulty about a somewhat outdated, loaded notion, as can be seen form their creation of the "Forum for Indo-China's overall development". The other donors have always preferred the abbreviation CLV, for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

Concerning Burma, Japan adopted a similar stand of trying to integrate it into the ASEAN. After the coup d'état following events in 1998, Japan however suspended aid. This aid should have been resumed upon the release of Aung San Suu Kyi was released but it remained considerably reduced, to the order of $18 million per year.

Coordinating projects at the regional level is a bold initiative: the countries in question jealously guard their independence and often consider themselves rivals with respect to the donors. Moreover, the interests of countries situated upstream of the Mekong do not coincide with those of the downstream countries as far as Mekong water management is concerned. Decision-making processes are therefore complex and render cooperation difficult. The Mekong Commission, created at the time of the Vietnam War, has experienced this bitter reality many times over. Nevertheless, the programme gradually took root in the course of the decade.

The First Actions: An Emphasis on Infrastructure

When the GMS was launched, emphasis was laid on transport infrastructure. The projects entailed laying out three main road links. The first was meant to connect Thailand to South Vietnam via Cambodia (Project R1, see map on p. 113). The second envisaged a horizontal link connecting Thailand to Laos, then to Central Vietnam (Project R2). The purpose of the third was to ensure a vertical link between Thailand and

China's Yunnan Province (Project R3). Work commenced, chiefly using funds provided by the ADB combined with those from Japan.

In 1998, the GMS promoters offered the riparian countries the opportunity to launch integrated development projects known as economic corridors. A "corridor" is a geographical zone in which infrastructure improvements are linked to production, trade and related aspects of economic life, in order to promote economic development and cooperation among regions or border countries. The first corridor corresponds to the East-West trunk road that has been mentioned earlier. This is a highway roughly 400 km long, which has been allotted a budget of $350 million. Among other things, it should facilitate the speeding up of traffic, which in turn will enable an increase in trade. The products traded are construction materials, fuels, wood and related products, manufacturing equipment, food products, textiles and livestock. The work is now complete (see map on p. 113).

For road infrastructure, the following table is only for information purposes. It does not claim to be exhaustive, for an original move of the GMS was the inclusion of works carried out by the member nations in

Transport Infrastructure projects in the GMS Region

Sub-programme	Project
North-South Corridor	Improvement of the road between Kunming and Hanoi Improvement of the Lashio-Loilem-Kentung Road Improvement of the road between South Laos and Sihanoukville Renovation of the Phnom Penh port Rangoon Port and Thilwa Port Cambodia: renovation of the Phnom Penh and Siem Reap Airport Burma: Improvement of Mandalay airport and construction of an airport at Hanthawaddy Improvement of the road between Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh-City
East-West Corridor	Bridge over the Mekong and construction of Highway No 9 to Laos Improvement of the road between Chiang Rai (Thailand) and Kunming (Yunnan)

Source: Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) portal of ADB website, <http://www.adb.org>.

Priority highway projects in the Greater Mekong Sub-region



Source: ADB website, <www.adb.org/GMS/gmsmap.gif>.

its name and procedures. So it is very difficult to distinguish between what was the responsibility of the programme itself and the initiative of the member States.

As for energy, many experts had identified the considerable hydro-electric potential ofthe region as early as in the 1950s. During the 1990s, its capacity was estimated at 40,000 MW, of which only 1 per cent was in use.

Main projects in the energy sector

Project	Date of Completion
Laos: Theun Hinboun Hydro-electric Power Station	April 1998
Laos: Nam Leuk Hydro-electric Power Station	On-going
Laos: Nam Ngun Electric Transmission Network	Feasibility study
Trans-Asian Gas pipeline	2020

The GMS promoters also decided to extend cooperation in infra-structure to the installation of an integrated electricity production and distribution network. Hydroelectric stations were thus constructed in Laos. Studies were carried out to overcome natural constraints. Therefore, it so emerges that for some countries, the option of buying electricity from a neighbouring country is more advantageous than indigenously producing and distributing it. There is a longstanding Purchasing Power Agreement between Laos and Thailand and a similar agreement is also being negotiated with Cambodia.

The GMS also wanted to install or strengthen the telecommunication networks in the region. Recently, Japan committed itself to financing a programme through the ADB, aimed at homogenising procedures and exchanges among the member nations.

Amongst the GMS' ideas, we therefore find elements of interest to Japan in the area of development: construction of infrastructure, development of ports to encourage external trade and development of telecommunications. Further, we find this truly Japanese obsession for cooperation, which is seen especially in the installation of sophisticated institutional mechanisms.

An Institutional Mechanism Finalised

The GMS is not a new political organisation like the ASEAN or APEC. Rather, it works like a flexible coordinating mechanism for aid projects

with a regional dimension on the one hand, and national projects on the other. It is heavily dependent on Japanese and ADB financing.[8] Each country has set up a national coordination committee. The programme's secretarial work is taken care ofby a special department ofthe ADB that also provides it technical know-how. Working groups covering a wide range of subjects are regularly organised, many of which deal with electricity production and distribution, telecommunications, transport, the environment, human resources,investment, tourism and trade facilitation. The GMS promoters have, in particular, tried to strengthen the programme's political dimension by organising ministerial-level conferences amongst member nations every year.

It was during the course ofimproving infrastructure that promoters realised there were problems that they had not necessarily anticipated, such as the mutual recognition ofdriving licenses or customs procedures that slowed down goods trade. Because of this, the working groups' responsibilities included an increasing number ofregulation considerations that complement construction projects, sector by sector.

Thus, in 2000, the member nations of the GMS signed a trans-border agreement on the East-West corridor, the main objective ofwhich was banning discriminatory treatment in trade and promoting transparency in regulations and procedures. At the same time, the GMS extended its scope to research programmes on far-reaching issues such as anti-AIDS campaigns or education.

What is the impact on the economic situation of member nations?

Today, the Greater Mekong Sub-region development plan can lay claim to many undeniable successes, whether at the practical or institutional level. The programme's first success was the capacity to coordinate programmes among several countries. Traditionally, development aid framework is essentially bilateral and consultant groups meet country-wise. The same can be said ofsetting up the ensuing finances and negotiations. The GMS has undeniably aided optimising projects by laying out project-wise programmes and financing with regard to specific countries.

Secondly, it can be said that the GMS has effected better coordination among member Nations. When we look at the highway programmes, for example, we realise that the nations themselves were responsible for a large part of the work, either through their own finances, or with aid credit or even private finances with BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) contracts. Co-ordination with the GMS takes place through sector-wise

working groups. The achievements of the GMS cannot be solely seen as the setting up of a new means of garnering Japanese aid, but also in outlining projects from several countries.

Lastly, the GMS succeeded in establishing better co-ordination among development aid agencies, whereas it is well known that these agencies jealously guard their independence and the transparency of their actions. Thus, in 2000, the GMS signed an agreement with the Mekong Commission, a body that has less scope than the GMS, since it is limited to Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. Besides, representatives ofthe World Bank and the United Nations participated in the GMS meetings in different capacities, which goes a long way in helping avoid duplication, which is a regrettable but nonetheless frequent phenomenon in the world of development aid. Similarly, "passage ways" have been established to link certain ASEAN resolutions and decisions to GMS projects.

From this point ofview, and taking into account Japan's implication in the various structures that were set up (JICA or JBIC have a representative in all the working groups), this programme undeniably represents a success for Japan and the Asian Development Bank.

The evaluation of the GMS's macroeconomic impact is, however, more delicate. It is certain that infrastructure improvement has contributed to each country's development. However, it is difficult to separate the effects related to national policies and those that arise specifically from the GMS. The information given below shows major progress in trade. Vietnam's total foreign trade with Laos, Cambodia and Thailand thus increased tenfold, going from $160 million to $1.6 billion from 1991

Trade between Vietnam and Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand
(exports + imports in millions of dollars)

	1991	1995	1999	2000	2001
Vietnam-Cambodia	11	118.6	150.4	180.4	283.2
Vietnam-Laos	7	108.3	204.8	362.7	176.4
Vietnam-Thailand	142	541	968.9	874.5	1183.2
Total	160	767.9	1324.1	1417.6	1624.8

Sources: General Statistical Office (GSO), Statistical Yearbook (Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House) Years consulted: 1986–99; ADB, Economics and Development Resources Center, KeyIndicators ofDeveloping Asian and Pacific Countries, 28 (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 426.

to 2001 (see table on p. 116). As for Vietnam, an examination of the trade structure shows a strong tendency towards Japan, China, Europe and the United States. The volume of trade with riparian countries remains low: $200 million between Vietnam and Cambodia, for example, which is less than 1 per cent of Vietnam's foreign trade.

Prospects of Japanese Aid to Vietnam

For more than ten years, the relation between Japan and Vietnam has been based on considerable amounts of aid being granted. The aim of the Fukuda Doctrine was Japan's active contribution to establishing stability in Southeast Asia. This stability was to have been achieved through the gradual reduction of disputes troubling the region, and through economic development. Also within the doctrine's scope was encouraging Vietnam to get a firm footing in its regional, political and economic environment. Have these objectives been attained?

As far as the economy is concerned, the figures are unambiguously affirmative. In 1990, Vietnam's annual per capita GNP was to the order of $200. Today, this figure stands at $417. Vietnam's total GNP places it just behind Morocco and Ukraine, and ahead of Tunisia and Guatemala. Vietnam's economy has opened up to such a great extent that with an export figure of $15 billion in 2001, the proportion of exports in the GDP is 45.6 per cent. Vietnam fared better after the Asian financial crisis than its Southeast Asian neighbours: In 2001, its growth reached 4.8 per cent, as against a total average of 2.4 per cent for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.[9] Also, leading agencies attributed an improved rating to Vietnam. Thus the International Country Risk Guide agency gave Vietnam an index of 60 in 1998, and this changed to 70 in 2001. The situation improved at the social level too: the proportion of the population below the poverty line (per capita expenses) fell drastically from 58 per cent in 1992/93 to 37 per cent in 1997/98. Of course, credit for these positive results cannot all go to Japan, but it is certainly true that long-term Japanese strategy has achieved its main objective in this regard.

In the field of politics too, Japanese strategy has yielded irrefutable results. Vietnam joined the ASEAN in 1995 and plays an increasingly important role in this association. Similarly, the GMS programme has become a reality, and should favour a strengthening of exchanges and a better mutual understanding between Vietnam and its Southeast Asian

neighbours. Lastly, in 1998, Vietnam joined the APEC. Yet another element that can be added to these results, and ascertained from various Japanese official declarations and documents, is Tokyo's intention to act as a coordinator.

During the last decade, we have witnessed a significant increase in Japanese aid to both the ASEAN (more than 50 per cent) and China (more than 100 per cent). At present, Vietnam receives 22 per cent of the aid to ASEAN. If we interpret this from a narrow economic angle, it might lead us to believe that Japanese aid budgets should diminish. This prognosis must however be qualified. Firstly, we must remember that aid programmes have "by nature", a certain momentum that makes it almost impossible to stop them immediately. The programmes for the next three years have been or are being finalised now.

Secondly, the prognosis must take into account Japan's macro-economic constraints. From this point of view, two forces should act in opposing directions. Restrictions faced by the Japanese economy should, in time, constrain the development budgets from developing further. However, we must acknowledge that giving Asia priority is unlikely to change significantly with respect to the general objectives of Japanese leaders, since this has been a strong trend in international relations in this part of the world since the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, we are likely to see redeployments within the region in question. Very recently, Japan announced a reduction in its aid to Indonesia. This new development, along with the probable reduction in aid budgets to Thailand should enable Japanese leaders to keep up their interest in Vietnam in the coming years.

All in all, in the Vietnamese context, we can only speculate on the relevance of a relation that depends to such an extent on development aid. Vietnam, like many countries developing through aid, has a very elaborate strategy to attract foreign aid. It knows how to play its donors against each other, and it is not sure that Japanese aid permits a true mutual understanding, even if the indices are very positive in this field.

CONCLUSION

A Strong Movement to Bring Japan and Vietnam Closer

The past decade has seen the two countries come closer, not only in the area of trade, but also culturally and politically. This rapprochement was the result of a deliberate strategy on Japan's part; a strategy in line with the Fukuda doctrine of the seventies, and, at the same time, due to Vietnam's desire "to be friendly with everybody", as one of its Prime Ministers put it.

Evidently, Japan and Vietnam are now "friends". Speaking in Singapore on 14 January 2002, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi further reaffirmed this: "I think Japan has contributed to strengthening the ASEAN countries. At the time of the Asian financial crisis, it stepped in to attenuate its effects, following the old adage, 'It is in times of adversity that you know your true friends'."

This friendship has, however, particular aspects that must be emphasised. It is based on Japanese generosity, to a considerable extent. Yet, as General de Gaulle was wont to say: "A country does not have friends, it only has interests". If we fall in with his line of thought, what are the interests of each of these countries at the dawn of the 21st century?

We have already shown that Japan's motivation concerning the Vietnamese cannot be limited to its economic interest: strictly speaking, this interest is now extremely limited. It must, however, be pointed out that the Japanese have amply demonstrated their sense of the long term. In fact, the consistency of their actions with respect to Vietnam must be emphasised: Their aid plan took shape as soon as the War ended, was implemented in 1992, and has been maintained since then. Japan, therefore, most likely conceives its aid to Vietnam in the perspective of several decades; something Japanese diplomats and politicians allude to

in their discourses all the time. In any case, it is certain that Japan envisages its relation with Vietnam in a much longer time frame than it does for most other countries.

A Model to be Followed?

Secondly, we can wonder if Japan is trying to propose its own development model as a template, by participating in Vietnam's reconstruction, transition, and global opening. This question obviously calls for a qualified reply. First of all, we have understood that the respective governments play a vital role in the relation between the two countries, with political contact being established at high levels on both sides. More vitally, the continuity of the cooperation policy is a consequence — as we see it, and as seen from the Japanese angle — of its being established by the Japanese administration. The very great instability of Japanese governments over the last decade must also be taken into consideration, with respect to the constancy of development aid programmes.

Despite that, the development aid policy conducted by the Japanese administration has not explicitly tried to impose a development model on Vietnam. In the exchanges that took place within the framework of the Ishikawa programme, we may note that, on many occasions, the Japanese distanced themselves from an industrialisation model based on heavy industry, which also made a deep impression on Vietnam's concept of development. Furthermore, the Japanese often suggested that the Vietnamese give more thought to the Chinese transition experience, by studying, in greater detail, the manner in which they had sustained their agricultural development. The Japanese, with their highly pragmatic approach, very subtly proposed a vision of development and global opening up that, if closely observed, frequently distances itself from the dogmas now enforced by most international bodies.

Japan's emphasis on the reconstruction of infrastructure is thus based on a very Keynesian concept of development, in which the State plays a key role. This insistence on the State's role can also be seen in JICA's intention to support the Vietnamese administration's reforms. The Japanese have also often called into question the integration of the Vietnamese economy into the international market, drawing Vietnam's attention to the need to proceed cautiously in the opening up of their economy. They did so, for example, during the 1997 financial crisis, by including Vietnam in the sphere of Asian countries that were to benefit from Japanese aid, and also by inviting the Vietnamese to open up their

capital markets only very gradually. Lastly, they also advised Vietnam during its negotiations with the WTO, and assisted with the detailed study ofseveral important sectors in Vietnam's economy, including agriculture. This approach was one that Hanoi leaders found most suitable, especially in 1996 and 1997, when they became aware of both the overheating oftheir economy and the risks that weighed down the Asian economies by the opening up of capital markets.

At the same time, Japan participated actively in the geographical reorientation of Vietnam's external trade that, in the first years of the decade, took place mostly with Eastern countries. It also contributed, as we have said earlier, to the significant development of this trade. Do we see a contradiction in this? Not necessarily, for the Japanese concept of development was that trade opening could be viable if at least two essential conditions were fulfilled at the same time: a modernisation of the structure ofproduction and an improvement in the State's efficiency. In fact, today, the Japanese place more emphasis on the reform of Vietnamese public enterprises than they did a few years ago.

Without ever coming into conflict with other sponsors, the Japanese continually proposed orientations that were quite far removed from those that were internationally fashionable in development aid at the time. On the question of the war against poverty, Japanese experts thus proposed alternative approaches several times. While the World Bank often offers programmes specifically targeting the most deprived populations, Japan, instead, recommended the logic ofgeneral economic development, based on the strengthening of a certain number of key sectors and on the improvement of competitiveness.

Supporting Vietnam's Regional Integration

By adopting a regional perspective, in the case ofthe Mekong programme, we have been able to show that Japan's approach to Vietnam was, for the most part, easier to understand if it was placed in the regional or sub-regional context. The Japanese strategy in Southeast Asia is one with a "strong tendency" towards the regional context, as the strengthening and expansion of ASEAN plays a crucial role in it. Thus we can better understand why both the settling of the Cambodian conflict and the lifting of the American embargo were instrumental in the resumption ofJapanese aid to Vietnam. In this regard, we may note that Japan rightly anticipated the normalisation of relations between the Unites States and Vietnam, a foresight which enabled it to take important stands.

Such an attitude was in no way obvious, if we regard it in the context ofthe years 1992 to 1994. Nevertheless, it allowed a number ofJapanese companies to gain a foothold in the Vietnamese market long before their American competitors, who are now trying to make up for lost time.

In the beginning ofthe new decade, we can consider Japan's Vietnam strategy to be a success, though with qualifications, for, meanwhile, two events contributed to making profound changes in the geopolitical environment. First, the Asian financial crisis, which is characterised, as far as our interest is concerned, by the triumph of the American positions on the management of Asian economies (cleaning up financial systems, bringing integrity to economic life by fighting corruption, and the opening up of certain markets heretofore protected to non-Asian companies).

The second event is incontestably China's entry into the WTO, which confirmed the rising power of this country at the regional and global level. Their emergence is concomitant with what appears to be a certain withdrawal of the Japanese presence, or at least a slowdown of the expansion of Japanese firms in the region, as a consequence of recession in the Japanese economy. In reality, Japan's exchanges with ASEAN are still at a much higher level (two and a half times more) than China's. Yet China is particularly well-placed in Vietnam. Since 2000, bilateral trade has registered a very strong growth and has now reached 55 per cent ofthe value ofNippo-Vietnamese business exchanges. This progression foretells an equally rapid development in Chinese investments, as well as cooperation extended to all other countries in Southeast Asia.

There is no doubt the danger of Sino-Japanese rivalry in this part of the world. But, for the moment, in every area — trade, investment and aid — Japan indisputably occupies a predominant position. As a result, it continues to shoulder the major responsibility of developing and maintaining security in this region; also still taking part in leadership, through dialogue and cooperation with Korea and China. It is the same with ASEAN "+three", in which Japanese and Chinese stands have gradually become resolute.

The projects or propositions pertaining to a larger perspective, with the objective of establishing a free-trade zone extending to the whole of East Asia, such as the China-ASEAN Free-trade Agreement, the Japan-ASEAN project of general economic partnership or the Nippo-Korean Free-trade Agreement, together work for the same objective. In this

context, it is still necessary to confer privileged treatment on the four new members of ASEAN (Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) who have lagged behind in development and whose internal political situation is, at least for certain amongst them, still fragile. During his tour of Southeast Asia early in 2002, the Japanese Prime Minister clearly reasserted that "Japan will continue to cooperate in the development of the Greater Mekong Sub-region, in order to enable the acceleration of the economic expansion of Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Vietnam."

Beijing is also forging close links with a few countries of the Indo-Chinese peninsula by contributing to the construction or renovation of infrastructure. China is thus giving its assistance, particularly to Burma, in road construction, and getting involved in big projects around the Mekong basin.[1] For professor Ebashi Masahiko of the Meiji Gaikuin University, "These countries are the 'weakest cog' in the whole ofSoutheast Asia."[2]

Beijing and Tokyo are united in thinking that their development and stability are truly indispensable in the pursuit of a harmonious regional integration. As Hugues Tertrais rightly notes: "Considering the Asia-Pacific realities, ASEANtoday remains an imperfect tool ofeconomic integration and the Pacific Rim countries are trying to consider it in a broader perspective."[3] Koizumi's proposition, which takes up anew an old Japanese concept of placing Asia in a wider set-up — often defined by the term "Asia-Pacific" — is once again on the agenda, with the East Asian Development Initiative.[4] This would involve a community encompassing East Asia, but extending up to Australia and New Zealand. With this project, the Japanese hope to regain the lead in the diplomatic game being played in this part of the world. But this does not exclude other associations. The United States has not been forgotten; Prime Minister Koizumi said in his speech in Singapore in January 2002: "The United States especially has an indispensable role to play, because ofits contribution to the region's security and its economic interdependence with it. Japan intends to further strengthen its alliance with the United States."

Amidst speculation that the Japanese era was coming to an end, the Land of the Rising Sun has made a comeback with a new project for the entire region. According to this, Japan can exercise a new form of leadership more in keeping with its diplomatic style, which aims to establish bridges between the various consenting countries in the region through its friendly relations with every one of them. So with that, we return to the "bridge diplomacy" mentioned in the Introduction, as well

as the longstanding bid for diplomatic autonomy from the American ally and mentor. Today, the Japanese have fully attained one of their major political objectives in the field of international relations: that of diplomatic autonomy (Jishu Gaikô). Paradoxically, this objective was attained at a time when China made a noteworthy entry on the international economic scene. In this big game of Go with "a China more ambitious that ever, a Japan keen on maintaining its pre-eminence"[5] and with Americans returning to the region, we can wonder about the future architecture of this geographic zone, marked by the rivalries of the biggest powers of the Pacific Rim. Owing to the work it accomplished over several decades in all the Southeast Asian countries, Japan can justly claim to have restored confident, friendly relations with countries in the region, in this changing environment. As far as Vietnam is concerned, the Japanese have clearly demonstrated that they were trustworthy, ifnot indispensable partners. With its Chinese neighbour, however, it is quite a different story.

In the words of Jean-Luc Domenach: "Beijing's policy in Vietnam is emblematic. The two countries are close from every point ofview, but their size is very different…. Relations between them gradually became normal and close. But they are still delicate. Hanoi, on entering ASEAN in 1995 and establishing ties with Europeand the United States, did not find the means to balance the economic and political influence of the neighbouring giant: It put up with it with bad grace. And the bilateral relations remain poisoned by the dispute on maritime borders. Vietnam is indeed the main victim of the Chinese thrust towards the Southeastern seas."[6]

On the economic scene too China represents a threat, as Benoit de Tréglodé observed: "Not a week passes without the Vietnamese Press devoting an article or a dossier to the economic and social risks of the absence of regulation of trade relations with China. In the integration of the PRC into the WTO, Vietnam sees an eventual threat to its economy."[7] While Japan's policy is no longer handicapped by any ambiguity, China's is confused to say the least, considering its strategy in the Southeast China Sea and its initiatives for a free-trade zone with the region. As much as Japan pushes for integration and strengthening the bonds between ASEAN countries, "Chinese manoeuvres assume a division of ASEAN."[8] The United States admittedly seeks to regain a central role, with a very strong military base in the Pacific and with the intervention of the APEC, an organisation which seems in many ways

to be instrumental in its economic policy in this part of the world. The Americans find it difficult, however, to wipe from people's memory the "drastic remedy" imposed via the World Bank and the IMF on countries that were victims of the Asian crisis. Besides, the military objectives of the world's police have the Asians worried about the consequences for their region.

In this context, Japan's apparently timid diplomacy is quite reassuring. Further, Tokyo has given proofofits goodwill, and nobody believes that Japan will attempt re-militarisation, even though it has declared its intention of maintaining a military presence in the zone just to protect the sea routes against pirates and terrorists. This kind of proposition is welcomed by Asian nations that see in it an additional proof of Japan's desire to take on all its regional responsibilities.

Vietnam today is still a poor country, with a coveted but restricted market. Nevertheless, it has the drive and all the features to become "the" nation that counts in Southeast Asia. This is clearly understood by the Japanese, who pinned all their 20th century hopes on Indonesia, the regional giant rich in oil and other raw materials needed for Japan's economy. In the 21st century, natural wealth will no doubt remain important, but other forms ofwealth, such as human resources, will play an elemental role. In this regard, the Vietnamese have a particularly promising potential with respect to economic, scientific and cultural development. And in this respect, they are very much like the Japanese, with whom they share a number of values. But in the end, the great strength ofthe Vietnamese lies in the fact that they are at ease with combining Chinese, French and American legacies with Japanese experience.

Fact Files: Vietnam and Japan

Vietnam

General Information

Area: 331,690 km^2
Population: 85,262,356 (July 2007 est.)
Capital: Hanoi
Government: Single party

Political Information

Head of State: President Nguyen Minh TRIET (since 27 June 2006)
Prime Minister: Prime Minister Nguyen Tan DUNG (since 27 June 2006)
Secretary General of the Communist Party: Nong Duc Manh
Official language: Vietnamese
Main religion: Buddhism

Economic Information

GDP (PPP): $262.8 billion (2006 est.)
Growth Rate: 8.2% (2006 est.)
Per Capita GDP: $3,100 (2006 est.)
Currency: Dong
(1 Dollar = 16,235 Dong as on 17 August 2007)
(1 Euro = 21,788 Dong as on 17 August 2007)
Annual inflation rate: 7.5%
Budget: $15.42 billion
[of which 2.5% (2005 est.) for Defence]

Main Trade Partners (2006):

Exports

1. USA	20.7%
2. Japan	12.0%
3. Australia	9.2%
4. China	5.6%

Imports

1. China	17.2%
2. Singapore	12.6%
3. Taiwan	11.2%
4. Japan	9.5%

Japan

General Information

Area: 377,835 km^2
Population: 127,433,494 (July 2007 est.)
Capital: Tokyo
Government: Constitutional Monarchy

Political Information

Head of State: Emperor Akihito
Prime Minister: Shinzo ABE
(since 26 September 2006)
Official language: Japanese
Main religion: Buddhism

Economic Information

GDP (PPP): $4.218 trillion
(2006 est.)
Growth rate: 2.2% (2006 est.)
Per capita GDP (PPP): $33,100
(2006 est.)
Currency: Yen
(1 Dollar = 112 Yen as on
17 August 2007)
(1 Euro = 150 Yen as on
17 August 2007)

Annual inflation rate: 0.3%
Budget: $1.411 trillion
[of which 0.8% (2006 est.) for
Defence]

Main Trade Partners (2006):

Exports

1. USA	22.8%
2. China	14.3%
3. South Korea	7.8 %
4. Taiwan	6.8%

Imports

1. China	20.5%
2. USA	12.0%
3. Saudi Arabia	6.4%
4. UAE	5.5%

Chronology

1954

April–July: Geneva Peace Conference.
On the morrow of the Conference, division of the country at the 17th parallel: Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the north and Republic of Vietnam (RV) in the south.

1955

19 March: Foundation of Nihon-Betonamu Yuko-kyokai (Japan-Vietnam Friendship Association).
August: Japanese companies form Nichi-Etsu Boekikai (Association for Nippo-Vietnamese trade).

1959

13 May: Japan signs a reparations accord with South Vietnam amounting to 39 million dollars over 5 years.

1960

20 December: Creation of National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam.

1963–73

American-Vietnamese War until Paris Peace Accords of 27 January 1973. American troops land at Da Nang in 1965.

1969

25 July: Nixon Doctrine, resulting in increase in donations and loans from Japan to South Vietnam.

1972

8 February: Tokyo establishes secret ties with North Vietnam.
21–28 February: Nixon's visit to Beijing.

1973

21 September: In Paris, a common communiqué and a note between DRV and Japan establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries are signed.

1975

30 April: North-Vietnamese troops enter Saigon. The end of the war marks the reunification of the country.
11 October: Japanese Embassy opened in Hanoi.

1975–78

Border incidents between Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge, then in power in democratic Kampuchea.

1976

2 July: The name Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) is officially adopted.

1977

18 April: Promulgation of laws concerning foreign investments, the objective ofwhich is to attract capital from foreign firms for the redressal of an economy ruined by decades of war.

1978

25 December: Vietnamese troops enter Democratic Kampuchea.

1979

January: Japan suspends temporarily its aid to SRV, following the fall of Phnom Penh (on 27 January); the suspension becomes an official

freeze when troops of USSR, Vietnam's ally, invade Afghanistan on 27 December 1979.
17 February–16 March: Military defeat for PRC which tries to give a "punishing lesson" to Vietnam.

1986

December: On the occasion of the 6th Congress of the CPV, Vietnam launches the Doi moi process.

1987

29 December: The first Bill on foreign investment is adopted.

1989

9 November: Fall of The Berlin Wall.

1990

15–16 January: In Paris, the five permanent members of the Security Council propose a more meaningful intervention of the UNO in the Khmer problem, as well as for the creation of a Supreme National Council (SNC).
18 January: USSR announces withdrawal of its military presence in Vietnam, especially its naval base in Cam Ranh. The USA and Japan are of the opinion that this withdrawal is "a contribution to regional stability and a positive effort to a political solution to Cambodia".
6 February: On the occasion of World Economic Conference in Davos (in Switzerland), Vo Van Kiet announces that Vietnam needs $10 billion to develop its economic infrastructure.
10 February: In Phnom Penh, annual meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (this year the meeting is attended by Deputy Ministers). A communiqué approves the efforts of ASEAN and the United Nations in bringing about peace in Cambodia.
11–12 February: In New York, the permanent members of the Security Council meet a second time to solve the Cambodian issue.
27–28 February: Jakarta Informal Meeting-III among the protagonists of the Cambodian conflict. It is a failure (JIM I: 25–27 July 1988; JIM II: 19–21 February 1989).

March: Trade between Vietnam and South Korea reaches 150 million dollars. Thus South Korea becomes Vietnam's third trade partner, after USSR and the PRC.
12–13 March: In Paris, third meeting of the Big Five: the SNC would have to occupy Cambodia's seat in the UNO, the composition ofwhich would be determined by the Cambodian factions.
21 April–6 May: Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu tours South and Southeast Asia.
23 April: The leader ofthe CPV Nguyen Van Linh declares to journalists that Vietnam can launch economic reforms without broaching the political question; according to him, economic reform should take place in the "context of socialism, the most progressive system in the history of humanity".
30 April: The Director of the Japanese Defence agency Yozo Ishikawa visits Thailand, Malaysia and Australia so as to give assurance about the military ambitions of his country and to establish ties of cooperation. The spokesperson of the American State department declares that the United States will not establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam until a political solution on Cambodia is found.
1–10 May: In Beijing, Sino-Vietnamese meeting between Qian Qichen (Foreign Affairs Minister) and Dinh Nho Liem (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs). A high level delegation would meet in early June to discuss about normalisation between the two countries.
14 May: Beginning of American-Philippines negotiations regarding the future ofthe American bases, the lease ofwhich would expire in September 1991. On the same day Malaysia announces that it would be ready to receive American ships if Philippines refuses to do so.
24 May: Vietnam and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) sign an accord concerning 60,000 Vietnamese working in East Germany.
25–26 May: In New York, fourth meeting between the five permanent members to discuss the Cambodian issue.
4–5 June: In Tokyo, Khmer Rouge rejects the agreement on equitable sharing ofseats ofthe Supreme National Council SNC (6+6) which had, however, been accepted by the other three Cambodian parties.
6 June: Even though Taiwan does not have diplomatic relations with Vietnam, two Taiwanese business groups sign air and trade agreements with their Vietnamese partners. In 1989, trade between the two countries was 41.2 million dollars (as against 9.7 million in 1988).

9 June: Sino-Vietnamese meeting in Hanoi to discuss improving bilateral relations and the peace process in Cambodia.
23 June: 30th Anniversary of the Nippo-American Security Treaty.
30 June: The Assembly amends the code for foreign investments of 29 December 1987: for the first time, foreign companies are authorised to form joint ventures with Vietnamese private companies.
16–17 July: In Paris, fifth meeting of the "Five". The Americans announce that they no longer support the CNG (Cambodian National Government comprising Khmer Rouge) at the UNO and that they will have direct talks with Hanoi and Phnom Penh to solve the Cambodian issue.
27 July: Taiwan announces its intention to increase its trade with Vietnam.
2 August: Iraq invades Kuwait.
6 August: In New York, first meeting between the United States and Vietnam; Cambodia is the focus of the discussions.
7 August: Beginning of Operation "Desert Shield" launched by the United States to liberate Kuwait.
8 August: Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng affirms that China will continue to "assist" the Khmer Rouge as long as other countries continue to support the other Cambodian factions (that is Vietnam and the Cambodian State), but "China will never support Khmer Rouge as a dominating power" in Cambodia.
27–28 August: In New York, the sixth meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council set up a basic plan with a view to placing Cambodia under a kind of international tutelage and thus allow the Khmer people to elect their government freely.
3–7 September: "Secret" Sino-Vietnamese meeting in Chengdu.
5 September: The Secretary of State James Baker announces that the United States will henceforth discuss directly with Cambodia; Hanoi is satisfied with the American decision.
9–10 September: The Jakarta accord ratifies the formation of a Supreme National Council (SNC) in Cambodia. It is composed of twelve members: six representatives from Phnom Penh, two "Sihanoukistes", two Khmer Rouge and two members from KPNLF (6+6). The question of the presidency remains open.
19 September: Vo Nguyen Giap arrives in Beijing for the 11th Asian Games.
20 September: In New York, third American-Vietnamese meeting on the Cambodian question.

21 September: In Hanoi, Seminar on Nippo-Vietnamese economic relations; 35 Japanese companies participate.
23 September: A Vietnamese delegation arrives in Seoul to discuss economic relations and investments between the two countries.
29 September: In New York, the Vietnamese Foreign Affairs Minister Nguyen Co Thach meets James Baker, his American counterpart (30 minutes). This was the first time such a meeting took place between the two countries since the January 1973 Paris Accords.
15 October: The UN General Assembly approves the peace plan of the five permanent members regarding the Cambodian issue. Cambodia's seat is "temporarily unoccupied".
17 October: For the first time, the Vietnamese Foreign Affairs Minister Nguyen Co Thach goes to Washington. It is an attempt to woo the Americans inasmuch as the Minister promised that Vietnam would step its efforts regarding the MIA cases (a liaison office in Hanoi is possible), criticised Hanoi's errors in the past and showed other signs of goodwill.
26 October: During a lecture given in Singapore, the representative of the American Chamber of Commerce Thomas White recommends lifting the American embargo on Vietnam. The objective is to allow American businessmen to profit from the economic opportunities available in this country.
31 October: The Soviet Ambassador posted in Hanoi announces withdrawal of USSR navy and air force from the Cam Ranh base.
25–26 November: In Paris, the members of the Security Council, the representative of the United Nations' General Secretary and the co-chairmen of the Paris Conference (France and Indonesia) meet to draft and approve the text of agreements about an overall political solution to the Cambodian conflict.
22 December: The European Community restores diplomatic relations with Vietnam.

1991

17 January: Beginning of the Operation "Desert Storm" led by the coalition against Iraq. Officially, Hanoi declares neutrality; Unofficially and sentimentally, Vietnam is on Iraq's side.
27 January: The Asia-Pacific Council of the American Chamber of Commerce decides to bring pressure on Washington to lift the embargo on Vietnam.

February: The USSR stops its aid ($2 billion per year, not including military equipment) which was 40% of Vietnam's external trade; the CMEA (COMECON) follows suit. A new exchange agreement based on international rates is established, with payment in strong currencies.
4 February: Malaysia opens a Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City; It is the first ASEAN country to do so. By this event, Hanoi intends to show that it wishes that "Saigon" can also benefit from economic opening.
12 March: Vietnam declares 1990 the "year of tourism".
3 April: The spokesperson for the Malaysian Foreign Affairs Ministry announces that his country will resume its Vietnam economic aid programme suspended since 1979.
4 April: Discussions between the Vietnamese Foreign Affairs Vice-minister and his Korean counterpart on improving bilateral and trade relations.
9 April: A schedule in four stages for normalisation ofrelations between the United States and Vietnam is envisaged. Normalisation and the lift of embargo are connected to solving the Khmer issue and the MIA-POW issue.
20 April: Vietnam approves of 32 new foreign investment projects during the first quarter of 1991.
27 April: The United States announces its first direct aid of $1 million to Vietnam for the manufacturing of prosthetic equipment for people who have lost their limbs.
10 June: Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Taro Nakayama visits Hanoi. Subjects of discussion: bilateral aid and solving the Cambodian issue.
13 June: Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister visits Phnom Penh.
24–27 June: CPV's 7th Congress in Hanoi. The policy of "renewal" is continued and intensified. CPV's new Secretary General is Do Muoi.
28 June: Official dissolution of CMEA (COMECON), formed in January 1949.
1 July: Dissolution of Warsaw Pact.
17 July: An American-Philippine accord extends the lease of the Subic Bay Naval base for at least 10 years. The Manila Senate refuses to ratify it. As for Clark base, it will be officially returned in November 1991.
30 July: President Le Duc Anh's "unofficial" visit to Beijing. The purpose is to improve relations between the two countries and to find an acceptable solution to the two parties regarding the Cambodian issue.
10–12 August: Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu goes to Beijing. It is the first visit of a leader of a big power since the Tiananmen events.

9 September: The first important move of the new Foreign Affairs Minister Nguyen Manh Cam is to go to Beijing. The final communiqué states that there is restoration of relations based on the five principles (respect of territorial sovereignty, non-agression, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual advantage and coexistence).
13 September: President Bush renews American embargo for a year. Vietnam is of the view that this decision is "anachronic and against American opinion".
16 September: The Philippine Senate refuses the accord reached on 17 July with the United States concerning the Subic Bay base. The Aquino government agrees to let the Americans occupy it till 1994.
18 September: Hanoi and Bangkok sign an accord on the establishment of a joint commission for economic cooperation.
8 October: ASEAN decides to create a free exchange zone with 2006 as the dead line. China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan are invited to join.
16 October: By the 717 resolution, the Security Council decides to create the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). Its task is to help maintain ceasefire, to facilitate communication between the headquarters of the four Cambodian parties and "to educate civilians on how to avoid injury from mines".
18 October: The Council of Ministers' order and the State Committee circular on cooperation and investments dated 20 August 1992, subjected to the law on foreign investments (except special exemptive clause), give rise to export production zones and special economic zones (SEZ).
21–23 October: Bringing together four Cambodian factions, the UNO and 18 backing countries, the Second Paris conference, co-chaired by France and Indonesia, results in the signing of an international peace treaty on Cambodia that is placed under the tutelage of UN until free elections are organised.
23 October: In Paris, after the peace conference on Cambodia, a meeting between James Baker and Nguyen Manh Cam to discuss MIA cases and the modalities of normalisation of relations.
24 October: Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet starts a tour of Southeast Asian countries: Indonesia (24–27 October), Thailand (27–30 October) and Singapore (30 October–2 November). The messages are clear: Vietnam wants peace, wants to open the country in economic terms, wants to wipe off its past etc.
29 October: Singapore lifts its restriction on investments in Vietnam; Lee Kuan Yew's visit to Hanoi is scheduled for April 1992.

5–7 November: Sino-Vietnamese summit in Beijing that sanctions total normalisation of Sino-Vietnamese relations.
14 November: The UNAMIC becomes operational. After 13 years of exile, Prince Sihanouk arrives in Phnom Penh.
21 November: American-Vietnamese working group set up to prepare for normalisation of bilateral relations.
26 November: Americans evacuate Clark base in Philippines earlier than planned.
8 December: The Presidents of Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine announce officially the dissolution of Soviet Union and the creation of a Community of Independent States (CIS).
21 December: In Alma-Ina, 11 out of 12 republics of ex-USSR ratify the 8 December accord forming the CIS (Georgia does not sign).
16 December: Singapore after lifting its investments ban in Vietnam, sends a delegation to discuss opportunities with the Vietnamese. On returning from Vietnam, a delegation of American businessmen concludes that it is urgent that the United States lift the economic embargo and take favorable measures to establish financial and trade relations between the two countries.

1992

A JVTA delegation led by IWAI Koshiro visits Vietnam and participates in the Joint Japan-Vietnam Economic Conference.
17 January: Singapore affirms that it will do everything in its power for Vietnam to integrate into the Southeast Asian zone and rebuild its economy.
27–28 January: In Singapore, 4th summit of the Heads of ASEAN state and governments announce the formation of an ASEAN free trade zone. During the summit, Vietnam, Laos, both socialist States join ASEAN's 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The two Indo-Chinese states are given a sort of status of "observing member" in the ASEAN (a case not envisaged by the texts).
11 February: French Secretary of State for Commerce visits Hanoi. He affirms that France will help Vietnam preserve its independence against any Japanese economic "invasion".
26 February: Vo Van Kiet visits Philippines to discuss bilateral cooperation. Signs accords related to investments and maritime transports.
China proclaims unilaterally its law on territorial waters and reaffirms

its sovereignty on all the archipelagos of the "South China Sea", thus arousing the fear of ASEAN countries.
27 February: In application of the decision taken on 8 October 1991, ASEAN creates ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
15 March: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) comes into existence officially to restore peace.
15 April: The new Vietnamese Constitution, adopted by the National Assembly (8th legislature), recognises "private capitalist economy" and allows private companies (Chapter II of the Constitution titled: Economic Regime). The Constitution comes into force on 18 April (before this date, there were the Constitutions of 1946, 1959 and 1980).
15 June: The Japanese government obtains Parliament's vote for a Bill authorising the engagement of military units in the UNO's operations (Peacekeeping Operations Bill).
20–22 June: Tokyo conference, attended by 33 countries and around 12 international organisations, announces an immediate aid of $880 million for Cambodia's reconstruction.
2 July: The Politburo's secretariat is enlarged with the addition of two new members: Nguyen Duc Binh and General Le Kha Phieu, both hardliners.
17 July: Beginning of a series of "unofficial meetings" between Japan, Thailand and Khmer Rouge to enable the peace process to come out of dead-lock (other meetings held on 22 and 27 August, the last on 29 October 1992). Failure.
21–22 July: At the end of the 25th ministerial summit of the ASEAN, a joint declaration on South China Sea published. For the first time, the Association was publicly taking a common stand on the question by which it condemned implicitly the strategy of China which had just occupied an additional islet of the Spratly Islands.

Vietnam and Laos sign the Bali Treaty, ending a long period of hostility with ASEAN. The two countries of the peninsula officially acquire the status of permanent observers in the Association.
8 September: The Japanese government authorises the deployment of 1,700 men in Cambodia in the context of the UNO peacekeeping operation. This is the first time Japan sends troops outside the country since the Second World War.
24 September: Vietnam and Singapore sign a trade agreement with a clause of the most-favoured-nation; the agreement would be reinforced the following month with another agreement guaranteeing the investments

made in Vietnam. Vietnam now becomes Singapore's biggest trading partner.
October: South Korea opens a liaison office in Vietnam for re-establishing diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries. Vietnam will open its liaison office in Seoul in November.
3 October: Vietnam, in order to protect its industry, bans imports of 17 goods including beer, cycles, textiles etc. Chinese products are specially targeted; the control of the Lang Son border zone is also stepped up.
8 October: The National Assembly approves the measures concerning reforms of the judicial system (Bill on organisation of the judicial system etc.).
12–18 October: In China, the 14th Congress of the CPC marks the political victory of the reformers. The passage into market economy is approved by admitting the principle of "socialist market economy".
3 November: In the United States, Bill Clinton is elected president.
6 November: Japan announces restoration of its aid to Vietnam. It had been suspended since 1978. This decision marks a new step in Japan's Indochina policy.
21 December: Vietnam and South Korea restore their diplomatic relations.
23 December: The National Assembly amends the 1988 foreign investment Act to "find new opportunities to accelerate economic development and increase productivity".

1993

4 February: A two-day seminar on business opens, sponsored by Keidanren, the powerful Japanese employers' organisation, to be attended by about hundred Japanese and an equal number of Vietnamese.
8 February: Congress of the Viêt Kieus In Ho Chi Minh City sponsored by Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet's office. Henceforth they are considered "rich and important technical, scientific, intellectual and economic resources" by Hanoi.
March: Jiang Zemin becomes the president of PRC; the principle of "socialist market economy" is inscribed in the new Chinese Constitution.
24 March: Vo Van Kiet goes to Japan. This is the first visit of a Vietnamese Head of Government to this country since 1973. Kiet tries to convince Tokyo to use its influence on Washington. This is also an opportunity for Japan to convey to the United States its wish for a more independent Asian policy.

9 April: According to official statistics, Vietnam is now the world's third biggest rice exporter, after Thailand and the United States. The exports are mainly to Africa and the Middle East.
25 April: During a visit to Laos, Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs promises that Japan will increase its aid.
28 May: Chinese consulate opened in Ho Chi Minh City, marking a further step in the relations between the two countries.
2 August: In Cambodia, beginning ofthe withdrawal ofUNTAC troops and beginning of massive Khmer Rouge defections.
9 September: 31 donor countries and 11 international organisations in favour ofCambodia meet in Paris. A new aid amounting to $119 million is envisaged, of which $12 million from Japan and $11 million from France.
24 September: A new Cambodian Constitution is promulgated. The UNTAC mandate comes to an end.
7 October: An important American commercial mission led by the banker David Rockefeller goes to Vietnam and recommends Vietnam's diplomatic recognition by the United States as well as lifting of the embargo.
11 October: In Hanoi, the IMF Director Michel Camdessus negotiates restructuring of Vietnam's international debt ($4.5 billion).
19 October: Nguyen Manh Cam goes to Russia and the CIS countries. In Moscow, negotiations on 9 billion dollars owed by Vietnam to the former USSR. Russia officially asks Vietnam to extend the usage ofCam Ranh base.
November: First Paris conference regarding assistance to Vietnam's development; Japan is the first donor.
7 December: In Manila, during a meeting of the ASEAN member countries, Vietnam declares that it is ready to become a member of the Association; Vietnam also wishes to cooperate with ASEAN in defence and security.
9 December: Representatives of 23 nations and 6 multilateral organisations meet in Tokyo to prepare an important international conference (scheduled for late 1994). The objective is to mobilise economic assistance for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

1994

2 January: The Foreign Affairs Minister Nguyen Manh Cam announces a positive outcome of Vietnam's diplomacy in 1993, with especially an

increase in Japan's economic aid (from $360 million in 1992–93 to $550 million for 1993–94) and obtaining aid from IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank amounting to $1.86 billion for the year 1994.
3 February: End of American embargo which had isolated Vietnam for 19 years.
4 March: A centre for Japanese studies opened in Hanoi with the task of facilitating study of Japanese language, history, culture and politics.
11 March: During a meeting in Tokyo, the main donor countries promise emergency aid of $773 million to Cambodia.
April: Second "Annual Japan-Vietnam Joint Economic Conference" in Ho Chi Minh City.
13 July: The Sino-Vietnamese trade In the Yunnan border goes up to 1.4 billion yuan, that is a 12% increase compared to the preceding year.
25 July: First meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on security. It is a formal body for "prevention" of conflicts.
26 October: In Hanoi, Nippo-Vietnamese discussions on bilateral trade and aid. Japan anticipates increasing its aid for the forthcoming year. Vietnam officially asks for membership to ASEAN.
16 November: In Paris, meetings between donor countries. They commit themselves to give subsidies and low-interest loans amounting to 2 billion dollars to Vietnam.
19 November: CPC President and Secretary-General Jiang Zemin's official visit to Vietnam. Since 1951, he is the first Secretary-General of the CPC to visit this country.

1995

40th anniversary of the Nippo-Vietnamese trade association founded in 1955 in Tokyo.
Official visit of the President of the National Assembly, Nong Duc Manh to Japan.
February end: 4th visit of a Keidanren delegation led by Shoichiro Toyoda.
26–27 February: Japan launches the first big "Forum on Indochina's global development" in Tokyo. It evinces a keen interest in the infrastructure working group.
March: JICA's report: "Japan's Official Development Assistance to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam" published.
April: CPV Secretary General Do Muoi visits Japan. This is the first visit by such an important representative to Japan.

5 April: In Chiang Rai (north Thailand), Bangkok, Hanoi, Vientiane and Phnom Penh sign an accord on the utilisation of lower Mekong waters and form the Mekong Commission; China and Myanmar are present at the signing in the capacity of observers. The Commission's works will be financed by the ADB.
11 July: President Bill Clinton announces normalisation of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam.
28 July: In Brunei, during a conference of ASEAN Foreign Affairs ministers, Vietnam officially becomes the seventh member of the Association.
31 July: Vietnam takes the opportunity to state that its membership to the Association will not affect Sino-Vietnamese relations in any way.
2 August: The Mekong Commission which replaces the interim committee (1978–95) is "reactivated" in Phnom Penh. It brings together Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam which wish to exploit the river's potential. China and Burma are given the status of invitee members.
5–7 August: American Secretary ofState Warren Christopher Hill's visit to Vietnam seals the normalisation between the two countries. On this occasion, the American Embassy is inaugurated in Hanoi.
11 August: In order to help Vietnam solve its debt problems, Japan gives it a $32 million aid. Japan is now the biggest donor with about $600 million per annum in the form ofloans and accords for development.
15 August: On the occasion ofthe 50th anniversary ofJapan's capitulation, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama expressesJapan's "profound regrets" about the aggression it committed in Asia.
7 November: Japan signs an accord with Laos according to which the Japanese will subsidise a 500 million yen development aid.
14–15 December: Fifth Summit of ASEAN Heads of State in Bangkok ratifies a treaty of denuclearisation of the Pacific. ASEAN reaffirms its intention of setting up a free trade zone (AFTA) before the year 2003, and adopts a three-year programme on liberalisation of services.

1996

January: Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Yukihiko Ikeda's official visit to Vietnam.
27 January: Construction of a rail network connecting Thailand and Laos begins. This is part of a huge project aiming to connect Southeast Asia and southern China.

1–2 March: In Thailand, first meeting of the Heads of State and Governments of the European Union, ASEAN, Japan, China and South Korea (ASEM). "Burning" issues like human rights are not taken up. Vietnam participates in the Forum in the capacity of a founder member.
20 March: The members of the Mekong Commission (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam) welcome the fact that China and Burma have agreed to establish a "dialogue mechanism" with the Commission.
16–17 April: In Tokyo, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton sign a new agreement of military cooperation which redefines the security system in the Asia-Pacific region and reinforces the 1951 Nippo-American Security Treaty.
24 April: Congressman Douglas Peterson, former prisoner of war during the Vietnam war is appointed Ambassador to Vietnam by President Bill Clinton.
18 June: During the "Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation" (APEC) summit organised in Philippines, the Vietnamese Foreign Affairs Minister Nguyen Manh Cam expresses officially Vietnam's desire for APEC membership.
28 June–1 July: 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam. The Congress reappoints President Le Duc Anh, Do Muoi, the CPV's Secretary General and the Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet to their offices. The fact that Hanoi has decided to retain this troika, set up since 1991 conveys its desire to maintain status quo in the political sphere. The CPV forms the Politburo's Permanent Council composed of five members including the Secretary-general, the President and the Prime Minister; its mission: to ensure the party's presence and influence in government's decisions. The Congress receives a Chinese delegation led by Prime Minister Li Peng which shows the importance of the new rapport between the two countries.
23 September: In New York, Japan and the United States adopt major principles governing their strategic alliance which particularly include extension of Japanese assistance to American troops in case of regional crisis.
12 November: The National Assembly votes on a new Bill on foreign investment in Vietnam. Promulgated on 23 November by the President of SRV (decree number 52-L/CT), this new version replaces the 29 December 1987 Act (which itself had been amended on two occasions, on 30 June 1990 and on 23 December 1992).

1997

12 January: Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visits Hanoi.
23–25 January: Deputy director ofthe Japanese defence agency, Naoaki Murata visits Vietnam to discuss the two countries' defence policies.
Official visit ofDeputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs Minister Nguyen Manh Cam to Japan.
March: In Thailand, collapse of Finance One, one of the premier Finance companies of the country, giving rise to a wave of speculation about the Thai baht. Beginning of the Asian crisis.
14 July: CPV secretary-general Do Muoi's friendly visit to China. On this occasion he recalls that "Vietnam wishes to establish peaceful, friendly and cooperative relations with all the countries ofthe region and the world with a priority for its ASEAN and Asia-Pacific neighbours." As for Taiwan, Do Muoi assured Jiang Zemin that Vietnam recognises the PRC government as the "only legitimate government representing the whole of China".
23 July: Burma and Laos are admitted to the ASEAN; Cambodia's candidature is rejected.
23 September: In New York, the United States and Japan redefine their alliance by adopting new guiding principles.
16 September: The CPV Central committee confirms Phan Van Khai as Prime Minister and Tran Duc Luong as President of SRV.
20 September: The new National Assembly ratifies the decision ofCPV Central committee during the first session.
23–25 October: Chinese Vice-Prime Minister holding the economic affairs portfolio visits Vietnam. Amongst other things, the two parties wish to sign, as early as possible, a cross-border trade agreement so as to stabilise the common border.
1–2 November: In Krasnoïarsk (Siberia), first "informal summit" in the history of Russian-Japanese relations. Economic and geopolitical considerations influenced the discussions between Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Boris Yeltsin.
13 November: Minister for Planning and Investment Tran Xuan Gia returns from a US tour. The purpose of the trip was to normalise economic relations between the two countries.
22–29 December: At the end of the 4th Plenary session of the CPV Central committee, General Le Kha Phieu becomes officially the Secretary General of the CPV.

1998

25th Anniversary of the establishing of Japan-Vietnam diplomatic relations.
10–12 January: Japanese Defence Minister M. Fumio Kyuma's official visit to Vietnam.
27 January: In Japan, Finance Minister Hiroshi Mitsuzuka resigns following a bank scandal involving his ministry (bureaucrats in charge of inspection of banks are suspected of corruption).
31 January: In the context of Asian crisis, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai decides to create a State Council for finance and currency by a bye-law. Its responsibilities: helping to study and solve problems related to financial and monetary policy at the national level; examining and giving suggestions for the elaboration of financial and monetary projects; organising and executing projects especially in the banking and credit fields; controlling and supervising the implementation of these projects.
1 February: A government directive regarding implementation of an Act encouraging internal investments comes into force. The State creates favorable conditions for all companies wishing to invest in Vietnam. From now, all the economic partners will be treated on an equal footing.
4 February: Phan Van Khai receives foreign investors in Ho Chi Minh City to discuss creating a more stable and attractive climate for investments.
12 February: The Vietnamese Embassy in Tokyo signs an agreement on Vietnam's membership to ASEAN-Japan centre for commercial, tourist and investment promotion. On the same day, the Vietnamese Embassy in Indonesia signs the same type of document. The centre comprises of seven countries: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Japan.
5–9 March: CPV secretary-general Le Kha Phieu's official visit to Laos. He reasserts that Vietnam "is ready to meet with Laos' demands to use Vietnamese seaports for its exports and imports".
2–4 April: Second Asia-Europe Forum (ASEM II) in London. Current issues such as human rights are once again overlooked in preference to the global aspect of Asia-Europe relations.
11 July: Prime Minister Phan Van Khai signs a decree to establish the first legal structure for the creation of two centres for stock-exchange transactions in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, attached to the State Securities and Exchanges Commission. The objective is to mobilise

long-term capital for companies and to encourage public issue of State enterprises. Provided for by the Jackson-Vanick amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, this American decision marks an important step in the process of normalisation of American-Vietnamese economic relations.
13 July: Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto resigns from his post; the previous day, his party, the LDP, had suffered a severe defeat in the senatorial elections.
29 July: South-Korean Foreign Affairs Minister Park Chung Soo's four day visit. On this occasion, the minister asserts that despite the Asian crisis, South Korea would strive to maintain and develop trade and investments with Vietnam.
30 July: In Japan, Keizo Obuchi is elected Prime Minister.
31 July: President Bill Clinton's decision to lift some trade restrictions on Vietnam, approved by the American Congress on 30 July, is welcomed by Vietnam as a "positive development".
7 August: Following Asian financial crisis, Vietnam devalues its currency the Dong by 7 per cent.
31 August: North Korea test fires a missile which later crashed into the Pacific after flying over Japan. The North-Korean threat forces Tokyo and Washington to consolidate their defence systems; Japan especially decides to participate in an American anti-missile program. China sees this reinforcement of Nippo-American alliance as a threat.
29 September–4 October: Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Nguyen Manh Cam visits the United States.
5–9 October: Official visit to the United States by a high ranking military delegation led by General Tran Hanh, Vice-Minister for defence.
19–23 October: Prime Minister Phan Van Khai's official visit to China. It is the first visit by a Vietnamese Head ofState to China since normalisation of the two States in 1991.
17–18 November: In the Kuala Lumpur Asia-Pacific Summit, Vietnam (as well as Russia and Peru) is officially admitted to APEC.
26–28 November: Chinese President Jiang Zemin's Tokyo visit; first visit of a Chinese Head of State to Japan.
30 November–3 December: A high ranking military delegation led by Defence Minister General Pham Van Tra goes on an official visit to Japan.
December: Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's official visit to Vietnam. Vietnamese Education and Training Minister Nguyen Minh Hien, visits Japan.

15–16 December: For the first time since its membership to ASEAN, Hanoi hosts the 6th Summit bringing together the Heads of States and Governments ofthe Association. Thus Vietnam establishes its true entry in the regional forum despite two snags: notable absence of President Jiang Zemin and the disagreement on Cambodia's admission to the ASEAN in spite of efforts deployed by Hanoi.

1999

25 February–2 March: CPV Secretary-General Le Kha Phieu visits China, his first trip to this country as the Party Chief. A cooperation agreement is signed by virtue of which China gives Vietnam a non-reimbursable aid of 20 million yuan. A "sixteen word motto" (in Vietnamese and Chinese) for the development of bilateral relations in 21st century is launched: "friendly neighbourhood, global co-operation, durable stability, looking towards the future".
5–15 March: In the end of the annual session of the People's National Assembly, China includes the role ofprivate economy in its Constitution. Beijing announces an increase of 12.7% in its military budget for 1999 (the increase was 12.8% in 1998 and 12.7% in 1997).
28–31 March: Prime Minister Phan Van Khai tours Japan and Australia.
29 March: In Berlin, opening of ASEM work forum in the presence of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the EU and ten Asian Countries.
6–15 April: Zhu Rongji is the first Chinese Head of Government to make an official visit to the United States in fifteen years.
30 April: At a ceremony in Hanoi, Cambodia becomesthe tenth member of the ASEAN.
18–28 May: A CPV and Government delegation visits China to study the Chinese experience on policies concerning reforms, liberalisation and construction of socialism.
26 May: Following Prime Minister Phan Van Khai's visit to Japan in March, Vietnam includes the Japanese Archipelago in the list ofcountries and territories benefiting from the Most Favoured Nation Clause (MFNC) in the long run on a reciprocal basis. From now, expansion of bilateral trade will be reinforced.
June: Prince Akishino and Princess Kiko visit Vietnam; first ever visit by the members ofthe Japanese Imperial family in the history ofNippo-Vietnamese relations.

8–9 July: Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizogoes to Beijing. Subject of discussions: regional security issues. At the end of the discussions, PRC enters into an agreement with Japan regarding its membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
25 July: Agreement in principle between Vietnam and the United States on bilateral trade.
26 July: In Singapore, sixth annual meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) takes up the problems of North Korea (an ARF member) and the Spratly islands, amongst other security issues. The 22 participating countries (10 ASEAN members and their 12 "dialogue partners") reassert navigation rights in the disputed zone of Spratly islands and advocate a "peaceful solution" to the maritime dispute. Philippines proposes a "code of conduct" plan in the said zone; Vietnam approves it whereas Malaysia rejects it.
30 August: A Japanese economic mission arrives at the conclusion that Japan should continue and improve the quality of its aid to Vietnam.
30 August–4 September: In Eastern Timor, at a referendum organised by the UNO, the Timorese decide their future by voting for or against "special autonomy" status proposed by Jakarta; a massive vote for independence, thus rejecting the principle ofautonomy. The pro-Indonesian militia, supported by the Indonesian army spreads terror in the island.
6 September: Madeleine Albright's two-day visit to Vietnam to evaluate the alliance between the two States since 1995.
15 September: Vietnam-Japan Investment Working Group meets in Hanoi.
29 September: Vietnam and Japan sign an agreement according to which a 20 billion yen loan (approximately $190 million) will be given to support economic reforms.

2000

January: Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi tours Thailand, Cambodia and Laos.
28 January: Nguyen Dy Nien becomes Vietnam's new Foreign Affairs Minister succeeding Nguyen Manh Cam.
8–12 March: Foreign Affairs Minister Nguyen Dy Nien visits Japan.
13 March: American Defence Secretary William Cohen's three day official visit to Vietnam.

28 March: Japan and Vietnam sign a note in Hanoi concerning $580 million credit meant for supporting socio-economic development projects.
April: JICA and the National Committee of Vietnamese Youth sign an agreement on Japan-ASEAN Youth Friendship Program for 2000–2003. As per the agreement, around a hundred young Vietnamese will go to Japan every year.
5 April: Mori Yoshiro becomes Japan's Prime Minister in the place of Obuchi Keizo who is hospitalised following a cerebral embolism.
8 April: Japan-Vietnam Friendship Association's (created on 19 March 1955) 45th Anniversary ceremony held in Tokyo.
20 April: In the framework of Nippo-Vietnamese cooperation for Vietnam's extended vaccination program (started in 1985), Japan offers 2 million doses of vaccination against measles and 1.6 million doses against diphtheria and whooping cough.
28 April: A delegation ofthe Japanese federation ofthe UNESCO clubs goes on a work visit to Vietnam. Discussions about two projects benefiting from Japan's ODA: literacy and spreading primary education in the Lai Chau (North) province and preservation oftraditional houses in Hoi An (Center).
29 April: Pham Van Dong, a historical figure of Vietnam dies.
May: After Japan Airlines, All Nippon Airway (ANA) airlines company opens two offices in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
3 May: Kawara Tsutomu, Director of the Japanese Agency for national defence visits Vietnam.
9–16 May: Prime Minister Phan Van Khai's Asian tour to Thailand, Burma and Laos, focused on development of cooperation.
10 May: Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Tang Jiaxuan's four day visit to Japan.
14 May: Japan announces Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo's death.
21 May: CPV General secretary Le Kha Phieu's European tour starting with five days in France and to be continued in Italy. This trip coincides with the 10th Anniversary ofestablishment ofrelations between Vietnam and the EU and with the 5th Anniversary of the signing of agreement on bilateral cooperation.
22 May: In the framework of Japan-ASEAN Friendship Program, a delegation of young Vietnamese goes to Japan to meet with Japanese youth to get acquainted with Japanese cultural life.
29 May: In Hanoi, signing of a document according to which Japan agrees to give a non-reimbursable aid of1,527 billion yen during 2000–

2001 for construction and renovation of 61 primary schools in four Vietnam provinces.
23 June: Vietnam and JICA sign a five-year plan for creating a center for cooperation for the development of Vietnam-Japan human resources. Amongst others, Accountancy, Management, Information Technology and Japanese language courses will be given.
4 July: Mori Yoshiro becomes Japan's Prime Minister.
13 July: Vietnam and the United States sign a trade agreement.
18 July: Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung announces the results of tenders for the first phase of the construction of the first deep water port in North Vietnam-Cai Lan (Quang Ninh province). Penta Ocean, the Japanese group is selected.
20 July: In Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam's first Stock Exchange is inaugurated.
August: Taku Yamasaki, President of the "Union of Japanese and Vietnamese Parliamentarians" visits Vietnam.
24–25 July: In Bangkok, 33rd conference of ASEAN ministers. Vietnam takes over the Association's presidency.
11 August: Vietnam and Japan sign a protocol to develop tourism in the Central region.
15 August: In Hanoi, Nguyen Manh Cam, the Deputy Prime Minister receives Hiroumi Masamitsu, the Asian Vice-President of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to discuss programs of cooperation in the fight against floods in the Centre and their impact.
18–22 September: 7th session of Nippo-Vietnamese negotiations on bilateral cooperation and Japanese public aid in Hanoi.
3 October: Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Manh Cam receives the delegation of the mixed committee of Vietnam-Japan economic co-operation led by its President Kenji Miyahara on the occasion of the 7th meeting in Hanoi.
5 October: Key Vietnamese leaders receive a delegation of the "Japan-Vietnam Parliamentarians Friendship Union" led by its President Taku Yamasagi.
13–17 October: Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visits Japan.
17 October: A seminar on "trade with Vietnam" under the aegis of Vietnam Commerce Ministry in collaboration with the ASEAN-Japan Centre for promotion of commercial and tourism investment (APC) in Osaka.
19–21 October: Third Asian-Europe Summit (ASEM III) in Seoul.

November: Floods in Vietnam: Japan mobilises funds; on the 8th, it gives a basic assistance of 9.6 million yen to the Vietnamese delegation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent; on the 17th, it extends its emergency aid to 24.91 million yen.
1 November: Second meeting of the Vietnam-Japan working group in trading and investment; in Hanoi.
11–13 November: Chinese President Jiang Zemin's official visit to Laos.
13 November: Chinese President Jiang Zemin visits Cambodia. It is the first visit of a Chinese Head of State after that of Liu Shao-chi in 1963.
Commissioning of Nghi Son, Vietnam's most modern cement works, a Nippo-Vietnamese joint-venture.
Opening ofthe second JETRO center in Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City.
16 November: Signing of a Nippo-Vietnamese agreement on a non-reimbursable Japanese aid of57 billion dongfor education and training.
16–19 November: Bill Clinton's historic visit to Vietnam. The first official visit of a US President to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
22–24 November: ASEAN annual Summit meeting.
24 November: Memorandum signed between Vietnam and Japan for a project to train Vietnamese technicians of the coal sector. Japan is Vietnam's biggest coal market.
Memorandum signed between JICA and the Vietnamese Transport and Communications Ministry on the feasibility studies ofthe "Development of ports network in South Vietnam" project.
27–28 November: In Hanoi, a seminar on tourism organised by Vietnam's General Department ofTourism amongst others, the objective ofwhich is to boost tourism cooperation between Vietnam and Japan, a potential market for Vietnamese tourism industry (according to estimates, nearly 140,000 Japanese had visited Vietnam in 2000).
10–16 December: A delegation of 52 Japanese companies goes to Vietnam. On this occasion, two exhibitions for promoting Vietnam's exports to Japan are opened in Hanoi and HCM-C.
11–12 December: 13th ASEANand EU Ministers' meeting in Vientiane.
14–15 December: In Hanoi, eighth annual conference ofa consultative group of sponsors in Vietnam decides to reserve $2.4 billion of ODA the following year to support the socio-economic development plan for the period 2001–2010.
17–29 December: A delegation of the Japanese Research Institute, appointed by the Japanese Government conducted enquiries concerning

public development aid funds (utilisation of Asian Pacific Division funds granted by Japan in favour of Vietnamese small and medium enterprises and their disbursement).
25–29 December: President Tran Duc Luong's official friendship visit to PRC. Signing of five cooperation documents. Vietnam reaffirms its acceptance of a single China under the authority of the People's Republic of China.
26 December: Convention signed between Vietnam and Japan concerning a project of training teachers and translation of manuals in the field of electricity in the next five years.

2001

10 February: Vietnam reaffirms its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands on the occasion of People's Republic of China's Defence Minister Chi Haotian's visit to Hanoi.
12–18 February: Vietnam-Japan working group's conference on investments in Ho Chi Minh City.
1 March: First ever visit by a Russian leader: Vladimir Putin signs a strategic partnership agreement.
April: IMF gives a $368 million loan to Vietnam.
17 April: 150 members of the CPV's central committee (elected the previous day) choose the moderate Nong Duc Manh as the party's Secretary General in place of Le Kha Phieu.
19–22 April: 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam that defines the orientations for the country's development, social and economic strategy (2001–2010) and the Five Year Plan.
26 April: Junichiro Koizumi becomes Japan's Prime Minister, replacing Yoshiro Mori.
7–8 June: In Tokyo, seminar on the future of Asia. On this occasion, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai declares that "Japan is Vietnam's No. 1 partner".
13 June: In Tokyo, 5th meeting of the consultative group on Cambodia.
21–28 June: Prince Akishino and Princess Kiko go on an official visit to Cambodia.
9 September: Li Peng, president of the National Congress of the Chinese people goes on an official visit to Vietnam.
November: In Brunei, on the occasion of the ASEAN meeting, China presents a project on free trade zone between Southeast Asia and China.

28 November: Vietnam ratifies a historic trade agreement with the United States which should facilitate its membership to the WTO (effective from 10 December).

2002

14 January: During a visit to Singapore, Prime Minister Koizumi announces to ASEAN a "new regional partnership" called IDEA (Initiatives for Development of East Asia).
26 January: A meeting of the Prime Ministers of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in Ho Chi Minh City to discuss "development Programme of the Vietnam-Cambodia-Laos Triangle".
19 February–1 March: APEC summit in Mexico city.
1–3 March: Chinese President Jiang Zemin goes on an official visit to Vietnam regarding the future oftrade and economic cooperation between the two countries.
4 April: Imai Takashi, Keidanren President visits Vietnam and reaffirms the interest of Japanese firms in continuing to invest in this country.
27–28 April: Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's official visit to Vietnam where he announces a promotion treaty for investments and also a trade agreement. He also confirms Japan's support to Vietnam's membership to the WTO.
4 May: Russia evacuates its Cam Ranh base in Vietnam where its troops were stationed since 1979.
20 May: The Nikkei Asia prize is awarded by Tsuruta Takuhiko, President of the Nikkei Shimnun to Vo Tong Xuan, President of the An giang University in Vietnam.
12 August: In Tokyo, Kawaguchi Yoriko, Foreign Affairs Minister meets with his ASEAN counterparts on the occasion of Ministers' meeting for the IDEA programme that was announced in January by the Japanese Prime Minister.
11 September: In Brunei, Japan and ASEAN members agree to start negotiations for economic partnership in 2003.
23 September: 4th ASEM Summit In Copenhagen which adopts a declaration reaffirming its support to the dialogue in the Korean peninsula.
2 October: Nong Duc Manh, CPV's Secretary General visits Tokyo where he could meet with the Emperor of Japan and the Prime Minister.
18–20 October: Francophonie summit in Beyrouth.

28 October: First visit by a Vietnamese Head of State to France since that of Ho Chi Minh in 1946. Tran Duc Luong, the President of the Vietnam Republic visits Paris and Lyon.
1–6 November: Beginning of bilateral talks between Vietnam and the European Union in a cycle of negotiations for Vietnam's membership to WTO.
3 November: Koizumi Junichiro, Japanese Prime Minister participates in a summit with the ASEAN+3 leaders in Phnom Penh.

Notes

Chapter 1

1 Noël Péri, "Essai sur les relations du Japon et de l'Indochine aux XVIe et XVII siècles", Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient 23: 1–104 (Hanoi, 1924).

2 Ibid., p. 3.

3 Ibid., p. 70

4 Others were just exiles including Japanese Christian converts who were fleeing religious persecution.

5 Saigon Eco: 6–8 (June 1998).

6 Tran My-Van, "Japan through Vietnamese eyes (1905–1945)", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30 (March): 128–29.

7 Ibid., p. 129.

8 "Dong du" is pronounced as "dong zu".

9 Masaya Shiraishi, "Phan Boi Chau in Japan", in Phan Boi Chau and the Dong Du Movement, ed. Vinh Sinh (Boston: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, The William Joiner Center UMass/Boston), The Lac-Viet Series, No. 8, 1988, p. 55.

10 Shiraishi, "Phan Boi Chau in Japan", p. 55.

11 One of the practical reasons for forming trading companies was that they would facilitate rapid financing of the revolutionary movement.

12 François Joyaux, Géopolitique de l'Extrême-Orient, 1981, tome 1, p. 214. (This paragraph owes much to chapter 10 of the book: "Le Japon, un État 'continental' devenu 'maritime'", pp. 195–215.)

13 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, vols. 1 and 2 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p. 153.

14 Nguyên The Anh, "Phan Boi Chau and the beginnings of the Dong-Du movement", in Phan Boi Chau and the Dong Du Movement, ed. Vinh Sinh, p. 5. At that time, Liang Qichao and Phan Boi Chau shared the same political view: to obtain their respective country's independence while preserving the institution of monarchy.

15 Georges Boudarel, "Phan Boi Chau and the Vietnamese society of his time", France-Asie 23, no. 199/4 (1969): 426.

16 Georges Boudarel, "L'Extrême gauche asiatique et le mouvement national vietnamien", in Histoire de l'Asie du Sud-Est. Révoltes, réformes, révolutions, ed. Pierre Brocheux (Lille: Presses universitaires de Lille, 1981), p. 171.

17 William H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movement, 1940 to 1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 27.

18 Ibid., p. 27.

19 Ibid., p. 38.

20 Philippe Richer, L'Asie du Sud-Est. Indépendances et communismes (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, coll. Notre siècle, 1981), p. 86. See Daniel Hémery, "Révolutionnaires vietnamiens et pouvoir colonial", in Indochina, Communistes, trotskystes, nationalistes à Saigon de 1932 à 1937 (Paris: Maspero, coll. Bibliothèque socialiste, 1975), pp. 130–31.

Chapter 2

1 Sir Halford John Mackinder, British geographer suggests in an article published in 1904 "The Geographical Pivot of History" that the control of East Europe was vital to control the rest of the world. His theory is based on the following assumption: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World-Island commands the world". Mackinder's "Heartland" is also known as "pivotal area" or area in the heart of Eurasia. See Halford John Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", in Democratic Ideals and Reality, pp. 241–42, 255, 257–58, 262–64.

2 Pierre Renouvin, La Question d'Extrême-Orient, 1840–1940 (Paris: Hachette, 1946), p. 365.

3 Philippe Richer, L'asie du Sud-Est, p. 88.

4 William H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movement, p. 16; William Gerard Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 227.

5 See particularly Michel Vié, "Points de vue sur la politique extérieure du Japon entre les guerres mondiales", Relations internationales, no. 22 (Summer 1980): 141–52.

6 William Gerard Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945, p. 227.

7 Ibid., p. 227.

8 Stéphane Dovert, "La Thaïlande prête pour le monde, ou de l'usage intensif des étrangers dans un processus de construction nationale", in Thaïlande contemporaine, ed. Stéphane Dovert (Bangkok-Paris: IRASEC-L'Harmattan, 2001), pp. 177–273.

9 See Bui Xuan Quang, "Le Samouraï et La Perle de l'empire français", in Saigon 1925–1945, ed. Philippe Franchini. Memoirs series, no. 17, September 1992, Paris, pp. 216–32.

10 Bui Xuan Quang, "Jeu de go Japonais", in Saigon 1925–1945, ed. Philippe Franchini (September 1992), p. 233.

11 Pierre Renouvin, 1946, p. 421.

12 Masaya Shiraishi, "La Présence japonaise en Indochine (1940–1945)", in L'Indochine française, 1940–1945, ed. Paul Isoart. Works and research of the Institute of Law for Peace and Development (Paris: University of Nice, 1982), pp. 215–41.

13 W.H. Elsbree, 1953, p. 24.

14 The colonial administration gave more importance to elite Indo-Chinese (especially monarchs, mandarins, notables), promoted indigenous officials, encouraged big installation projects, favoured craft industry, developed teaching, the "theeing" and "thouing" of the natives was officially banned by the Governor General in 1941, etc.

15 David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945, The Quest for Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 81.

16 Ibid., p. 85.

17 Ibid., p. 91.

18 Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 205–13.

19 The Tonkin delta was called Bac Ky or Bac Bo, the Cochin-China delta was called Nam Ky and Nam Bo, and the Centre was called Trung Ky or Trung Bo.

20 Marcel Benichou, "Il y a cinquante ans: le coup de force japonais du 9 mars 1945", Le Médecin du Vietnam, no. 23: 18. This historian's article presents the events of this important period in the history of Vietnam in a much synthesised manner.

21 The first time by China (French-Chinese Treaty of Tien Tsin of 1885), and the second time by Japan (French-Japan Treaty of 1907).

22 Telegram on 5 October 1945 for Walter Robertson, chargé de mission in China, extract mentioned by William J. Duiker, "Les États-Unis et l'Indochine française, 1940–1945", in Isoart (ed.), 1982, p. 211.

23 Quoted by Pierre Mélandri, "L'Apprentissage du leadership occidental. Les États-Unis et le monde 1941–1949", Relations internationales, no. 22 (Summer 1980): 187.

24 For this passage on the great famine, our text is largely based on Nguyen Thê Anh's article "Japanese Food Policies and the 1945 Great Famine in Indo-China", in Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in South-East Asia, ed. Paul H. Kratoska (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1998), pp. 208–17; and also on Bui Minh Dung's "Japan's Role in the Vietnamese Starvation of 1944–45", Modern Asian Studies 29, no. 3 (1995): 573–618.

25 Nguyen Thê Anh, "Japanese Food Policies and the 1945 Great Famine in Indo-China", in Kratoska (ed.), 1998, p. 214.
26 Ibid., p. 217.
27 According to the Indo-China Centre for Overseas Archives, 338/21, quoted by Nguyen Thê Anh, "Japanese Food Policies and the 1945 Great Famine in Indo-China", in Kratoska (ed.), 1998, p. 222.
28 Marr, Vietnam 1945, p. 100.
29 This passage is largely based on Christopher Goscha's lecture in the Institute of Eastern Asia on 7 February 2003, and his works on this question. See Christopher Goscha, "Belated Allies, technical support of Japanese deserters to Vietminh during the first years of the French-Vietnamese war", in Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 202–203 (2002): 81–109; and Christopher Goscha and Kyoichi Tachikawa, "Betomin to tomoni Tatakata Nihonjin (Japanese who fought beside the Vietminh)", Gunjin Shigaku 36, no. 3–4 (March 2001): 218–32.
30 Christopher Goscha, "Belated Allies, technical support of Japanese deserters to Vietminh during the first years of the French-Vietnamese war", in Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 202–203 (2002): 83.
31 Ibid., p. 85.
32 Le Van Hien and Nhat Ky, Cua mot bo truong (Journal of a Minister), Nha tuat Ban Da Nang, Danang, 1995, 2 volumes, p. 11.
33 Masamichi Oka, "Love in the Annam Jungle", in Jay Gluck, Ukiyo, Stories of the "Floating World" of Post-war Japan (Japan: Personally Oriented Ltd, 1993), pp. 107–21.
34 Christopher Goscha, "Belated Allies, technical support of Japanese deserters to Vietminh during the first years of the French-Vietnamese war", in Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 202–203 (2002): 108.

Chapter 3

1 Shizuo Maruyama, "Japanese Opinion and the Vietnam War", Japan Quarterly 12, no. 3 (July 1965): 306–307.
2 Thomas Havens, Fire Across the Sea, the Vietnam War and Japan 1965–1975 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 27.
3 Ibid., p. 35.
4 Asahi Poll on Vietnam, Japan Quarterly 12, no. 4 (October 1965), Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, pp. 463–66.
5 Havens, Fire Across the Sea, p. 51.
6 Ibid., p. 71.
7 In Boston Globe, 7 August 1965, quoted by Thomas Hanvens, p. 78.
8 Havens, Fire Across the Sea, p. 87.
9 Asahi Shimbun (collective), The Pacific Rivals: A Japanese View of Japan-America Relations (Tokyo: Weatherhill Asahi, 1972), p. 304.

10 Keizai hatten kyokai (Association for economic development), Betonamu sengofukkokaihatsu to Nihon no yakuwari (Japan's role in the reconstruction of Vietnam after the war) (Tokyo, 1974), p. 116.
11 Havens, Fire Acrossthe Sea, p. 97.
12 Bernard Béraud, La Gaucherévolutionnaireau Japon (Paris: Combat, 1970), p. 120.
13 YoshiyukiTurumi, "Senkyûhyakushichijûnen to Beiheiren" (The year 1970 and the movement for peace in Vietnam), in Beiheiren, ed. Makoto Oda (Tokyo: San'ichi Shôbô, 1974), p. 51.

Chapter 4

1 Masaya Shiraishi, Japanese Relations with Vietnam: 1951–1987 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 43.
2 The second took place in 1973 with the announcement ofthe end ofdollar convertibility into gold.
3 Yoshiharu Tsuboi, "La Diplomatie japonaise et le Vietnam 1972–1998", Revue d'Étudesinternationales 30, no. 1 (March 1999): 85–86.
4 Ibid., p. 86.
5 Keizai Hatten Kyokai (Association for economic progress), Betenamu SengoFukkôKaihatsu to Nihon no yakuwri (Japan's Role in the development and reconstruction of postwar Vietnam) (Tokyo, 1973), p. 50.
6 Tsuboi, "La Diplomatie japonaise", p. 87.
7 Takeo Fukuda, (1905), former Civil Servant of Finance, several times minister, for Agriculture (1959–60), Foreign Affairs (1971–72) and Finance (1965–66, 1968–70, 1973–76), would be Prime Minister from 1976–78. His greatest achievement was the Peace and Friendship Treaty with China.
8 See Far Eastern EconomicReview (13 January 1978): 16.
9 See Asahi Shimbun (17 January 1979).
10 Havens, Fire Acrossthe Sea, p. 250.
11 Akihiko Tanaka and Yasuhiro Takeda, "Japan's Economic Policy toward China and Vietnam", in The U.S.-Japan EconomicRelationship in East and Southeast Asia, ed. Kaoru Okuizumi, Kent Calder and Gerrit Gong (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), p. 219.

Chapter 5

1 NobuyukiTakahashi, "The Scandal ofJapanese Aid to Indonesia", AsiaTimes (2 August 2002), <www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/DH02Dh01.html>.
2 JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization), White Paper on foreign investment, Jetro, Tokyo, summary in English 2002, <www.jetro.go.jp.>.

3 Let us remember that as far as direct investment is concerned, we should differentiate between the commitments — investment amounts fixed when the investment approval was given, and disbursements — amounts actually invested. The difference between the two large figures can be significant and arise from various causes: investment approvals can be withdrawn ifthe project implementation is delayed. Similarly, because of hazards in project implementation, there can be delays in the actual disbursement: imports, starting the work, etc.

4 Gene Gregory, management consultant, "The End of the Vietnamese Investment Boom" (Betonamu toshi bumu no shuen to shirarezaru Nihon kigyo no Seiko), Diamond (27 January 2001): 57.

5 US Department of Commerce <http//www.pulse.tiaonline.org/0900/text/intlmkts.htm.>.

Chapter 6

1 Motoo Furuta, "Betonamu no Nihonzô" (Vietnam's image in Japan), in Nihon no imeiji no Kosaku,ed. Yamauchi Masayuki (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku Shuppankai, 1997), pp. 8–102.

2 Yves Bougon, "Le Japan a gagné la guerre de l'image", France-Japan Éco, no. 65 (Winter 1995): 22–24.

3 Motoo Furuta, Japanese Research on Vietnam, in Social Science (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1997), pp. 18–19; Masaya Shiraishi, "A Short Essay on Scientific Exchanges Between Japan and South-East Asia", The Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, no. 1 (Tokyo, 2000): 9–106.

4 Furuta, Japanese Research on Vietnam, in Social Science, p. 19.

Chapter 7

1 Juichi Inada, "Japan's Aid Freeze to Vietnam: Historical Process and its Diplomatic Implications", in Indochina in transition: confrontation or co-prosperity(Tokyo: Japan Institute of International affairs, 1989), p. 256.

2 Grips, Japan's DevelopmentCooperation in Vietnam: Supporting Broad-Based Growth with Poverty Reduction, Grips Development Forum, National Graduate Institute for Policies Studies (Tokyo, May 2002), pdfdocument, <www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e>,p. 32 (March 2004).

3 The JETRO (Japan Trade Organization) also pursues operations of cooperation in Vietnam.

4 Results of this programme can be consulted on the website <www.neujica.org/vn>(in English and Japanese).

5 The electricity production ofLaos exceeds widely its consumption and the surplus is mainly exported to Thailand.

6 The Japanese use the terms "Indochina" and "Indo-Chinese", although a little dated as for example in the "Forum for the Global Development of Indochina". Today, the abbreviation CLV, for Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam tends to replace the term "Indochina".
7 Japan adopts a similar position on Burma, consisting in trying to integrate it within the ASEAN. Further to coup d'état of1998, Japan suspended its assistance.
8 The GMS has a portal on the ADB site. See: <www.adb.org/GMS> [April 2004].
9 "Vietnam Economic Monitor, Spring 2002", World Bank.

Conclusion

1 "China's economic influence in Asia is growing because ofJapan's weakness", Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 27 September 2002.
2 Masahiko Ebashi, Ajia Keizai Handobuku (Tokyo, 2003), p. 85.
3 Hugues Tertrais, Asiedu Sud-Est: enjeu régional ou enjeu mondial ?, Gallimard (Paris: Collection Folio-Le Monde actuel, 2002), p. 203.
4 The French translation of the complete text of Koizumi Junichiro's speech can be read in Cahiers du Japan (Autumn 2002), pp. 15–18.
5 Tertrais, 2002, p. 11.
6 Jean-Luc Domenach, Où va la Chine, Fayard (Paris, 2002), p. 219.
7 Benoît de Trèglodé, "Un théâtre d'ombres: le Vietnam entre la Chine et l'ASEAN au lendemain de la crise asiatique", Les etudes de CERI, no. 68 (August 2000): 29
8 Jean-Luc Domenach, 2002, p. 220.

Glossary

(J) is for a word or phrase of Japanese origin
(V) is for a word or phrase of Vietnamese origin

ADB:	Asian Development Bank
AEDC:	American Economic Development Council. Merged with the Council for Urban Economic Development (CUED) to form the International Economic Development Council (IEDC)
AFTA:	ASEAN Free Trade Area
Ao dai (V):	Traditional garment worn by Vietnamese women (see Ethnic Boom)
APEC:	Asia Pacific Economic Conference
ASEAN:	Association of South-East Asian Nations
Beheiren (J):	Betonamu ni heiwa o ! Shimin Rengo, Japanese League for Peace in Vietnam
Betonamu Tokuju (J):	public contracts for Vietnam
Bridge Diplomacy:	Japanese policy for creating links between countries
Build-Operate-Transfer:	System of private concession for construction and operation and transfer to the public finally
CEJ:	Centre for Japanese Studies
Centre japonais des coopérants:	Japan Volunteer Centre
Chua Cau (V):	pagoda at the Hoi An bridge
Churistsu Rôren (J):	Japanese trade union
CNRS:	French National Centre for Scientific Research

COMECON:	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPI:	Communist Party of Indochina
CPJ:	Communist Party of Japan
Dai Nippon Seinentô (J):	Youth party of Greater Japan
Dai Tôa Kyoeiken (J):	East Asian Co-prosperity sphere
Doi moi (V):	Literally "modify to make new things"; reform policy in force in Vietnam since 1986
Dong-Du (V):	Exodus to the East
DLP:	Democratic Liberal Party of Japan
DRV:	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
EFEO:	École française d'Extrême-Orient (French school for Far-East)
Ethnic Boom:	All things coming from Third World countries, particularly Asia, in fashion in Japan
Ethnic Food:	Asian Gastronomy and food products in fashion in Japan
FDI:	Foreign Direct Investment
Futsuin Kenkyû (J):	Japanese studies on French Indochina
Gaimushô (J):	Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
GMS:	Greater Mekong Sub-region, programme covering Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the Chinese Yunnan province
Hansen (J):	Hansen Seinen Iinkai, Anti-war youth committees
HCR:	High Commission for Refugees of the United Nations
Hoa:	Vietnamese of Chinese origin
IEDC:	International Economic Development Council, (US)
Indochina Nanmin Kyûen renraku kai (J):	Committee for assistance to Indochinese refugees
JATEC:	Japan Technical Committee for Assistance to Anti-war U.S. Deserters
JBIC:	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JETRO:	Japan External Trade Organization

JICA:	Japan International Cooperation Agency
Jishu Gaikô (J):	Independent diplomacy (of the United States)
JSDF:	Japanese Self-Defense Forces
JVPC:	Japan Vietnam Petroleum Company
Kaikoku (J):	Re-opening of Japan in the 19th century
Kempeitai (J):	Japanese armed police before 1945
Kokusai Gakuyukai (J):	Institute for International Studies
Kokutai (J):	Japanese concept identifying Japan as a national entity, appeared at the same time as kaikoku
Konnichi-sha (J):	Literally "Today's Society", association of Vietnamese writers set up within the Japanese Cultural Institute in Hanoi by Komaki Oomi
Kuomintang:	Chinese Nationalist party
Kyôsantô (J):	Japanese Communist party
Lai Vien Kieu (V):	Literally "bridge for far-off visitors"
Manchukuo:	Manchuria under Japanese occupation
METI:	Ministry of Economy and Trade and Industry, succeeded to MITI in 2002
MITI:	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
NEDO:	Nippon Energy Development Organization
Nemawashi (J):	Literally "preparing the earth before planting a tree", informal "Japanese style" negotiation
Nichietsu Boekikai (J):	Nippo-Vietnamese trade association
Nihon Betonamu Kenkyusha Kaigi (J):	Japanese Association of Vietnamese studies
Nihon Bunka Kaikan (J):	Japanese Cultural Institute in Hanoi
Nihonmachi (J):	Literally "Japanese town"; Japanese quarter
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIC:	Newly industrialised Countries
NTT:	Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
ODA:	Official Development Aid
OECF:	Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
Office Lady:	Japanese office employee

OSS:	Office of Strategic Services, American secret services
PRC:	People's Republic of China
Sakoku (J):	Closing of Japan from 17th–19th century
Seikei bunri (J):	Principle of separating politics and the economy
Shuinjô (J):	Red Seal
Sôgô shôsha (J):	Japanese Trading Company
Sôhyô (J):	Japanese trade union
Taigan no Kasai (J):	Literally "fire on the other side of the river", Japanese feeling of being safe by being far away from Vietnam during the war against Americans
Tôa Dôbunka (J):	country having the same culture as East Asia
Toi Co (V):	Favourable occasion
Tongmenghui:	Sworn league, first version of the Kuomintang
Trading with the Enemies Act:	American Act barring trade with enemy nations
Tsumetai Nihonjin (J):	Expression of Makoto Maekawa, literally "cold, glacial, heartless", that he used to qualify his countrymen's lack of compassion for Vietnamese exiles
UNDP:	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF:	United Nations Children's Fund
UN:	United Nations
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Viêt Bac (V):	administrative term to describe North Vietnam under the Rule of Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Viet Kieu (V):	Vietnamese of the diaspora

VNPT:	Vietnam Post and Telephone
VNQDD:	Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang or Viet Quoc: Vietnamese nationalist party formed in 1927 on the Kuomintang model
Wako (J):	Japanese pirates
Wakon Yôsai (J):	Slogan of the Meiji era, literally "Japanese spirit and western science"
WTO:	World Trade Organisation
Zengakuren (J):	National Students' Union of Japan

Bibliography

Abe Shigeyuki. "Trade and Investment Relations of Japan and ASEAN in a Changing Global Economic Environment". In Kobe University Economic Review, no. 42 (1997): 11–54.

Aldrich, J. Richard. Intelligence and the War Against Japan, Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 524pp.

Asahi Shimbun (collectif). The Pacific Rivals: A Japanese View of Japan-America Relations, Tokyo: Weatherhill-Asahi, 1972.

Beasley William Gerard, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, 280pp.

Béraud, Bernard. La Gauche révolutionnaire au Japon. Paris: Seuil, coll. Combat, 1970, 154pp.

Blechinger, Verena and Legewie, Jochen., eds. Facing Asia: Japan's Role in the Political and Economic Dynamism of Regional Cooperation. Munich: Indicium-Verlag, coll. Monographier aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien der Philipp-Franz von Siebold-Stiftung, 2000, 328pp.

Boudarel, Georges. "Phan Boi Chau et la société vietnamienne de son temps". In France-Asie 23 (199/4): 355–436.

_____, "L'Extrêmegauche asiatique et le mouvement national vietnamien". In Histoire de l'Asie du Sud-Est. Révoltes, réformes, revolutions. Edited by Pierre Brocheux. Lille, Presses universitaires de Lille, 1981.

Bougon, Yves. "Le Japon a gagné la guerre de l'image". In France-Japon Éco, no. 65 (Winter 1995): 22–24.

Brocheux, Pierre and Hémery, Daniel. Indochine, la colonisation ambiguë, 1858–1954. Paris: La Découverte, 1995, 431pp.

Bui Minh Dung. "Japan's Role in the Vietnamese Starvation of 1944–45". In Modern Asian Studies 29(3) (1995): 573–618.

Bui Xuan Quang. "Le Samouraï et la Perle de l'empire français". In Saigon 1925–1945. Edited by Philippe Franchini. Memoirs series, no. 17, September 1992, Paris, pp. 216–32.

Bui Xuan Quang. "Jeu de go Japonais". In Saigon 1925–1945. Edited by Philippe Franchini (September 1992), p. 233.

Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. Vols. 1 and 2. London: Pall Mall Press, 1967, 1346pp.

Dahm, Henrich. French and Japanese Economic Relations with Vietnam since 1975. Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999, 162pp.

Do Du Dinh. Quan he Kinh te Vietnam — Nhat Ban dang phat trien (The expansion of Nippo-Vietnamese economic relations). Hanoi: NXB Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1996, 312pp.

Dovert, Stéphane. "La Thaïlande prête pour le monde, ou de l'usage intensifdes étrangers dans un processus de construction nationale". In Thaïlande contemporaine. Edited by Stéphane Dovert. Bangkok-Paris: IRASEC-L'Harmattan, 2001, pp. 177–273.

Duffield, Barbara (ed.). Japanese Investment and Aid Strategies in Vietnam Implications for DevelopmentDirections. Université de Victoria, Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, 1995, 343pp.

Duong, Phu Hiep, et al., eds. "Japanese Studies in Vietnam". In JapaneseStudies in South and Southeast Asia. Japanese Studies Series 30, vol. 2, The Japan Foundation (December 1999).

Duiker, William J. "Les États-Unis et l'Indochine française, 1940–1945". In L'Indochine française, 1940–1945. Edited by Paul Isoart. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, coll. Travaux et recherches de l'Institut du droit de la paix et du développement, Université de Nice, 1982.

Elsbree, William H. Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements,1940 to1945. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press,1953, 182pp.

Franchini, Philippe., ed. Saigon1925–1945. Memoirs series, no. 17, September 1992, Paris, 261pp.

Furuta Motoo. Japanese Researchon Vietnam, in Social Science.Tokyo: University of Tokyo (January 1997).

_____, "Betonamu no Nihonzô" (L'Image du Viêt Nam au Japon). In Nihon no imeiji no Kosaku (Images mélangées du Japon). Edited by Yamauchi Masayuki. Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku Shuppankai, 1997, 268pp.

Gipouloux, François. "Un Nouvel espace économique et politique pour le Japon en Asie orientale". In TocquevilleReview 16, no. 1 (1995): 111–25.

Goscha, Christopher. "Alliés tardifs, les apports techniques des déserteurs japonais au Viêt-minh durant les premières années de la guerre francovietnamienne". In Guerresmondialeset conflitscontemporains,no. 202–203 (2002): 81–109.

Goscha, Christopher and Tachikawa Kyoichi. "Betomin to tomoni Tatakata Nihonjin" (The Japanese who fought by the side of the Viet-minh). In Gunjin Shigaku 34 (3–4) (March 2001): 218–32.

Goto Ken'ichi. Tensions of Empire. Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial & PostcolonialWorld. Singapore: Ohio University Press; Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003, 349pp.

GRIPS Development Forum. Japan's Development Cooperation in Vietnam — Supporting Broad-based Growth with Poverty Reduction. GRIPS Development forum, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. Tokyo, May 2002. Document PDF, <www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e>,32pp. (May 2004).

Guilbert, François. "Les Japonais et le Vietnam". In Relations internationales et stratégiques,no. 8 (Winter 1992): 242–56.

Havens, Thomas. Fire Acrossthe Sea, the Vietnam War and Japan 1965–1975. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, 329pp.

Hatch, Walter, et al. Asia in Japan's Embrace: Building a Regional Production Alliance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, coll. Cambridge Asia-Pacific Studies, 1996, pp. xv–281.

Holloway, Nigel., ed. Japan in Asia. Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1991, 208pp.

Institute for International Relations. Asia-Pacific and Vietnam-Japan Relations. Papers from the Second Workshop, Hanoi: 136 (20–21 September 1994).

Ishii Yoneo., ed. The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia. Translation from the Tôsen Fusetsu-gaki1674–1723. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998, 282pp.

Ishikawa Shigeru. Country Study for Japan's Official Development Assistance to the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. Tokyo: JICA, 1995, <www.jica.go.jp> (May 2004).

Ishikawa Shigeru. Sekaiginkô no Kokusai Kaihatsu Seisaku Minaoshi to Nihon no ODA (Re-examining the international development policy of the World Bank and the Japanese ODA). In Shakai Kagaku Kenkyû 53(6). Tokyo: University of Tokyo (March 2002): 25–50.

Isoart, Paul., ed. L'Indochinefrançaise, 1940–1945. Paris: Puf, coll. Travaux et recherches de l'Institut du droit de la paix et du développement, Université de Nice, 1982, 244pp.

Joyaux, François. Géopolitique de l'Extrême-Orient. In Espaceset Politiques, tome 1: 226, Frontièreset Stratégies, tome 2: 226. Bruxelles: Complexe, 1981.

Juwana Hikmahanto. "Japan's Defence Conception and its Implication for Southeast Asia". In IndonesianQuarterly 21(4) (1993): 483–94.

Kimura Hiroshi, Nguyen Duy Dung and Furuta Motoo, ed. Nihon Betonamu Kankei wo manabu hito no tame ni (For studying Japan-Vietnam relation). Tokyo: Sekai Shisô, 2000, 270pp.

Kratoska, Paul, ed. FoodSupplies and the Japanese Occupation in South-East Asia. Basingstoke (Hampshire): MacMillan, 1998, 272pp.

_____. Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006, 433pp.

Lam Peng Er, "Japan and the Spratlys Dispute: Aspirations and Limitations". In Asian Survey 36(10) (October 1996): 995–1010.

_____. "Japan's Search for a Political Role in Southeast Asia". In Southeast Asian Affairs, 1996, pp. 40–55.

Langon, Frank. "Le Japon et l'Asie. Le danger d'une nouvelle guerre froide". In Revue études internationales 30(1) (March 1999): 93–111.

Le Van Hien and Nhat Ky. Cua mot bo truong (Journal of a minister), Danang: Nha tuat Ban Da Nang, 1995. 2 volumes (vol. 1: 475 and vol. 2: 454).

Ly Toan Quan. Géopolitique du Viêt Nam, un État entre continent et mers du sud. Thèse de science politique, defended at the Sorbonne, 2000, 620pp.

Marr, David G. Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power. Berkley: University of California Press, 1997, 587pp.

Maruyama Shizuo. "Japanese Opinion and the Vietnam War". In Japan Quarterly 12(3) (July 1965): 303–10.

Mélandri, Pierre. "L'Apprentissage du leadership occidental. Les États-Unis et le monde, 1941–1949". In Relations Internationals 22 (Summer, 1980).

Mio Tadashi., ed. Indochina in Transition: Confrontation or Co-Prosperity. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1989, 256pp.

Népote, Jacques and Vienne, Marie-Sybille de. Japon. Une stratégie pour le XXIe siècle. Paris: Cahiers de Péninsule-CHEAM, 1999, 236pp.

Ngo Van. Vietnam 1920–1945. Révolution et contre-révolutions sous la domination coloniale. Paris: Nautilus, Paris, 2000, 440pp.

Nguyen The Anh. "Japanese Food Policies and the 1945 Great Famine in Indochina". In Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in South-East Asia. Edited by Paul H. Kratoska. Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1998.

Niquet, Valérie. "Chine-Japon: la montée des rivalités en Asie". In Défense nationale, 51(7) (July 1995): 123–33.

Ohno Kenichi. Global Development Strategy and Japan's ODA Policy. Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (15 October 2001), 22pp.

Oka Masamichi. "Love in the Annam Jungle". In Jay Gluck, Ukiyo, Stories of the "Floating World" of Post-war Japan. Japan: Personally Oriented Ltd, 1993, pp. 107–21.

Osborne, Milton. The Mekong, Turbulent Past, Uncertain Future. New York: Grove Press, 2000, 295pp.

Papin, Philippe. Viêt-Nam, parcours d'une nation. Paris: La Documentation française, Paris, 1999, 179pp.

Péri, Noel. "Essai sur les relations du Japon et de l'Indochine aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles". In Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient 23 (1924): 105.

Pomonti, Jean-Claude and Tertrais (Hugues). Viêt Nam, communistes et dragons. Paris: Le Monde Éditions, 1994, 210pp.

Postel-Vinay (Karoline). "L'Activité internationale des acteurs locaux au Japon et en Asie du Nord-Est". In Études du Ceri 17 (June 1996): 1–26.

_____. Le Japon et la Nouvelle Asie. Paris: presses de la fondation des sciences politiques, 1997, 128pp.

Preston, Peter Wallace. "Domestic Inhibitions to a Leadership Role for Japan in Pacific Asia". In CSA 16(4) (March 1995): 355–74.

Renouvin, Pierre. La Question d'Extrême-Orient, 1840–1940. Paris: Hachette, 1946, 442pp.

Richer, Philippe. L'Asie du Sud-Est. Indépendances et Communismes. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, coll. Notre siècle, 1981, 430pp.

_____. "L'Asie du Sud-Est. Indépendances et communismes". In Péninsule, no. 8 (Paris, 1984): 207–9.

_____. L'Asie du Sud-Est. Paris: Flammarion, coll. Dominos, Paris, 1996, 125pp.

Sacy, Alain de. Vietnam, le chagrin de la paix. Paris: Vuibert, 2002, 200pp.

Schwab, Laurent and Thiercelin (Patrice). L'Économie du Japon. Performances et Internationalisation. Nathan, coll. Économie Sciences sociales, 1990, 208pp.

Shiraishi Masaya. "La Présence japonaise en Indochine, (1940–1945)". In L'Indochine française, 1940–1945. Edited by Paul Isoart. Paris: Puf, coll. Travaux et recherches de l'Institut du droit de la paix et du développement, Université de Nice, 1982, pp. 215–41.

_____, "Phan Boi Chau in Japan". In Phan Boi Chau and the Dong Du Movement. Edited by Vinh Sinh. Boston: Conseil sur les études du Sud-Est asiatique, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, The William Joiner Center UMass/Boston, The Lac-Viet Series, 8, 1988.

_____. Japanese Relations with Vietnam 1951–1987. Ithaca-New York: Cornell University Press, 1990, 161pp.

_____. Betonomu Minzôku Undô to Nihon. Ajia, Van Boi Chau no Kakumei Shisô to taigai ninshiki (Vietnamese Nationalism and its relations with Japan and Asia. The Ideas of Phan Boi Chau on revolution and the world). Tokyo: Gannandô Shôten, 1993, 840pp.

_____. Betonamu Koka Kikô (Structure de l'État vietnamien). Tokyo: Akashi Shôten, 2000, 330pp.

_____. "A Short Essay on Scientific Exchanges Between Japan and South-East Asia". In The Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 1 (Tokyo, 2000): 9–106.

Shiraishi Takashi and Katzenstein Peter J. Network Power: Japan and Asia. New York-Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, 399pp.

Södeberg, Marie and Reader, Ian., eds. Japanese Influences and Presences in Asia. Richmond: Curzon Press, coll. NIAS, 2000, 266pp.

Soeya Yoshihide. Vietnam in Japan's Regional Policy, Vietnam Joins the World. In James Morley et Masashi Nishihara (ed.). New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, 260pp.

St. John, Ronald Bruce. "Japan's Moment in Indochina, Washington Initiative … Tokyo Success". In Asian Survey 35(7) (1995): 668–81.

Tertrais, Hugues. Asie du Sud-Est: enjeu régional ou enjeu mondial?. Paris: Gallimard, coll. Folio-Le Monde actuel, 2002, p. 280.

Tachikawa Kyoichi. Daini Sekai TaisensôtoFuransuryôIndoshina (Franco-Japanese Relations in Indochina during the Second World War). Tokyo: Sairyûsha, 2000, 347pp.

Takahashi Nobuyuki. "The Scandal of Japanese Aid to Indonesia". In Asia Times, 2 August 2002, <www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/DH02Dh01.html> (May 2004).

Tanaka Akihiho and Takeda Yasuhiro. "Japan's Economic Policy toward China and Vietnam". In The U.S.-Japan EconomicRelationshipin East and Southeast Asia. Edited by KaoruOkuizumi, Kent Calder and Gerrit Gong. Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992.

Toda Yoshiko. Nihon no Betonamujin komyuniti, Issei no Jidai, Soshite ima (The Vietnamese Community in Japan, from the first generation till today). Tokyo: Akatsukiinshôkan, 2001, 212pp.

Tran My-Van. "Japan through Vietnamese Eyes (1905–1945)". In The Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (30 March 1999): 128–29.

Truong Buu Lam. "Japan and the Disruption of the Vietnamese Nationalist Movement". In Aspectsof the Vietnamese History. Edited by Walter Fella. Hawaii Asian Studies, 8, 1973, pp. 237–69.

Tsuboi Yoshiharu. "La Diplomatie japonaise et le Vietnam, 1972–1998". In Revue études internationales 30(1) (March 1999): 85–92.

Turumi Yoshiharu. Senkyûhyakushichijûnen to Beiheiren (The Year 1970 and the peace movement in Vietnam). In Beiheiren. Edited by Makoto Oda. Tokyo: San'ichi Shôbô, 1974.

Valette, Jacques. Indochine 1945–1954, Français contre Japonais. Paris: Sedes, 1993, 505pp.

Vié, Michel. "Points de vue sur la politique extérieure du Japon entre les guerres mondiales". In Relations internationales, no. 22 (Summer 1980): 141–52.

_____, Le Japon et le Monde au XXe siècle. Paris: Masson, coll. Histoire, 1995, 303pp.

Vienne, Marie-Sybille de. L'ÉconomieduViêt-Nam(1955–1995). Paris: CHEAM, 1994, 223pp.

Vinh Sinh., ed. Phan Boi Chau and the Dong Du Movement. Boston: Counsel on Southeast Asian studies, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, The William Joiner Center UMass/Boston. The Lac-Viet Series, no. 8, 1988, 229pp.

Official Documents

Asian Development Bank (ADB), Economics and Development Resources Center, Key Indicators ofDeveloping Asian and Pacific Countries, Oxford University Press, vol. 28, 1997, 202pp.

Asian Development Bank (ADB), Annual Report 2000, Hawaii, May 2001, 284pp.

World Bank, Annual Report 1996, Washington D.C., 1996, <www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/annrep96/french/selectpd.htm> (May 2004).

International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, reference years: 1986–2000.

Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), White Paper on International Trade, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Tokyo, reference years: 1992–2000 (9 vols.).

Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), White Paper on Foreign Investment, Jetro, Tokyo, summary in English 2002, <www.jetro.go.jp> (May 2004).

République Socialiste Du Viêt Nam (RSVN), General Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook, Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi, reference years: 1986–99.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Viet Nam's Development Partners. Profiles of Co-operation Programmes, Hanoi, December 1999, 89pp.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Overview of Official Development Assistance-Vietnam, Hanoi, December 2000, 31pp.

Periodicals

Asahi Shimbun
Far Eastern Economic Review
Japan Times (The)
Nikkei Weekly (The)
Business Vietnam
Courrier du Vietnam (Le)
Economic Development Review
Saigon Times (The)
Saigon Eco
Vietnam Business Magazine
Vietnam Economic Times
Vietnam Economic News
Vietnam Investment Review
Vietnam Scoop
Vietnam Southeast Asia Today

Sites of Official Bodies

ASEAN: <http://www.ASEANsec.org>
World Bank: <http://www.worldbank.org>
IMF: <http://www.imf.org>
JETRO: <http://www.jetro.go.jp>

Asian Development Bank: <http://www.adb.org>
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan: <http://www.mofa.go.jp>
Japan Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center: <http://www.stat.go.jp>
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV): <http://www.cpv.org.vn>

Sites of Dailies and Specialised Magazines

Asia Times, Bangkok: <http://www.atimes.com>
Asiaweek: <http://www.asiaweek.com>
Economist (The): <http://www.economist.com>
FEER, Hong Kong: <http://www.feer.com>
Japan Times (The), Tokyo: <http://www.japantimes.co.jp>
Monde (le), Paris: <http://www.lemonde.fr>
South China Morning Post: <http://www.scmp.com>
Vietnam Economic Times, Hanoi: <http://www.vneconomy.com.vn>
Foreign Press Service: <http://www.nttls.co.jp/fpc/>
Asahi Shimbun: <http://www.asahi.com>
Nihon Keizai Shimbun: <http://www.nikkei.co.jp/enews/>
Yomiuri Shimbun: <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/index-e.htm>
Press Club (Review of Vietnamese daily press): <http://www.hanoipressclub.com>
Vietnam Business Journal: <http://www.viam.com>

Index